

NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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Governmental Affairs

TIME, APRIL 8, 1974

Mounting Momentum for Impeachment

It was a rough Watergate week for President Nixon. A grand jury report and a satchel of evidence on his role in the cover-up conspiracy were turned over to the House Judiciary Committee's impeachment investigators. Then, after a short delay, Nixon backed down and submitted to a subpoena for more evidence from Leon Jaworski, the persistent special prosecutor, rather than face a new, and probably losing, court battle. Almost as surely, he will soon be forced to stop resisting similar requests from the impeachment committee for more tapes and documents.

Those setbacks for the President occurred under the pressure of rising public protests from members of Congress against what appeared to them to be legalistic maneuvering by the White House to withhold evidence. Largely as a result of these tactics, impeachment sentiment was gathering momentum in the House—and even leaders of the Senate talked matter-of-factly about the probability of a trial in that chamber later this summer to determine whether Nixon shall remain in office (see box next page).

The shift in sentiment was illustrated last week by the pointed remarks of Mike Mansfield, the ever-cautious Senate Democratic majority leader. Mansfield observed: "I talk to House members, and they think the votes are there" for impeachment. This, he suggested, is partly because of "the dilatory tactics" of Nixon and his men in dealing with the Judiciary Committee, headed by New Jersey Democrat Peter Rodino. Moreover, said Mansfield, he did not want the President to resign, as suggested by Republican Conservative Senator James Buckley, and indicated little enthusiasm for any legislation granting him immunity from prosecution if he were to leave office. "This matter should take its course," Mansfield said, meaning a full Senate impeachment trial. "We should not have another Agnew situation," he added—a reference to the Vice President's being allowed to plead *nolo contendere* to income tax evasion, then to resign and be granted immunity from further federal prosecution.

Other Senators spoke in a similarly ominous vein. West Virginia's Democratic Senator Robert Byrd—a conservative whom Nixon once considered for a Supreme Court vacancy and who is highly regarded by the Southern Senators Nixon is most ardently courting—charged that the President was trying "to mislead the people and to sabotage the legitimate and constitutional impeachment inquiry." Republican Senator Howard Baker, a member of the Senate Watergate committee, declared that the "legalisms and narrow issues" adopted by Nixon had hurt rather than helped his survival chances and that he must surrender all "relevant" evidence

to the Rodino committee. One of Nixon's most vocal supporters, Senate Republican Leader Hugh Scott, has also privately warned Nixon through the President's chief Watergate counsel, James St. Clair, that the President must yield all relevant evidence.

Some other influential Senators were not ready to speak out publicly—yet. But their attitude was increasingly unsympathetic to Nixon. Said one Senate Republican: "Over the past ten days, the feeling has been pervading the Senate that there is going to be a

trial. Individual Senators are studying the impeachment process. You have trouble getting the books out of the library; they're all checked out."

At a rally of Midwestern Republican leaders in Chicago, even Vice President Gerald Ford seemed to be criticizing the President. Addressing the Watergate issue, he declared: "Never again must Americans allow an arrogant, elite guard of political adolescents like CREEP (The Committee for Re-election of the President) to bypass the regular party organization and dictate the terms of a national election."

Outwardly undaunted, Nixon continued to court a conservative constituency. He invited Mississippi Senators James Eastland and John Stennis to the White House for breakfast. He staged a ceremony for Southern Senators and Congressmen as he signed a \$100 million appropriation for Mississippi River flood-control projects. He addressed a Republican congressional dinner and hosted a farewell gathering for his departed aide Melvin Laird.

But the rising congressional impeachment pressure could not be ignored, and Nixon gave up some tactical territory. He and St. Clair had for so long resisted a request by Jaworski for 27 tapes and various documents that the special prosecutor finally issued a subpoena to get some of the documents. St. Clair first asked last Monday for a delay in the subpoena's return date, and Jaworski agreed. As the new deadline approached on Friday, Presidential Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler offhandedly announced without explanation that the subpoenaed evidence would be surrendered. The documents, dealing primarily with the use and possible abuse of Nixon campaign funds, were delivered to Jaworski in a small brown package (no U-Haul trailer was required).

Historic Turnover. The turnover of the grand jury's evidence, on the other hand, was transacted with lavish security and given all the attention of a historic event. No fewer than 22 uniformed police of the Federal Protective Services formed a double line as three members of the Rodino staff—Chief Counsel John

Doar, Minority Counsel Albert Jenner and Assistant Counsel Robert Shelton—arrived at Washington's Federal Courthouse to pick up the evidence. The crush of newsmen, however, diverted the Committee lawyers away from this protective corridor as they moved from their car up the courthouse steps. In a second-floor jury room off the chambers of Federal Judge John J. Sirica, two of Sirica's law clerks arrived with the bulging satchel (bought by the special prosecutor's office for \$37.95) containing the grand jury material.

The lawyers then examined the contents. These included a 1½-page letter from the grand jury requesting transmittal of all the evidence to the Rodino committee; a 13-page list of some 50 findings of "fact" about the President's Watergate activities; and references to tapes and documents in the briefcase that support the findings. As each reference was read by the attorneys, Todd Christofferson, Sirica's law clerk, pulled the appropriate file from the briefcase. After the two-hour check-off, Doar and Jenner signed a statement that they had received all the material cited by the grand jury.

Under elaborate rules established partly at White House insistence, only Doar, Jenner, Rodino and the Judiciary Committee's ranking Republican member, Edward Hutchinson, had immediate access to the material. All four spent hours studying it, but would not talk about its contents.

Whatever the import of the grand jury evidence, the Rodino committee is still expected to push hard for 42 other tapes that Doar and Jenner had requested from St. Clair on Feb. 25. So far, according to Ziegler, no one at the White House has even listened to these tapes or, for that matter, determined how many of them actually exist. Some are certain to be nonexistent, he indicated, because they involved meetings on Sunday, April 15. That is the date on which one conversation between Nixon and Dean was not recorded because, Nixon contends, a recorder wired into his Executive Office Building hideaway ran out of tape. Deputy Press Secretary Gerald Warren claimed that it was "a matter of court record" that tapes of ten conversations could not have been made because of this. The court records, on the contrary, show that Nixon's telephone was not hooked up to the same tapeless recorder and therefore at most only five tapes of requested conversations could logically be missing.

Both St. Clair and Ziegler have insisted that the House committee must first specify the scope of its investigation before the White House will supply any more tapes or documents. House Republican Leader John Rhodes last week endorsed one possible compromise under which St. Clair and the top Rodino staff lawyers would jointly review the requested evidence to seek agreement on what parts are relevant. If they cannot agree, the committee counsel's view would prevail. "The White House cer-

tainly should accept that," Rhodes said.

Perhaps. But relations between the White House and the committee were hardly helped by yet another Ziegler attack, this time implying that the committee was dawdling in its investigation. He suggested that the committee ought to be "working nights" to speed the inquiry. In fact, the staff has been working nights to index and digest the material that it now has. It includes some 700 documents and 19 tapes of conversations that Nixon had given Jaworski. It was only last week that the White House completed the transfer of the material to the Rodino committee staff. The committee evidence also includes testimony from the Senate Watergate committee and other congressional investi-

gations, as well as the new grand jury lode. Once all this material has been studied, the staff will brief the full Judiciary Committee on its findings.

Scandalous Conduct. Nixon sustained another blow last week when it was revealed by the *Washington Post* that former Attorney General Richard Kleindienst was bargaining with the staff of Prosecutor Jaworski to avoid indictment on a felony charge of perjury. At his confirmation hearings in the spring of 1972, Kleindienst had testified that no one at the White House had brought pressure on him in any way to influence the Justice Department's settlement of its antitrust suit against ITT. He later revealed that Nixon himself had phoned him and asked him not to

carry the case against ITT to the Supreme Court. Apparently, Jaworski's staff prosecutors are willing to let Kleindienst plead guilty to a misdemeanor rather than a felony, giving him a better chance to avoid disbarment.

Kleindienst thus could become the second Attorney General—and third Cabinet member—in the Nixon Administration to face criminal charges. John Mitchell and former Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans are already on trial in New York on one campaign funding case (see story following page). A guilty plea by Kleindienst would be another dismal record for an Administration that is breaking all precedents for scandalous official conduct.

Impeachment Timetable

The uncertainties in the historic impeachment inquiry now under way in the Congress are astronomical. But impeachment sentiment is rising, and a trial of the President in the Senate is increasingly probable. Senators and Representatives are trying to determine how and when these momentous events will unfold. Assuming that there is no protracted wrangling or unforeseen delays—a risky presumption—and that the entire process will run its full course, the following is a rough but plausible timetable:

By May 30. The House Judiciary Committee votes articles of impeachment against the President.

First Week in June. Debate on impeachment begins before the full House. Judiciary Committee Chairman Peter Rodino leads the debate, explaining each article.

Second Week in June. The debate ends, and voting begins on each article, together with any amendments.

Third Week in June. Voting is completed. Assuming that some articles are approved by a majority vote, the Senate is informed by two Representatives chosen by the House that "In the name of the House of Representatives, and of all the people of the United States, we do impeach Richard Nixon, President of the United States, of high crimes and misdemeanors in office."

Fourth Week in June. The Senate officially informs the President of his impeachment and issues a "summons" for him to appear in the Senate to respond to the articles. Nixon's representative, probably Attorney James St. Clair, appears before the Senate and asks for time to reply to the charges in writing.

Second Week in July. The President's "answer" is introduced in the Senate. The House of Representatives responds to the President's brief with a "replication"—probably a pro forma reply supporting the charges. The Senate informs Nixon's lawyers that they have about another week to prepare for trial, which will take precedence over all other Senate business.

Third Week in July. The trial begins, with Chief Justice Warren Burger presiding, and television cameras probably allowed. The House presents its evidence through six or seven "managers" selected from members of the Judiciary Committee; they are, in effect, the prosecutors. The President's lawyers have the right to cross-examine any witnesses and call rebuttal witnesses. Senators can ask questions only in writing.

Late September. The trial ends, and voting begins on each article of impeachment. The Chief Justice polls each Senator, who must vote either "guilty" or "not guilty" on each article. If two-thirds of the Senators present cast a guilty vote on any single article, the President is removed from office.

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WATERGATE

Mary McCarthy

I
It is five months now since I left the Senate Caucus Room. Helms, the former CIA director, was testifying before the Committee that Thursday—thin, elegant, debonair, the only witness insouciant enough to smoke cigarettes in the witness chair. He was followed by General Cushman, who was followed, on Friday, by General Walters, both CIA brass and beefy. The next week came Pat Gray, former Attorney General Kleindienst, and Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen, each in his own way an emotional witness, service-oriented and wearing Watergate wound-stripes. After that, the Committee went home for what was left of the summer—high time.

Something had happened, probably during the Ehrlichman week, to destroy the "spirit of wonderful unanimity" of which Senator Ervin had spoken so feelingly during the early stages of the tapes confrontation. When the Committee resumed hearings in the fall, it was more disunited than ever. There have been reports and rumors of fighting within the staff between majority and minority appointees, of dissatisfaction with Sam Dash, but these internal troubles may be mere localized symptoms of a general collapse. At the height of its success, seemingly in the prime of life, the Committee behaved like a broken man, and the public was quick to sense this and demonstrate boredom. The lie put about by the Nixon people during the exciting, electrifying months of June and July, that the public was fed up with the hearings and all the coverage, in due time became true.

Those who watched on television during late September (I was no longer in America) said the low point came when Patrick Buchanan, the White House speech writer, was able to make fools of the senators. For me, the low point had come before that, in the failure to call Colson to testify. Colson was a key figure, in my view the key figure who could have unlocked the mystery, if there really is one, of who ordered the Watergate break-ins. Though he was not Liddy's sponsor (that was Egil Krogh), he had gone out of channels to press for action on the Liddy project, back in February, when the other principals—Mitchell, Dean, Magruder—were dragging their feet.

That is, if Jeb Magruder can be believed. The master of dirty tricks had called Magruder one evening "and asked me, in a sense, would we get off

the stick and get the budget approved for Mr. Liddy's plans, that we needed information, particularly on Mr. O'Brien." Unfortunately for Magruder, Fred LaRue, who he said was present during this conversation, had no recollection of it. Yet Dean accepted Magruder's word that there had been pressure on him from Colson and not just on that one occasion. Dean had the impression that Colson was on Magruder's neck.

And even if one wonders about Magruder, there is the fact that it was Colson who detailed Howard Hunt, his employee and long-time protégé, to work on the Gemstone operation with Liddy and McCord, giving him time off from his own projects. Colson denied McCord's assertion that he had had prior knowledge of Gemstone and was supported by Hunt in an affidavit sworn to on April 5, 1973. Then, appearing before the Committee in September, Hunt changed his story: he did remember one or more conversations with Colson about the Liddy plans and in fact remembered telling him back in January 1972 of his intention to recruit the same team of Cuban-Americans he and Liddy had used in the burglary of Ellsberg's psychiatrist. With the addition of the Cubans to the original nucleus, the Watergate break-in became operational.

Of all Nixon's counselors, Colson thus appears to have been not only the most zealous in pushing for Gemstone but also—a further sign of zeal—the most familiar with the mode and staffing of the operation. McCord testified that a typewritten step-by-step plan for the break-in, which Hunt showed him in his office, was being taken, he understood, to show Colson. This was more than a conjecture.

... at one point, he held this plan in his hands, and his words were, he interjected the name of Mr. Colson into the conversation at that point, words to the effect, "I will see Colson." And he held the paper in his hand in this sense. From that statement, I drew the conclusion that he was going to see Mr. Colson and discuss our giving him the operational plan.

If Mitchell ever got any such blueprints or was aware of a Cuban component in the personnel, no witness has been able to say so. The same with Haldeman. Nobody, not even Magruder, has claimed that the Gemstone memos Haldeman received through Strachan contained any programmed "specifics." Possibly this is just a difference of

temperament: Colson eager and pushy, the others prudent and incurious.

The Senate panel's excuse for not calling Colson when hearings resumed late in September was that they had heard him in executive session, where he had taken the Fifth Amendment on every question put to him. Even so, the Committee might have let the public see him take it, in response to counsel's questions: "I refuse to answer on the ground of self-incrimination," "I refuse to answer," "I refuse to answer," "I refuse..." He would have been the only witness before the Committee to take the Fifth in open session. Liddy had invoked it in executive session, just as he had refused to take the stand in his own defense in Judge Sirica's court. In jail he has maintained his silence, though he could bargain his way out if he would talk. The Colson-Liddy axis represents the irreducible hard core of resistance to investigation of Watergate, as on another plane does Nixon himself. It would have been educational for the public to watch the spectacle (martyrdom, he would have called it) of the recusant Colson in the Caucus Room and draw the analogies.

A second (or third) low point was reached in October when Senator Ervin, summoned from New Orleans to the Oval Office, agreed to the so-called Stennis compromise, by which Nixon would give the tapes to Senator Stennis, an ancient, infirm, Southern reactionary, to listen to and check against the summaries the White House would furnish the Committee. Senator Baker, found in Chicago, agreed too, but this was not surprising since Baker for some time had been inching toward the Administration, having concluded (I would assume) that that was the winning side. The shock was Sam Ervin. Even though he soon retracted his agreement, declaring that the compromise had been misrepresented to him (he had understood that the Committee would get transcripts, not summaries, and had been allowed to think that Archie Cox had accepted the compromise), he sounded unlike himself, befuddled and vague. How could the old man, looking benign and dreamy in that Oval Office rogues' gallery, have welcomed a Trojan horse into his so long and stoutly defended territory? A country lawyer looks a gift horse in the mouth.

The answer, I am afraid, is that most men have a fatal weakness or—to stay in Troy—an Achilles heel, and Nixon had found Ervin's. Ervin is a hawk. We had forgotten or all but forgotten it in our affection for his love of liberty,

Shakespeare, and the Bill of Rights. But Nixon had not. When the Stennis compromise was proposed, the Middle East crisis was at its height, a confrontation with the Soviets was looming, and the White House played on the old warrior's patriotic sentiments, emphasizing the need for national unity in the impending showdown. Ervin succumbed. Well, every good man pays for his sins, and Senator Sam paid for a lifetime of being a hawk; he was diminished in the public eye and probably in his own. The sudden loss of his heroic stature made him seem pathetic, a deflated windbag still tiresomely huffing and puffing.

Yet one would have to have a very short memory to join the ravens dining on his flesh. The Ervin Committee served the country well in an emergency, and if it has now outlived its function, that is hardly a reason for minimizing what it did. Rather the contrary: the proof that it served its purpose is that it is now regarded as obsolete. The accomplishments of the Committee can be measured by asking ourselves where we would be today if it had never held hearings. Nixon would be nowhere near impeachment or resignation if the tapes had not caught him in their toils, and we might never have known of their existence without the Ervin Committee—if a junior staff member, routinely questioning Alexander Butterfield, had not chanced to ask the right question.

And it was a passage in John Dean's testimony before the Committee that had led Donald Sanders, the deputy minority counsel, to put the question to Butterfield: Dean had got the feeling, he said, that his April 15, 1973, conversation with Nixon was being taped. Perhaps Archie Cox and his staff would have uncovered, in time, the same information, but that is not sure. Moreover, without the Ervin Committee, Cox, Richardson, and Ruckelshaus would no doubt still be in place: the Saturday night massacre grew out of the Butterfield disclosure. Indeed, without the Ervin Committee, there might never have been a Special Prosecutor Cox to fire.

The tapes have always been the crux of the case against Nixon, and the public has always understood that, despite the pleas of liberal editorialists who begged for greater *seriousness*, concentration on the main issues, compared to which the tapes were a childish distraction, trivial sensational stuff out of a whodunit. The fear that the tapes would be tampered with, based on ordinary common sense, has been with the public since the very first day. The only wonder is that they were not destroyed altogether and then

declared to be "missing," like the two under subpoena that the White House now says were never made. Why eight erasures in the eighteen-and-a-half-minute gap? Why not rub the whole thing out? Nixon believes that there is material favorable to him in what remains of that June 20 "meeting" with Haldeman, but how can scraps of a conversation exonerate him when the surrounding parts have been obliterated? The public, unlike Senator Hugh Scott, is not such a fool, which is why, as Nixon's spokesmen now state frankly, the public must never be allowed to see them.

That the pursuit of the tapes was chasing after a will-o'-the-wisp is something else. It took no prophetic gift to foresee that even if captured they would not tell us what was on them, for the simple reason that they would not be permitted to. But the handling of the sought-after tapes by Nixon and his aides has told us a great deal or, rather, has confirmed our suspicions that something here is not kosher. Mr. Kalmbach, to quote Tony Ulasewicz. The handling has turned suspicion into the nearest approximation to certainty one can have outside of signed confessions by Nixon and his associates.

Of course there are still those who can believe that the tape erasures were accidental, that by bad luck the June 20 telephone conversation with John Mitchell was never recorded because the call was made on an extension not connected with the automatic recording system, that during the April 15 conversation with John Dean in the Oval Office the equipment, owing to another accident, was "malfunctioning" or had an "inadequacy." Such people will not ask why Nixon and Mitchell were talking on another extension, i.e. a "secure phone," three days after the break-in: there could be a lot of innocent explanations, e.g., that

*The hypothesis published in *Science* magazine—that the panel of six experts appointed by Judge Sirica failed to take account of the possibility of electrical failure of a component in Rose Mary Woods's machine—may in fact clear up this little mystery. As the author of the *Science* article, Nicholas Wade, writing in *The Washington Post* in answer to Joseph Alsop, points out, the Dektar hypothesis, even if proved right, would still leave the eighteen-and-a-half-minute gap or continuous buzz to be explained. How did that happen? Someone must have held the machine on "Record" for eighteen and a half minutes, thereby effecting the erasure. One big erasure, rather than eight little ones. If you accept Rose Mary Woods's explanation, that she accidentally pressed the Record button and kept her foot on the pedal during a five-minute telephone call, you are left with thirteen and a half minutes of unaccountable buzz.

Nixon, when the Mitchell call came, was answering a call of nature. Yes: It makes me think of the old joke about the jealous Frenchman wanting solid proofs of his wife's infidelity: at last he catches her in bed with a lover, and his friend, to whom he relates the story, says "*Eh bien, enfin!*" but the husband shakes his head sadly—"*Toujours ce doute.*" Anybody who is satisfied that the tape erasures and the missing tapes prove nothing would probably not be satisfied by Mr. Nixon's signature on a full confession and ask for handwriting tests, medical certificates stating that he had not been drugged or hypnotized.

Naturally, it would be a help if Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Mitchell, and Colson—or any one of them—were to turn state's evidence, and if Nixon falls we shall certainly hear more from some of them. There will be a scramble to shift responsibility; like a football, from one member of the former team to another and back to the old quarterback, who was calling the signals. But to hope that these men, singly or in unison, will talk and bring about Nixon's fall is nearly as foolish as the hope that the tapes would talk. The tapes have talked, by now, to the maximum (one guesses) of their ability; they have told us that someone with access to them—and that cannot be John Dean—is afraid of them. But then Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Mitchell, and the others have also talked; we heard them before the Ervin Committee proclaim their guilt by open equivocation and manifest lying. Though they left us to speculate on the degree of guilt in each case, they all plainly told us that they were afraid that the knowledge they carried inside them would inadvertently slip out.

The great service of the Ervin Committee was to show these men to the nation as they underwent questioning—something that would not have been possible in a court of law, where TV is not admitted. That the questioning was not always of the best, that leads were not always followed up, is minor in comparison. The self-righteous, pedantic tone adopted by some mournful analysts writing in liberal magazines, the triumphant pouncing on sins of omission by the hard-worked senators; are unpleasant reminders of the persistent puritanism and Zeal-of-the-Land Busyness in our national character. The Ervin Committee was not out to convict the witnesses before it, to nail down their testimony with expert ringing blows, but to give us a basis for judging them and the Administration they served. Who can deny that it did that?

What emerged from the hearings and emerges even more clearly from the

transcripts as they are published, with appendices (eleven volumes now), by the Government Printing Office is an overwhelming case for impeachment and conviction. To my mind, there can be no doubt that Nixon himself ordered Watergate and was kept informed of the cover-up, which of course he did not need to order—as the testimony repeatedly brought out, the necessity of a cover-up was taken for granted as soon as news of the arrests reached the Nixon organization. Nobody had to order it; it happened by itself and was inherent in the break-in. A covert operation is covered before it gets off the ground, and the process continues mechanically to the bitter end, which is where we seem to be now. The mystery is not in the cover-up—who took part and how. They *all* took part, each in his own capacity: the money-raisers raised money; the petty bureaucrats shredded; the big bureaucrats got on the telephone to switch off the FBI investigation. Everybody (with two exceptions) stood ready, if called upon, to commit perjury; nobody talked. The mystery lies in the original decision—who made it and under what circumstances?

Without prejudice, let us tick them off. *Mitchell*. He is the White House candidate, but that does not entitle us to rule him out of consideration. In favor of the Mitchell hypothesis is the fact that he was in charge at CREEP, out of which the conspiracy operated. Nobody in CREEP but he had the authority to order it—certainly not his deputy, Magruder, acting on his own. And, according to Magruder, Mitchell did order it, at Key Biscayne, on March 30. The date, if not the fact, is confirmed by other testimony. According to McCord, early in March the operation had not been funded; roughly a month later it was. All through March McCord was weighing the decision of whether or not to accede to Liddy and sign on; it took him thirty days to make up his mind, and during these same thirty days (Liddy told him) "... the whole matter was being considered and reconsidered by Mr. Mitchell."

Robert Reisner, Magruder's deputy, remembers Magruder saying to him, "Call Liddy and tell him it is approved." He is uncertain of the exact date but feels it must have been around the end of the month since Magruder gave Liddy the first two weeks in April to get ready. Gordon Strachan, Haldeman's deputy, says Magruder reported to him on March 31 or April 1 that a \$300,000 "sophisticated intelligence-gathering plan" had been approved at Key Biscayne. Just before or just after April 7, according to Hugh Sloan, Liddy came to him with a

sheet of paper representing a \$250,000 budget on which he would soon be wanting "substantial cash payment." All this argues that if the decision was not made at Key Biscayne on March 30 (LaRue says it was not), it was made within the next day or two, and who could have done that but Mitchell?

Yet it does not sound like Mitchell. Magruder and Dean, who had been present at the two earlier meetings, both described Mitchell's very negative, pipe-puffing responses. At Key Biscayne, he was still "reluctant" (Magruder), "not enthusiastic" (LaRue). Gemstone in any of its avatars was not in Mitchell's style. Dean says the Attorney General "was not interested at all" in its predecessor, Operation Sand-wedge, when it was presented. Nor can that dour realist have cared much for Liddy, an exotic product of Ehrlichman's brain work. Liddy and his plan were a bitter pill he had to swallow and, in the hearing-room, almost visibly spat out. McCord, who was not privy to the ins and outs of Gemstone's reception, gave his estimate of how it must have gone.

I knew from previous contact with him that he was a very decisive man, that he did not agonize over decisions, and yet apparently he took this one under careful consideration and considered it for some thirty days in making the decision, and frankly, I had it, my conclusion was that he took it as well to higher authority and got a final approval from his superior before embarking on this task.

Again the sense of duress. Despite Mitchell's insistent denials, there is plenty of evidence to show that he was aware of Watergate before the morning of June 17, whether or not he had approved it, but everything points to a disgruntled, unwilling awareness. And the new awareness, coming to him late last March, of his now being set up as the "goat" for Watergate, must have increased his bile. If of all Nixon's counselors you were the one who was a hold-out on Watergate, what a mockery, what an irony to sit in exile and bitterly savor. In the Caucus Room, he was steeped in irony, like some horrible dark and yet congenial decoction brewed in his private still. If, against his better judgment, he did authorize Watergate, he evidently had not conceived it.

Dean. He did not have the authority, and all the arguments against Mitchell's having been the "father" of Watergate would apply to Mitchell and Dean working together. If somehow he was behind Gemstone, pushing the plan forward despite Mitchell's resistance, it

must have been as somebody else's representative and courier—in his characteristic messenger role. But what powerful figure could have deputized him to flit behind the scenes? His chief friend, Krogh, had no more power than he. Against Dean, however, is the fact, heavily underlined by Senator Gurney and Minority Counsel Thompson, that he had "recommended" Liddy to Mitchell, "introduced" him to the Committee to Re-elect. True, he had accompanied Liddy on his maiden appearance at the CREEP offices, and, true, he had recommended Liddy to Mitchell for the post of General Counsel. But he was only passing on his friend Krogh's recommendation, and the transfer of Liddy to CREEP had been approved by Ehrlichman when Dean brought him to the office and introduced him to Magruder, his new boss. Unlike Dean, Ehrlichman had previous experience with Liddy, having kept him on his staff and used him (with Hunt) for the burglary of Dr. Fielding's office. Ehrlichman hated Mitchell and vice versa.

Two other counts against Dean as the author or main abettor of Watergate should be mentioned. First, the fact vouched for by Magruder (and by Magruder only) that in the fall of 1971, before the advent of Liddy, "some people in the White House" had been keen on an intelligence-gathering project: when asked to specify, the only name he could remember was John Dean. Finally, Dean had urged Magruder to try to stay on terms with Liddy after a falling-out. Dean did not deny this, but it scarcely constitutes proof of eagerness on his part to bring Watergate to fruition. He was a natural smoother-over, and, in any case, Strachan testified that Dean had been acting on Haldeman's instruction.

At worst, these small "damning" facts only show that Dean had more prior information about Watergate than he has admitted to. They might also show, however, that Dean, from the start, was being used as the unconscious agent of other people anxious to remain invisible: if the Liddy project went sour, only Dean could be seen as instrumental in recommending it, performing the right introductions, smoothing its course...

Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Either or both had the power—if not technically the authority—to override Mitchell's objections and direct Magruder to proceed with Gemstone. Or Haldeman alone, invoking the presidential sanction, could have forced the recalcitrant Mitchell to initial the budget; from Ehrlichman, Mitchell would probably not have accepted that. There is a faint possibility, which gets some tenu-

ous support from Robert Reisner's testimony to communications between Magruder and Liddy, that the operation had *already* been approved by somebody not Mitchell when Magruder flew down to Key Biscayne, in other words that Mitchell's signature was a formality that could be dispensed with if need be. Yet Gemstone, at least to my mind, does not sound like a conception that could have originated with Haldeman and Ehrlichman, though it is closer to their spirit than to Mitchell's.

Even if it could not be traced to them in the event of failure, they would surely have had their doubts about the public-relations aspect of such an adventure, were the press to get hold of it. A simple CIA workhorse like Jim McCord could be persuaded that a break-in at Democratic National Committee headquarters was in the interests of national security, but Haldeman and Ehrlichman, whatever their private convictions, would scarcely have seen national security as a plausible public defense for a job against the opposition party.

There is very strong evidence that Haldeman, at least, knew that a plan for electronic surveillance was in the works, but knowing and advocating are not the same thing. Probably he and Ehrlichman, assuming they both knew, kept their fingers crossed throughout May and early June. If the operation got results, so much the better; if it failed, old John Mitchell would be left holding the bag. Apprehension, on their part, must have mingled with amusement—the amusement anticipating Mitchell's grim predicament if Liddy's men got caught. This would account for Haldeman's "mellow mood" on the morning of June 20 when he checked into the office, fresh from Florida, where he had been during the break-in. Gordon Strachan went in to see him, "scared to death," fully expecting to be fired for having failed to reach his boss over the weekend and report to him on Magruder and the Gemstone connection. Instead, Haldeman greeted him "half jokingly" with "Well, what do we know about the events of the weekend?" and calmly perused the file Strachan handed him.

Colson. More likely, in all but one respect, than any of the preceding. When he heard of the break-in on his return from the Philippines, Dean's first thought, he testified, was "Colson." Asked to explain that reaction, he mentioned the Brookings Institution burglary by fire-bombing—a typical Colson project that he himself, by flying to California, had managed to avert. In addition, he had remembered Colson's friendliness with Hunt. Dean

was not the only member of the White House staff to have the name "Colson" rise out of the cloudy incident like a genie issuing from a bottle. Ehrlichman, on the telephone, as soon as Dean got back to his desk in Washington Monday morning, the nineteenth, told him "to find out what Colson's involvement was in the matter." If that instruction was given in good faith and not merely placed on the record, it shows that Ehrlichman, far from being on the inside track about Watergate, was guessing like anybody else. In any case, it was an easy guess. After being debriefed by Liddy, Mardian thought so too. On its face, Watergate looked like pure Colson.

There was only one catch: did he have the power to authorize it? The call to Magruder urging him "to get off the stick" seems to prove that he did not. That was an entreaty, not an order. The best Colson could do for Gemstone was to keep after Magruder in the hope that it would go through. If he was the mastermind, he must have had an ally more powerful than himself who interposed to put an end to shilly-shallying.

Nixon. By elimination, we arrive at the only suspect who had the power to authorize Watergate, and character traits to match. Unless we say "Nixon," we are forced to conclude that nobody authorized Watergate, that the directive to fund Liddy and his co-conspirators came to Magruder from a supernatural agency, identified by some with Mitchell, by some with Haldeman, by some with Colson, and by Mitchell probably with the President.

II

It remains to try to analyze how and by what stages and through whom the presidential will was implemented. Here we are in the dark, and Dean, our only guide, is in the dark too. He does not know where the plan for electronic surveillance of the opposition party (as opposed to traditional spying) originated and he offers no conjecture.

Something happened, he thinks, between December 10, 1971, when Liddy went to work at CREEP, and January 27, when he showed his charts on an easel in the Department of Justice, with Mitchell, Magruder, and Dean watching in utter astonishment. The plan for intelligence-gathering on demonstrators discussed at the time of Liddy's hiring, to occupy only a small part of his time (2 to 5 percent, Hugh Sloan understood), had undergone a wondrous change. In the January 27 plan, the demonstrators are still there (to be kidnapped and held in Mexico till the Republican convention, then slated for San Diego, was over), but the main activity, inflated and grandiose, with a bugged yacht, call girls, and

blackmail, now centers on the Democratic convention at Miami.

In the scaled-down second presentation of February 4, the demonstrators have disappeared, and instead, as a sideshow to the big anti-Democratic attraction, there is a burglary of Hank Greenspun's safe in Nevada with a Howard Hughes plane standing by to fly the burglars to a Central American haven once the job is completed. In the final, Key Biscayne version, again no demonstrators, and nothing more is heard of them as the Watergate scheme develops except as *justification* given to McCord and the Cubans for entering Democratic headquarters to plant bugs on telephones and photograph papers. The Latin American theme (perhaps Hunt's leitmotiv) persists, though pinnissimo: in the end it is just money that is spirited to Mexico to be laundered.

Thus the rational basis for Liddy's employment was quickly subordinated to irrational elements and soon vanished from sight. For the Republicans to be concerned about having their convention broken up by demonstrators (as had happened in Chicago to the Democrats in 1968) was perfectly natural and even sensible; to infiltrate antiwar groups would be Standing Operating Procedure and an old habit with the FBI. That Nixon was unwilling to leave the handling of left-wing protesters to the FBI and the police was not quite so sensible but understandable, in view of his feud with J. Edgar Hoover and his general dissatisfaction with the ordinary repressive agencies of government. He wanted his own spies, paid by his own campaign people and under their supervision.

What is strange is that once this function was added to CREEP's administrative structure no more heed was paid to it, and it was allowed to atrophy, as though the expensive charms of electronic surveillance were too wonderful to be wasted on dime-a-dozen left-wingers. With the dynamic Liddy and his vision in the pay of CREEP, somebody, singular or plural, was tempted to divert this "capability" from powerless antiwar groups—who were only a nuisance—to the still powerful opposition party. In this broader perspective, the demonstrators were even seen to have a certain utility, particularly if they could be linked to the Democrats. Dean, a reasonable and pacific young man who well understood the realities of the demonstrator problem (he had won credit as the Justice Department negotiator with the leaders of the big protest march on Washington in 1969), was baffled by the sudden delusion of grandeur implicit in the Liddy charts. Mitchell, for his part, on each presentation, kept growling, in effect: "What about the demonstrators? What about

our security? Why isn't this fellow working on that?"

Several times in his testimony, Dean returned to the incredible transformation that, in the space of a month and a half, had overtaken a project with which he thought he was familiar. "That has always been one of the great mysteries to me, between the time he [Liddy] went over there... what happened between December 10 and January 27, and my conception of what his responsibilities were and possibly his own and others' conception dramatically changed." His mystification continued and embraced the whole sequence of events right up to June 17. He had thought the plan was dead after January 27. When it resurfaced on February 4, he was alarmed enough to go to inform Haldeman. After this, he was told no more of Gemstone till he was called upon for his services in the cover-up: "I have never been clear on what happened between February and June 17." All he could say was that "someone wanted the operation."

Obviously this puzzlement of his may be specious. While admitting large responsibility in the cover-up, he may want to dissociate himself in so far as he can from the planning of the break-in. That possibility must be kept in mind, and yet it seems undeniable that on January 27 both he and Mitchell were taken completely by surprise. Could they have been deceived from the outset as to Liddy's functions? Was "intelligence-gathering on demonstrators" a cover under which the former Plumber was slipped into Mitchell's territory, with Dean, all unknowing, acting as his escort? The idea of electronic surveillance may have been in the White House air throughout the fall of 1971—the offspring of group-think with no acknowledged paternity—and Liddy may have been chosen and sent over to CREEP to try it out on Mitchell. When Mitchell refused, then the pressure slowly built up, White House desire for the project mounting as frustration was encountered.

The only evidence, though, for such a supposition comes from Magruder. According to him, Liddy, early in December, on his first days at work, was already talking of a \$1 million broad-gauged intelligence plan that had White House approval. But of all the witnesses before the panel the self-seeking Magruder is the most suspect, and in any case Liddy may merely have been boasting. The "something" that happened between December 10 and January 27 (assuming Dean is right that a new factor then entered) may have been simply Liddy. He had found, ready to hand, guarded by Sloan and Porter, the pot of gold at the end of his dream rainbow.

CREEP's campaign money, seemingly unlimited, may well have been the stimulus that set his brain working (who but he could have named the operation "Gemstone"?), and even before his charts had been submitted to Mitchell he had discovered a receptive audience back in the White House.

It is not hard to accept Dean's puzzlement as genuine. Both he and the unimaginative Mitchell lacked the quality of "vision" and were incapable of grasping that what had been added to CREEP with the accession of Liddy was a new potential for transforming cash into power. In the unexplored field of electronics as a campaign accessory, Nixon and his corporate backers would have a clear advantage, almost a monopoly, since the Democrats were in no position to finance million-dollar bugging experiments, so poor in fact that they were defenseless against enemy bugging—Larry O'Brien guessed that his headquarters were being tapped but could not afford to hire his own team of experts to find and de-activate the bugs.

Dean and Mitchell, thinking along traditional lines, were too short-sighted to see that this unique advantage, which could outweigh the Democratic numbers (the country was still basically Democratic), should not be lightly discarded because of the risk element. Liddy ought to be given a trial, an initial dry run, to show what he could deliver. Unable to look at it this way, with an open mind, they were at a loss when Liddy appeared, apparently as a missionary from some quarter, discouraged by orders to "burn that stuff," obediently cutting down his budget requirements (as though the price tag was the problem), indefatigably proselytizing, like a Jehovah's Witness who has got one foot in the door. Who had sent him, what could be behind him, they hardly dared speculate.

And yet "someone wanted the operation" or, in Mitchell's idiom, "somebody obviously was very interested." At Key Biscayne, the former Attorney General must have drawn a terrible conclusion: it could only be Nixon. Hence his spleen and misery. He was frightened by the project, frightened by Liddy, and frightened by the advice the President evidently was getting from an undetermined familiar. His suspicions must have veered angrily back and forth between Colson and Haldeman, touched on Ehrlichman and reluctantly withdrawn. Since he has the primal virtue of loyalty, he would not have let himself blame the President: those damnable others had got at him.

He may have been told, straight out, and still half-refused to believe. One

can imagine the telephone call to Florida, say on March 31. Haldeman: "The President wants this, John. I sympathize with your reservations, but what can we do? He wants it." Or else Colson: "John, get your ass moving. That's an order from You-Know-Who. If you don't like it, put Jeb on it." Mitchell, setting down the receiver, was maybe trying to persuade himself that the caller was lying—pretending to speak for the President but really pushing his own merchandise. In that case, why not ask to hear it from Nixon directly? But that was something Mitchell was not going to risk. As long as he did not ask the President, he could retain a doubt.

It may even be true that to this day he has refrained from asking. His categorical statement that he never discussed Watergate with the President, which the senators found inconceivable, was quite possibly a fact, though the reasons he gave (the "White House horror stories," "lowering the boom," and so on) were obviously fictitious. As so often happened in his testimony, Mitchell's weary lies and justifications did not seek to convince, which was perhaps astute on his part: if the senators did not believe his explanations, they did not believe the astonishing fact he was stating, which from his point of view was just as well.

To go back to Key Biscayne. When Mitchell recognized, before, during, or after the March 30 meeting, that he could not stop Gemstone, he capitulated. But not gladly. His "I am tired of hearing it... let's not discuss it any further" (if that is what he said to Magruder) defined his position. His lack of stomach for the enterprise was evident in his subsequent behavior, which, stopping just short of total non-cooperation, must have appeared strange to others in the CREEP office. He left Magruder in charge of whatever Liddy was up to and gave him sole authority over the moneys dispensed to him.

When Hugh Sloan, worried, begged Finance Chairman Maurice Stans to get Mitchell's sanction for the first outside payment (\$83,000) on what Liddy said was an approved \$200,000 budget, Stans drew a laconic answer: "Tell him to ask Magruder. He has the responsibility." It was after this colloquy that Stans told Sloan, who wondered what the money was for, "I don't want to know, and you don't want to know." Mitchell swears he never saw the Gemstone material placed in his file by Magruder. If "never saw" means "never looked at," that may well be true. It would be Mitchell's way of demonstrating that he knew in advance (and he was right, apparently) that the material would be worthless.

If the spongy surrounding tissue of

lies can be cut away (which is now possible for a reader of the transcript), much of the testimony by Mitchell and about him becomes believable. Once you accept the hypothesis that Mitchell knew (or feared) that Nixon had ordered Gemstone, nearly everything falls into place. Even his sour jests about wishing that he had shot certain people, wishing that he had thrown Liddy out of the Department of Justice window. The trouble was, he couldn't, but those are the wishes you entertain, cheerful murder dreams, when you sit by yourself, powerless, watching the fools take over. His exclamation (reported by LaRue) on getting the news of the break-in—"This is incredible!"—sums up with explosive sincerity his feelings on the subject or, as he would say, on the subject matter. Incredible from the beginning and incredible in the finale. That they should have let themselves get caught was predictable, but that McCord should have been with them! The CREEP security officer! It blew your mind.

Mitchell testified that he had taken no part in the cover-up. Few believed him, but it was probably half true and it expressed a whole truth of feeling: he wanted no part of the cover-up. Probably he had as little faith in the abilities of the cover-up activists as he had had in Liddy's capacities. John Dean had some sparks of judgment, but he was busy being a messenger boy for the others. Mitchell trusted only his own people: Mardian and LaRue. And to be forced to cover up for a crazy action that you had opposed from the outset was a bit much. In trying to cover up, you might be digging yourself in deeper.

Yet there was his loyalty to the President to remember, there was the election, and there was the fact that the faithful LaRue was being dragged into the business of paying hush money to the defendants and Mardian had been drafted into the role of Liddy's legal adviser, among other uncongenial Watergate-related tasks. Under the circumstances, Mitchell could not refuse to lend a hand. Though his opposition to Gemstone had probably cost him the President's friendship, he carried on.

He seems to have drawn the line, though, at hush money. Somebody, no doubt, had to pay it, but let them use White House funds and not come to him about it. The last time anyone tried to enlist his help in pay-offs was in February, 1973, when his old friend Richard Moore was dispatched to New York by Haldeman and Ehrlichman, in the unlikely hope that Mitchell could be persuaded to raise money for "lawyers' fees" from "his rich New York friends." Mitchell's answer: "Tell

them to get lost." On March 21, LaRue was worrying about a \$75,000 payment he had been directed to make to Hunt's lawyer. This was a large sum, the largest he had paid out yet, and he hesitated to use his own judgment on whether or not to make the delivery. At Dean's suggestion, he called Mitchell, "and he told me that he thought I ought to pay it." This can be construed as authorization (Mitchell, then, making an exception to the sour rule he had set himself), but it can also be construed as private worldly advice given to an old friend who had come to him for counsel. Anyway, that White House money was not Mitchell's lookout; it came out of a cash fund Haldeman had been holding to be used "for polling purposes."

Yet for all his disgust and rancor, Mitchell, being human, must have blamed himself as well as the others for the Watergate fiasco. Against any nominee but McGovern, it could have cost Nixon the election, and Mitchell, in that eventuality, would have had plenty of cause for self-reproach. If he had not stubbornly declined to know anything about Gemstone, if he had not left it strictly to Magruder, in short if he had not been so unyielding, the burglars might still have been caught, but there would have been no Jim McCord among them. Nor, if Mitchell had had any say, would a White House telephone number have been found in two of the Cubans' address books or sequenced CREEP bills in their pockets. So, at any rate, he may have argued "in hindsight," and here another bit of his testimony suddenly fits into the puzzle and assumes a truthful look. On June 20, he spoke with the President, for the first and only time, about Watergate. You could hardly call it a discussion, since Mitchell was talking and Nixon was listening. Mitchell says he apologized to the President for not running a tighter ship: "I think I made it quite clear to him that I hadn't exercised sufficient control over the activities of all the people in the Committee."

That this was all Mitchell had to say on the matter to the Chief Executive struck most people as unbelievable, positively grotesque. Yet it was about all he could say in the circumstances: he was sorry he had not kept his eye on Gemstone, sorry he had left Magruder to handle it, sorry he had let his opposition to the project get the better of him. . . . The tape of that conversation is "missing," but we can assume that Nixon's response was icy. No wonder the call was short.

If we accept that the impetus for Watergate came from Nixon, still it must have been communicated through a channel or channels. Someone besides Nixon was active in promoting the plan. Mitchell, in his testimony

threw out a few morose hints as to who that might have been, but he would not be more definite. "You can almost take your pick of quite a number of such influences." The obvious choice is Colson. Magruder is a possibility, though mainly because of his eagerness to divert suspicion elsewhere—onto Colson, among others. He authorized the funds, without reference to Mitchell, and he was very much up-to-the-minute on the break-in program. When Liddy called him, on the morning of June 17 in the Beverly Hills Hotel in Los Angeles, he came back from the telephone to the breakfast table and said in an aside to LaRue, "You know, I think maybe last night was the night they were going into the Democratic National Committee." But if he was getting orders from the Oval Office and feeding information back, it seems inconceivable that somebody was not acting as liaison—impossible to picture Nixon stepping into a pay phone booth, depositing a dime, and asking for "Jeb." But this sends us back to wondering about Haldeman; Magruder was an old Haldeman boy.

From some of Dean's notes written at Camp David and from remarks he made to the President, it sounds as if for a time Dean had suspected Gordon Strachan of being the principal agent or intermediary. But either this suspicion had been dropped in his ear by Magruder (status rivalry: he had been Strachan's boss in Haldeman's office and now at CREEP he was getting orders from him), or "Strachan" was a pseudonym for the big boss, Haldeman, since of all the figures we have been discussing the thin high-voiced Strachan was the most powerless. But by the time of the hearings Dean had dropped Strachan or "Strachan" and seemed to be inclining toward Colson. One wonders whether, by now, the thought of Nixon as the prime mover is turning over in his mind.

Colson, Haldeman, Haldeman, Colson—the Moving Finger writes and, having writ, erases; the needle wavers; maybe the daisies can tell. It is a count-out game. But one thing is sure: Nixon cannot be counted out. Senator Baker's "searching" question, "What did the President know and when did he know it?" could not be more incongruous. Ask when an arch-conspirator first heard of his conspiracy or when our wicked Creator got news of this wicked world.

III

Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to examine the circumstances out of which Watergate emerged. The crucial date was probably June 1971. The publication of the Pentagon Papers was a turning-point for Nixon. At that moment, maybe at that instant, he

went around the bend, from normal politics (however dirty and ruthless) to the politics of irrationality. There had been premonitory signs. Already, in the spring of 1971, the installation of the White House monitoring system pointed in the direction of Watergate, and the Huston internal-security plan of the summer of 1970 was another road-indicator. Both of these measures were well-guarded secrets, and it was Watergate, significantly, that finally released them, along with a great deal of other material that had been kept from public scrutiny.

The monitoring system and the Huston plan were directed, in their different ways, at a much tighter control of the environment and both were designed to make use of modern, up-to-date technology. An infatuation with the latest technology apparently went hand in hand with a passion for secrecy: according to John Dean, Tom Huston (whose hero was Cato the Younger) had a scrambler telephone locked in a safe beside him—he sounds like a more highly educated Liddy, a flamboyant conservative militant responsive to the appeal of space-age gimerackery.

But the Huston plan had to be scrapped (or to go more deeply underground) after only a few days of service, owing to the resistance of J. Edgar Hoover, and this thwarting of the presidential will occurring within the extended "family" of government must have made Nixon sharply aware of his nuclear isolation. Just as he was moving to establish the tighter control he deemed necessary to the process of governing, he was forced to note, and not for the first time, his inability to control or discipline the agencies that were supposedly under him.

He was isolated, pent up, in the White House with his tiny nucleus of planners and visionaries, and against him were allied the inert and—from his point of view—reactionary forces of the nation: J. Edgar Hoover, Helms at the CIA, the Eastern Establishment press, the judiciary, most of the Congress, and the Internal Revenue Service, manned by Democratic holdovers who blocked all his efforts to enforce legitimate authority through tax audits and tax harassment.

It is important, I think, to realize that Nixon saw nothing wrong in the conception of governing through tax harassment of foundations and individuals. To him, control of the IRS was one of the natural perquisites of the office, like the patronage dispensed by the Postmaster General, the parceling out of contracts and embassy assignments as rewards to campaign contributors. As for the wire-tapping of dissenters and subversives, some

people, he knew, thought it was illegal, but it was not *wrong*. And why shouldn't the CIA lend a hand in undercover operations against domestic radicals? Its charter from Congress specified foreign intelligence work only, but it was common knowledge that a lot of those radicals were working for foreign powers.

Yet these little natural, innocent things (how could a tax audit hurt anybody who had made an honest return?) were being treated as if they were *crimes* by the people over at IRS and by Hoover and Helms, who got legalistic when asked to do the slightest favor. It had not been that way when the Democrats were running things. The difference was Richard M. Nixon. Elected by the popular will to the highest office of the land, the President of the United States was thrust into the position of a conspirator if he was going to execute his mandate.

A number of presidents—e.g., Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson—have not been strangers to this feeling and have acted accordingly. It is probably in the nature of things that the Chief Executive will chafe against the laws and institutions restraining him more than the average citizen and turn, on occasion, into the Chief Lawbreaker. But no Administration before Nixon's can have lent itself so readily to a conspiratorial view of government. His secretive and unsociable nature made friends with the underground methods he felt were imposed on him by an unsympathetic Congress (even his own party had its Javitses and Percys) and an uncooperative entrenched bureaucracy.

In 1970, conspiracy (the wrong kind) was much in the Administration's thoughts. At Justice, Mitchell and Mardian were bringing dissenters to trial under the conspiracy statutes and creating more dissent among the judiciary, which complained of loosely drawn indictments, tainted evidence, and the violation of the rights of defendants. From the Administration's point of view, those aborted trials should have been seen, nevertheless, as a qualified success; like tax audits, they constituted a harassment, very costly both of time and money not only to those indicted but also to their supporters, busy raising funds, writing letters to the press, hiring halls, drafting appeals. But Nixon was dissatisfied.

(A) With the judiciary and (B) probably, with Mitchell and Mardian. As he drew closer to the notion (unnamed by him, of course) of forming a conspiratorial nucleus within his own government, he began to draw away from his old counselor Mitchell, who believed in "working within the

system" by rapping on the right doors. The Senate's rejection of Haynsworth and Carswell-Mitchell's nominees for the Supreme Court and part of "the Southern strategy"—must have produced the first signs of a chill on Nixon's part. Trying to work within the system, twisting a few arms (Senator Margaret Chase Smith's for instance) had caused him two public humiliations and anyway it was too slow. An analogy with the politics of the left comes to mind: the younger ideologues and actionists of the White House inner circle were revolutionaries, while Mitchell and his cronies (I ask Willy Brandt's pardon) were Social Democrats. Both had the same goal—the rule of Nixon—and the differences were over methodology, but Mitchell's addiction to the old semi-legal methods, a habit he could not shake, was starting to prove, at least to Nixon, that he did not understand the goal any better than J. Edgar Hoover or Randolph Thrower of the IRS.

The disclosure of the Pentagon Papers brought all this to a head. Their publication inflicted a *symbolic* injury on Nixon. Whatever disapproval he was bound to express in public, privately he might almost have enjoyed it. The documents had nothing to do with him, and cast discredit, to put it mildly, on his Democratic predecessors. Nor did the Pentagon come out well, which could have given him some satisfaction; relations, as we now know, were strained to the point where the Pentagon was spying on him. It is understandable that he should have been led to worry about leaks from his own Administration. Perhaps almost any president in his place would have formed something like a Plumbers' unit to make doubly sure this did not happen to him.

But Nixon's reaction of fury was far in excess of the cause and unaccounted for by his practical interests. He became obsessed with Ellsberg—a spaced-out academic who would never see the inside of a government office again. By all accounts, Nixon could not get his mind off him and talked about him incessantly. Ellsberg was the goad that spurred his thinking along security lines, and the White House staff was aware of it, so much so that a sycophant like Colson, trying to keep pace with that thinking, actually directed a White House employee to set off a fire-bomb in the Brookings Institution in order to effect an entry and steal some documents they were using for a current study of Vietnam affairs. It is interesting that this project was a mirror image of the Pentagon Papers "theft," with arson, property damage, and possible loss of life added.

Nixon's determination to see Ells-

berg punished, like a close personal enemy, hardened throughout the summer. All his grudges and grievances now had a point to center on: his hatred of the press, his hatred of reds and pinks, his hatred of Hoover, his mistrust of the CIA and impatience with the judiciary. The FBI was refusing to conduct a serious investigation because of a friendship between Hoover and Ellsberg's father-in-law; the CIA "psychological profile" of Ellsberg was derisory; the judge hearing the case naturally could not be counted on, so he had to be "fixed" with an offer to head the FBI.

Like furniture being moved into place to set a stage, Hunt and Liddy that summer were brought onto the White House staff. Caulfield and Ulasewicz, both with police backgrounds of investigating dissidents, were already there. Caulfield, a former Bronx cop, had been hired by Haldeman; his specialty had been "monitoring" terrorists, the Communist party, Cuban militant organizations, and a variety of "Latin domestic revolutionary groups who planned or were suspected of planning various kinds of unlawful activities." The burglary of Ellsberg's psychiatrist was coming.

The Ellsberg-poisoned atmosphere of the White House during the summer and fall of 1971 is reminiscent of the Kremlin during the late days of Stalin and the chimera of "the men in white." Nixon could not tolerate the sight of an opponent, even the most harmless and peaceful demonstrator with a sign. The specter of Philby (called "Philbrick" by the preparer of the transcript, who is obviously not very spy-conscious) seems to have haunted the President, as though he were a nascent Ellsberg in British disguise. Like Stalin, Nixon was meditating a purge, but because the US was a democracy it would have to wait till after the election. In Washington, after the election, heads did not roll, as they did during the "doctors' plot," but Helms went, early in 1973, death had taken care of Hoover the previous spring, and late last summer a big "reorganization" of the CIA was reported. Ehrlichman, moreover (this has just come to light), took a leaf from Yagoda's book: in 1971, he presented Admiral Welander with a prepared confession to sign that would have made "me admit to the wildest possible, totally false charges of political espionage." Welander refused.

Nixon's grim focus on Ellsberg is as easy (or as hard) to explain as Stalin's final paranoia, which combined his fear of assassination with a phobic suspicion of Jews to fix on the doctors around him, and then struck out at Soviet Jews in general. Anti-Semitism was latent in the Soviet Union, just as red scares are endemic in the United

States. Even Nixon, though, cannot have imagined Ellsberg as his future assassin except in a symbolic sense. The theft of those documents, their exposure to public view had dealt the Presidency a wound, and Nixon, in his own mind, had merged with the institution, to become a single body. The publication of the Pentagon Papers planted in him a doubt of the inviolability of his person and the office and of the principle of "confidentiality" about which he evidently has deep-rooted feelings. It was as if his monitoring system, which he had hoped would ensure permanent control of the presidential environment by putting whatever happened there on record for his own exclusive retention, had been defied, almost laughed at, by another set of records compiled under McNamara's directions and spirited away by a private individual.

At the same time there was perhaps something about Ellsberg, the man, the pre-Papers, clean, crew-cut Ellsberg, a defiant hawk in Vietnam, looking out, still, with a tight eager smile, from the cloud of hair, that reminded Nixon of some of the younger "modern conservatives" in his own hard-driving office family, and the feeling of half-familiarity would have further disturbed his balance, making him look fearfully at the aide with a clipboard coming in the door. Hence the angry insistence on Ellsberg as a "traitor" and the obsessive memory of Philby.

Late in the fall of 1971, after the unproductive fielding burglary, as the courts prepared to try Ellsberg, the co-ordinates for Watergate were fixed, even if no brain as yet had made the calculation. The White House retained the Plumbers' "capability" in addition to Caulfield and Ulasewicz, but had no immediate interesting employment to offer them. Electronic surveillance, working out of Ehrlichman's office, had hardly been given a chance to show what it could do: only a few taps on journalists and on Kissinger's aides. At CREEP there was money to burn. In September, McCord, on Caulfield's recommendation, was hired by CREEP as a security officer, part time. A former FBI and CIA operative, he had knowledge of "the art of certain technical devices... listening devices and so on." Liddy, who arrived on December 10, did not; his field was clandestine photography. On January 1, McCord went on full time.

The idea of putting these elements together and plugging them into the campaign may have been Nixon's. If he dropped it into Haldeman's "suggestion box" during a chat at Camp David, it probably drew a neutral response: "I'll look into the parameters, Mr. President, and report back." Alternatively Colson brought Nixon the idea, which either he had thought up himself or

which had come to him via Hunt from Liddy-Colson did not meet Liddy in person until early February. Or maybe several people, separately, put it forward. It is impossible to trace the routes by which it beat its way to Nixon's mind until finally it could not be dislodged. But some time, as early as December or as late as April 1, it achieved "worthwhile for go status." The conjugation of McCord and Liddy in the CREEP offices, followed by McCord's going on full-time salary—facts not subject to dispute—point to a Christmas birth date.

It is impossible to foretell whether Nixon will be removed from office, by one means or another, when Watergate celebrates its second anniversary. As I write, in late February, the prediction is that he will stay. Yet Watergate has a strange organic life of its own which, in my opinion, is more persistent than Nixon's desperate hold on power. Watergate has showed itself to be like an angworm or a child's belief about an angworm: if you chop it in pieces, each piece will wriggle off and make a brand-new angworm. Last September, everyone was sure that it had died. Then came Agnew. After Agnew, another "dead" period followed. Then came the Saturday night massacre. Another brief suspension of breath, then the missing tapes, then the tape erasures.

This persistence is not an accident or just bad luck. Watergate returns, reasserts itself because it is a whole, consistent in all its parts like the angworm. It is a creation of Nixon and of Nixonian politics. Agnew, strictly speaking, had nothing to do with Watergate, but because he himself was a creation of Nixonian politics, he was a parallel phenomenon that could not sustain scrutiny when brought out into the light of day.

This organic wholeness of Nixon and his works, faithfully reflected in Watergate, has produced some ironies, nasty tricks of fate. But the irony results from the utter consistency of the whole—there are no spare parts; everything returns on itself. Because of Watergate, for example, Dan Ellsberg has gone free. And if Nixon gnashed his teeth over that, he must at least have cursed when he read McCord's letter to Judge Sirica. What had persuaded McCord to talk or had been at any rate a prime factor in his decision was his loyalty to the CIA. On this point, he testified with a good deal of heat and at length. He was angry when he first heard of the White House effort "to lay the Watergate operation off on the CIA," and he had refused to go along with the suggestion that he use the CIA in his defense.

I could not use as my defense the story that the operation was a CIA

operation because it was not true Even if it meant my freedom, I would not turn on the organization that had employed me for 19 years. . . . I was completely convinced that the White House was behind the idea and ploy which had been presented, and that the White House was turning ruthless, in my opinion, and would do whatever was politically expedient at any one particular point in time to accomplish its own ends.

I was also convinced that the White House had fired Helms in order to put its own man in control at CIA. . . . It appeared to me that the White House had for some time been trying to get control over the CIA estimates and assessments, in order to make them conform to "White House policy."

He went on to talk somewhat incoherently about how Hitler's intelligence chiefs had been obliged to lie to him in giving their estimates of foreign military capabilities—thereby losing him the war. Jim McCord was a fire-breathing patriot and seemed to have decided, post-Watergate, that the White House, through persecution of the CIA, was weakening the country's defenses. It took all kinds of Americans, including the seven rather conservative senators, to bring out the Watergate story: the press, the judiciary (Judge Sirica), even Pat Gray of the FBI. Nearly all of Nixon's chickens have come home to roost, but a few more—the last of the brood—may finish the job.

Postscript, March 7

On March 1, since these thoughts were

written, the grand jury indicted seven of Nixon's associates and handed its sealed envelope to Judge Sirica. Watergate has come to life again, and again Nixon's days appear to be numbered. In Cincinnati, a Republican candidate for Congress has been defeated—another inroad on strongly held Republican territory. Senator Ervin's Committee has been voted some more money. Nixon has said on television that when he told Dean, "It would be wrong, that's for sure"—his newest recollection of the words he used on March 21, 1973—he was talking about clemency for the men in prison. Not, as Haldeman had sworn before the Ervin panel, about raising a million dollars' worth of hush money.

This would seem to "cover" Haldeman on one perjury charge: he had not been lying under oath to the Senate Committee but had only had a poor recollection of the context, understandable since hush money and clemency were linked in the discussion. Nixon went on to say that some people (was he thinking of the twenty-three grand jurors?) who read the whole transcript or heard the whole tape might put a different interpretation on the conversation, but "I know what I meant."

We can now understand at least why the tape was not deep-sixed. The statement "it is wrong" or "that would be wrong" must occur somewhere on it, and to preserve those three or four precious little words, Nixon evidently decided to let the grand jury, if that was its mood, "misinterpret" the rest of the conversation: proof that he has a moral sense was scarce enough not to

be jettisoned.

The seven indictments for conspiracy, perjury, lying, and obstruction of justice relate only to the cover-up. The grand jury apparently drew no conclusions as to who planned and directed the original crime, unless those conclusions are contained in the sealed envelope. One can hardly blame the jurors for failing to pronounce on the matter since no hard evidence, so far as we know, pointing to the guilty party or parties has been produced. Those who had an interest in covering up are legion—virtually the entire Nixon apparatus—but the entire apparatus cannot be guilty of ordering the break-ins at the Watergate. The plain fact is that the cover-up is still going on: evidence in the form of criminal knowledge is being effectively hidden, justice is being obstructed.

The grand jury indictments only confirm what was already a certainty in most people's minds: that those seven men (though I must say that I did not suspect Gordon Strachan) were lying and/or conspiring to conceal when they gave testimony to legally constituted bodies. But what is not yet a general persuasion, what we can only guess at, remains a secret shared among a handful of men, not more than four probably. Three of these are now under indictment, and the prospect of jail may serve to squeeze some truth out. But it is more likely that the one who is still at large will be judged and condemned by another court—the Congress or what is left of the Republican party—before his accomplices can stand up to hear the verdicts reached by their peers. □

ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH

EDITORIAL - 12 March 1974

Above Reproach?

Now that the Senate Watergate committee is holding its hearings in private, reports about the committee's closed door questioning of Richard Helms, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, do not suggest that the Senators are digging very deeply into the CIA's highly questionable involvement in the burglary of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, the Watergate building break-in and other crimes far afield from the agency's lawful role.

Chairman Sam Ervin of the committee emerged from one closed-door session with Mr. Helms to say he believes that Mr. Helms is "above reproach." If Mr. Helms is above reproach, there is a lot of explaining to be done. For while Mr. Helms was director of the intelligence agency (he left in late 1972), the CIA, according to sworn affidavits in the Watergate case, provided equipment and false documents for the burglary of the psychiatrist's

office and of the Democratic Party offices at the Watergate.

The CIA, on Mr. Helms's orders, attempted to divert the FBI's Watergate investigation. The CIA was reportedly involved in the attempted burglary of the offices of the International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. in New York, where incriminating documents concerning the corporation's questionable dealings with the Nixon Administration were presumably on file. The CIA admittedly destroyed tapes which recorded conversations between its officials and key figures in the Nixon Administration, including possibly the President himself. Senators were said to be seeking some tapes as evidence vital to the Watergate investigation.

None of these activities has been satisfactorily squared with the law, which supposedly bars the CIA from domestic operations. Unless the Senate committee brings in a report with convincing evidence to justify its apparent indulgent attitude toward Mr. Helms, the committee itself will be suspected of a cover-up.

MORE, New York City
April 1974

Undercovering The CIA

BY VICTOR L. MARCHETTI AND JOHN D. MARKS

Editor's note: In June, Alfred A. Knopf Inc. will publish The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by Victor L. Marchetti, who worked for the agency for 14 years, and John D. Marks, a former assistant to the Department of State's director of intelligence. The book will appear with 162 deletions demanded by the CIA. On the page opposite, Brit Hume, [MORE]'s Washington editor, explores the legal and censorship issues involved in a battle that dates back to the spring of 1972 when U.S. marshals arrived at Marchetti's home outside Washington with a temporary restraining order. In their book, Marchetti and Marks deal at length with the CIA and the press. The following article is adapted from that material and other related research collected by the authors.

On Sept. 23, 1970, syndicated columnist Charles Bartlett was handed, by a Washington-based official of ITT, an internal report sent in by the company's two representatives in Chile, Hal Hendrix and Robert Berrellez. This eight-page document—marked "Personal and Confidential"—said that the American ambassador to Chile had received the "green light to move in the name of President Nixon... [with] maximum authority to do all possible—short of a Dominican Republic-type action—to keep Allende from taking power." It stated that the Chilean army "has been assured full material and financial assistance by the US military establishment" and that ITT had "pledged [its financial] support if needed" to the anti-Allende forces.

Instead of launching an immediate investigation into what could have been one of the biggest stories of the year, Bartlett did exactly what ITT hoped he would do: he wrote a column on Sept. 28 about the dangers of a "classic Communist-style assumption of power" in Chile. He did see some hope that "Chile will find a way to avert the inauguration of Salvador Allende," but thought there was little the United States could "profitably do" and that "Chilean politics should be left to the Chileans." He did not inform his readers that he had a document in his possession that indicated that Chilean politics were being left to the Central Intelligence Agency and ITT.

"I was only interested in the political analysis," Bartlett explained in an interview. "I didn't take seriously the Washington stuff—the description of machinations within the U.S. government. [The ITT men who wrote the report] had not been in Washington; they had been in Chile." Yet by Bartlett's own admission, his Sept. 28 column was based on the ITT report—in places to the point of paraphrase. He wrote about several incidents occurring in Chile that he could not possibly have verified in Washington. Most reporters will not use material of this sort unless they can check it out with an independent source,

so Bartlett was showing extraordinary faith in the reliability of his informants.

An ITT official also gave the same report to *Time's* Pentagon correspondent, John Mulliken. Mulliken covered neither the CIA nor Chile as part of his regular beat, and he sent the ITT document to *Time's* headquarters in New York for possible action. As far as he knows *Time* never followed up on the story. He attributes this to "bureaucratic stupidity—the system, not the people." He explains that *Time* had shortly before done a long article on Chile and New York "didn't want to do any more."

Thus, the public did not learn what the U.S. government and ITT were up to in Chile until the spring of 1972, when columnist Jack Anderson published scores of ITT internal documents concerning Chile. Included in the Anderson papers, as one of the most important exhibits, was the very same document that had been given eighteen months earlier to Bartlett and *Time*.

With a few notable exceptions, the American press consistently tiptoes around the CIA and its operations. And those few who do penetrate the secret organization find the going hard, indeed. Newsmen are physically denied access to the CIA's heavily-guarded buildings in Langley, Va., except under tightly controlled circumstances. No media outlet in the country has ever assigned a full-time correspondent to the agency, and very few report on its activities, even on a part-time basis. Except in those cases where the CIA wants to leak some information, almost all CIA personnel avoid any contact whatsoever with journalists. In fact, agency policy decrees that employees must inform their superiors immediately of any conversations with reporters.

Back when Allen Dulles headed the CIA and Cold War anti-communism was still rampant, two disasters hit the CIA that newspapers learned of in advance but refused to share fully with their readers. First came the shooting down of the U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union in 1960. Chalmers Roberts, long the *Washington Post's* diplomatic correspondent, confirms in his book *First Rough Draft* (Praeger) that he and "some other newsmen" knew about the U-2 flights in the late 1950s and "remained silent." Roberts explains: "Retrospectively, it seems a close question as to whether this was the right decision, but I think it probably was. We took the position that the national interest came before the story because we knew the United States very much needed to discover the secrets of Soviet missileery."

Most reporters at the time would have agreed with former Clandestine Services chief Richard Bissell that premature disclosure would have forced the Soviets "to take action." Yet Bissell admitted that "after five days" the Soviets were fully aware that the spy planes were overflying their country, and that the secrecy maintained by the Soviet and American governments was an example "of two hostile governments collaborating to keep

operations secret from the general public of both sides."

When the U-2 was shot down, the U.S. government lied about the nature of the plane's mission. After two days, the Soviets announced they had captured the CIA pilot, Francis Gary Powers, and the State Department issued a second cover story—also partially a lie. Finally President Eisenhower levelled with the American people and took the personal responsibility for the flight.

The U-2 incident may well have been a watershed in the way the press and the American public looked at their government. For most, it was the first indication that their government lied, and it was the opening wedge in what would grow during the Vietnam years into the "credibility gap." But as the Eisenhower administration came to an end, there was still a national consensus that the fight against communism justified virtually any means. The press was very much a part of the consensus, which did not start to crack until it became known that the CIA was organizing an armed invasion of Cuba.

Five months before the actual landing took place at the Bay of Pigs, *The Nation* published a second-hand account of the agency's efforts to train Cuban exiles for attacks against Cuba and called upon "all US news media with correspondents in Guatemala" (where the invaders were being trained) to check out the story. *The New York Times* responded with an article on Jan. 10, 1961, describing the training, with U.S. assistance, of an anti-Castro force in Guatemala. At the end of the story, which mentioned neither the CIA nor a possible invasion, was a charge by the Cuban Foreign Minister that the U.S. government was preparing "mercenaries" in Guatemala and Florida for military action against Cuba. Turner Catledge, then the managing editor of the *Times*, declared in his book, *My Life and The Times* (Harper and Row), "I don't think that anyone who read the story would have doubted that something was in the wind, that the United States was deeply involved, or that *The New York Times* was onto the story."

As the date for the invasion approached, *The New Republic* obtained a comprehensive account of the preparations for the operation, but the liberal magazine's editor-in-chief, Gilbert Harrison, became wary of the security implications and submitted it prior to publication to President Kennedy. Kennedy asked that the article not be printed, and Harrison, a friend of the president, complied. At about the same time, *New York Times* reporter Ted Szulc uncovered nearly the complete story, and the *Times* made preparation to carry it on April 7, 1961, under a four-column headline. But the *Times* publisher, the late Orvil Dryfoos, and then Washington bureau chief James Reston, both objected to the article on national security grounds, and it was edited to eliminate all mention of CIA involvement or of an "imminent" invasion. The truncated story, which mentioned only that 5,000 to 6,000 Cubans were being trained

in the U.S. and Central America "for the liberation of Cuba," no longer merited a banner headline and was reduced to a single column on the front page. Clifton Daniel, then the paper's managing editor, later explained that Dryfoos had ordered the story toned down "above all, [out of] concern for the safety of the men who were preparing to offer their lives on the beaches of Cuba."

Times reporter Szulc says he was not consulted about the heavy editing of his article, and he maintains that President Kennedy made a personal appeal to publisher Dryfoos not to run the story. Yet, less than a month after the invasion, at a meeting where he was urging newspaper editors not to print security information, Kennedy told *Times* Catledge, "if you had printed more about the operation you would have saved us from a colossal mistake."

The failure at the Bay of Pigs cost CIA Director Dulles his job, and he was succeeded in November, 1961, by John McCone. McCone did little to revamp the agency's policies in dealing with the press. In McCone's first weeks at the agency, the *Times* heard that the CIA was training Tibetans in paramilitary techniques at a base in Colorado, but, according to David Wise's account in *The Politics of Lying* (Random House), the Office of the Secretary of Defense "pleaded" that the *Times* kill the story, which it did. Then in the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962, President Kennedy again prevailed upon the *Times* not to print a story—this time, the news that Soviet missiles had been installed in Cuba—which the *Times* had learned of at least a day before the President made his announcement to the country.

In 1964, McCone was faced with the problem of how to deal with an upcoming book about the CIA: *The Invisible Government* (Random House) by reporters David Wise of the *New York Herald Tribune* and Thomas Ross of the *Chicago Sun-Times*. Their work provided examples of the kind of tough reporting that other journalists consistently failed to do on the agency. As a result, McCone and his deputy, Lt. Gen. Marshall Carter, both telephoned Random House to raise their strong objections to publication of the book. Then, a CIA official offered to buy up the entire first printing of over 15,000 books. Calling this action "laughable," Random House's president, Bennett Cerf, agreed to sell the agency as many books as it wanted but stated that additional printings would be made for the public. The agency also approached *Look*, which had planned to run excerpts from the book and, according to a spokesman, "asked that some changes be made—things they considered to be inaccuracies. We made a number of changes but do not consider that they were significant."

When it became obvious that neither *Random House* nor *Look* would stop publication, the CIA started a whispering campaign against the book among selected journalists. In one instance, McCone, at a party in his home, took columnist Marquis Childs aside, showed him the galleys

(which the agency had obtained by covert means), and made derogatory comments about the book. McCone had misjudged his man, however, and Childs wrote a strong defense of the book in his nationally syndicated column.

The CIA charged that Wise and Ross were exposing agency operations and endangering CIA employees by their disclosures. The authors' view was that no individual was mentioned in the book whose name had not already appeared in print or who was not already a public figure; that the operations described were history; and that the agency was trying to use the "national security" label to suppress legitimate criticism of the CIA.

William Raborn took over the CIA in April, 1965, and was quickly subjected to a series of savage leaks aimed at discrediting him, and then to a series by the *Times* on the CIA. The leaks occurred because Raborn, a salty retired admiral, was extremely unpopular among agency professionals who spread unfavorable (and largely true) stories about him all over Washington. Perhaps the most well known was that Raborn, after listening to a briefing on the elite group that ruled Libya, asked to see the biographical file "on this fellow Oli Garchy." Obviously damaged by the publication of such tales, Raborn resigned after a little more than a year and was succeeded by his deputy, Richard Helms.

In setting up the *Times* series, Washington bureau chief Tom Wicker talked to Helms, who promised the agency would try to cooperate. Then, according to *Times* reporter John Finney, the five or so newsmen who were working most actively on the story, went to CIA headquarters for a general briefing about the agency's functions. Finney remembers there was a great deal of emphasis on the intellectual and analytical character of the agency and almost no mention of "dirty tricks."

While the series was being pulled together, Secretary of State Dean Rusk telephoned *Times* publisher Arthur Sulzberger, according to Catledge's book, not explicitly to kill the series but to "make it clear that he believed publication of the series might upset delicate U.S. intelligence efforts all over the world, might endanger agents, might offend allies, encourage enemies, and otherwise harm the national interest and perhaps the national security." The *Times* decided to print the series anyway but to submit it first to former CIA Director John McCone for review. Reporter Finney recalls that "we weren't giving it to the agency for censorship." But according to Catledge, "We changed certain facts when we were persuaded we had been in error or that danger to an agent or an operation might result. When we'd finished with the facts, the CIA challenged the tone of the articles, and some of our conclusions, but we said we'd make the decision on those things." And a *Times* reporter knowledgeable about the series recalls "it was absolutely shocking what we didn't print. Among other things, we had the low-down on the whole secret CIA war in Laos and didn't use it."

The *Times* published the five-part series starting on April 25, 1966. Catledge noted in a memo to Sulzberger: "I don't know of any other series in my time which has been prepared with

greater care and with such remarkable attention to the views of the agency involved as this one. Articles involving much greater consideration of national security... have been published without the extreme care which we have taken in this case. We have taken care to meet the points raised by an agency...."

Catledge's last point is particularly significant, for almost the entire American press has traditionally treated the CIA as something special, as an organization to which different reporting standards apply than those used for other government agencies. The *New York Times* and other papers have frequently written stories about the most sensitive aspects of America's national security, but beyond routine checks for accuracy, they would never consider submitting the full texts to the government for prior review—although the *Times* certainly deserved commendation for publishing the most comprehensive look at the CIA taken up to that time by any American newspaper.

When Richard Helms took over the agency in 1966, shortly after the *Times* series appeared, press relations changed noticeably. Helms himself had been a reporter with United Press in Germany before World War II, and he thought of himself as an accomplished journalist. He felt he understood reporters' problems, knew how their minds worked. Only 18 days after he became director, a flap developed that caused (or allowed) him to revamp the agency's system of dealing with the press. The *St. Louis Globe Democrat* published a letter signed by Helms praising an extremely critical editorial the paper had run about Sen. J. William Fulbright. Helms claimed he had not read the letter before affixing his signature, but, in any case, he was forced to apologize to Senator Fulbright and to promise that it would not happen again. Shortly thereafter, the CIA press officer, Col. Stanley Grogan, who drafted the letter, was eased out of his job, and Helms replaced him with Jake Goodwin, a highly experienced clandestine operator who had once been, before joining the agency, a stringer for *Time*. As one of Helms' old favorites from the Clandestine Services, Goodwin brought a much higher status to the press office, and the new press officer soon began attending the director's morning staff meetings. Goodwin would report at the meetings whenever a particular reporter was showing undue interest in the CIA. More often than not, Helms would say something to the effect, "Oh, I know him. I'll handle it."

One way he handled it was with a series of breakfasts, lunches, and occasionally cocktails and dinners for individual reporters and groups of them. On days when he was hosting a gathering of journalists, he would often devote part of his morning staff meeting to a discussion of the seating arrangements and make suggestions about which CIA official would be the most compatible dining partner for which reporter. While a few senior clandestine personnel were invited to these affairs, Helms made sure that the majority came from the CIA's analytical and technical branches. As always, he was trying to portray the agency as

predominantly a non-clandestine organization.

Helms' invitations were not for every reporter. He concentrated on the bureau chiefs, columnists, and other opinion-makers. *CBS News'* Marvin Kalb, who attended several of Helms' sessions with press (and who was recently bugged by the Nixon administration) recalls that Helms "had the capacity for astonishing candor, but told you no more than he wanted to give you. He had this marvelous way of talking, of suggesting things with his eyes. Yet, he usually didn't tell you anything." Helms was also an active member of the so-called Georgetown set, and he often saw many of the capital's leading reporters and pundits at social functions. By all accounts, he was a charming guest whose presence was coveted by Washington hostesses. Kalb notes that "it was a triumph for your wife when you plotted out a dinner party and Helms came."

Helms was an excellent news source—for his friends. Columnist Joseph Kraft (another Nixon administration bugging victim) recalls that Helms was the only government official who forecast that South Vietnamese President Thieu would successfully block implementation of the Vietnamese peace accords until after the 1972 American election, and other reporters tell similar stories of Helms being among the most accurate high government sources available on matters such as Soviet missiles or Chinese nuclear testing. He did not usually engage in the exaggerated talk about communist threats that so often characterizes "informed sources" in the Pentagon and he seemed to have less of an operational axe to grind than other Washington officials.

In early 1968, *Time* reporters were doing research on a cover story on the Soviet navy. According to *Time's* Pentagon correspondent, John Mulliken, both the White House and the State Department would not provide information on the subject for fear of giving the Soviets the impression that the U.S. government was behind a move to play up the threat posed by the Soviet fleet. Mulliken says that with Helms' authorization, CIA experts provided *Time* with virtually all the data it needed. Commenting on the incident five years later, Mulliken recalls, "I had the impression that the CIA was saying 'the hell with the others' and was taking pleasure in sticking it in." He never did find out exactly why Helms wanted that information to come out at that particular time when other government agencies did not; nor, of course, did *Time's* readers, who did not even know that the CIA was the source of much of the article which appeared on Feb. 23, 1968. Dating back to the days of Henry Luce and Allen Dulles, *Time* had always had close relations with the agency. In more recent years, the magazine's chief Washington correspondent, Hugh Sidey, relates that "with McCone and Helms, we had a set-up that when the magazine was doing something on the CIA, we went to them and put it before them... We were never misled."

When *Newsweek* decided in the fall of 1971 to do a cover story on Richard Helms and "The New Espionage," the magazine went directly to the

agency for much of its information, according to a *Newsweek* staff member. And the article, printed on Nov. 22, generally reflected the line that Helms was trying so hard to sell: that since "the latter 1960s... the focus of attention and prestige within the CIA" had switched from the Clandestine Services to the analysis of intelligence and that "the vast majority of recruits are bound for" the Intelligence Directorate. This was, of course, written at a time when over two-thirds of the agency's budget and personnel were devoted to covert operations and their support (roughly the same percentage as had existed for the preceding ten years). *Newsweek* did uncover several previously unpublished anecdotes about past covert operations (which made the CIA look good) and published at least one completely untrue statement concerning a multibillion dollar technical espionage program. Assuming the facts for this statement were provided by "reliable intelligence sources," it probably represented a CIA disinformation attempt designed to make the Russians believe something that simply was not accurate about U.S. technical collection capabilities.

Under Helms, the CIA has continued to intervene with editors and publishers to try to stop publication of certain books and articles which are either descriptive or critical of the agency. Early in 1972, Helms telephoned William Attwood, publisher of *Newsday*. According to Attwood, Helms was "unhappy" about an article submitted to his newspaper by one of the authors of this book. For his own reasons, Attwood had already decided not to run the article, so Helms' intervention was academic.

That spring proved to be a busy season for the CIA's book banners. In June, the number two man in the Clandestine Services, Cord Meyer, Jr., visited the New York offices of Harper and Row, Inc., which was scheduled to publish a work by Alfred McCoy called *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, charging the agency with a certain degree of complicity in the Southeast Asian drug traffic. Meyer, whose previous literary achievements included directing the funding of several CIA-subsidized publications (as well as the National Student Association), asked several old acquaintances among Harper and Row's top management to provide him with a copy of the book's galley proofs. While the CIA obviously hoped to handle the matter informally among friends, Harper and Row asked the agency for official confirmation of its request. The CIA's general counsel, Lawrence Houston, responded with a letter on July 5, 1972, stating that while the agency's intervention "in no way affects the right of a publisher to decide what to publish... I find it difficult to believe... that a responsible publisher would wish to be associated with an attack on our Government involving the vicious international drug traffic without at least trying to ascertain the facts."

McCoy objected strenuously to the request. He maintained that the CIA had "no legal right to

review the book" and that "submitting the manuscript to the CIA for prior review is to agree to take the first step toward abandoning the First Amendment protection against prior censorship." Harper and Row apparently disagreed and made it clear to McCoy that the book would not be published unless first submitted. Rather than find a new publisher at that late date, McCoy went along. He also gave the entire story to the press, which was generally critical of the CIA.

The CIA listed its objections to Harper and Row on July 28, and in the words of the publisher's vice president and general counsel, B. Brook Thomas, the agency's criticisms "were pretty general and we found ourselves rather underwhelmed by them." Harper and Row accelerated its production schedule by a month and brought the book out—unchanged—in the middle of August.

CIA officials obviously have the right to talk or not to talk to any reporter they choose. But a reporter, knowing full well that future scoops may well depend on being thought of as a "friend" of the agency, faces a powerful inducement to write stories pleasing to the CIA, which is perfectly ready to reward its friends. Besides such obvious news breaks as defector stories, selected reporters can receive "exclusives" on everything from U.S. government foreign policy to Soviet intentions. Hal Hendrix, described by three different Washington reporters as a known "friend" of the agency, won a Pulitzer prize for his 1962 reporting of the Cuban missile crisis in *The Miami Daily News*. Much of his "inside story" was based on CIA leaks. (This is the same Hal Hendrix who later joined ITT and sent the memo saying President Nixon had given the "green light" for covert U.S. intervention in Chile—the memo published by Jack Anderson in 1972 and not published by Charles Bartlett and *Time* in 1970.)

Because of the CIA's adept handling of reporters, and because the personal views held by many of those reporters and their editors are sympathetic to the agency, most of the American press has at least tacitly gone along, until the last few years, with the agency view that covert operations were not a proper subject for journalistic scrutiny. The credibility gap arising out of the Vietnam War however, may well have changed the attitude of many reporters. The *Times'* Tom Wicker credits the Vietnam experience with making the press "more concerned with its fundamental duty." Now that most reporters have seen repeated examples of govern-

ment lying, he believes, they are much less likely to accept CIA denials of involvement in covert operations at home and abroad. As Wicker points out, "lots of people today would believe that the CIA overthrows governments," and most journalists no longer "believe in the sanctity of classified material." In the case of his own paper, Wicker feels that "the *Pentagon Papers* made the big difference."

Yet as late as the spring of 1973, the *Times*—which with the *Washington Post* has championed "the public's right to know"—balked at printing an account of . . . [three full lines in the manuscript are censored here]. The *Times'* Seymour Hersh uncovered the whole story shortly after Martin's latest appointment as ambassador to Vietnam was announced in March, 1973, (and shortly after the *Times* had run a generally favorable profile of Martin). The paper's editors apparently felt that Hersh's material, *although thoroughly verified*, was unfair to Martin. Even when Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman J. William Fulbright asked Martin in a public hearing last May 9 whether he had recommended the renewal of the covert payments, the *Times* still only printed a tiny back page article saying that Fulbright had raised the question. Finally on May 13, at Hersh's insistence, the paper ran the whole story.

The unfolding of the Watergate scandal apparently has opened the agency to increased scrutiny. Reporters have dug deeply into the CIA's assistance to the White House "plumbers" and the attempts to involve the agency in the Watergate cover-up, and have drawn parallels between CIA operations overseas and the tactics used by the Nixon administration at home. Perhaps most important, the press has largely rejected the "national security" defense used by the White House to justify its actions. This, of course, is the same justification that the CIA has used for so many years to hide from public view, and, considering the abuses which have been committed in its name, the press is now much less likely to be diverted by its invocation. Certainly, many reporters have passed the point where they consider themselves part of the government's "team." With any luck at all, maybe the American people can look forward to learning from the media what their government is doing—even its most secret part.

(MORE)

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Traditionally, a new publication is launched with a Ringing Declaration of Purpose. The trouble with such noble manifestoes, however, is that you then have to live up to them. This often proves exceedingly difficult. Despite your best intentions, little old ladies from Dubuque do pick up your magazine. Or some newspaper editor (or even publisher) momentarily forgets the marble admonition in the lobby and gives the news partially with both fear and favor. Not surprisingly, this causes a certain embarrassment. But worse, it turns out to be quite costly as well. For, having fallen short of your R.D.P., you are forced to keep up appearances by noting your achievements in large, expensive advertisements on the back page of the *Times* and *The Wall Street Journal*. With luck, these advertisements will persuade your readers that at least you are doing something worthwhile. But then there's your staff. They're a pretty savvy bunch and they really know how far you are from the old R.D.P. So to bolster their morale, you have to give them air travel cards and thousands of pencils reminding them that they work for the world's most quoted newsweekly. Obviously, our budget will never be able to support such extravagances, so we have reluctantly put aside our own Ringing Declaration of Purpose (and a clarion call it was, too) in favor of a sentence or two on what we *hope* to accomplish. Our goal is to cover the New York area press—by which we mean newspapers, magazines, radio and television—with the kind of tough-mindedness we think the press should but seldom does apply to its coverage of the world. We hope to do this seriously but not without wit, fairly but not “objectively.” Many of our contributors (though by no means all) will be working journalists in the city and we hope that their employers will have the common sense to recognize that a journalist ought to be free to write about his profession without feeling his job is in jeopardy. For our part, we recognize the conflict of interest in asking a journalist to write about his own organization and consequently have established an ironclad policy never to commission or publish such articles. Beyond that, we would like to apologize for being so tardy. In that nether region west of the Hudson that the local press is so fond of disdaining, journalism reviews already exist in Philadelphia, St. Louis, Denver, Honolulu and Chicago. The *Chicago Journalism Review* in particular has made that city a better place for journalists to work and by following their example we hope to do the same in New York.

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WASHINGTON POST
2 April 1974

U.S. Judge Rebuffs CIA On Secrecy

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency has received a major setback in a court battle to keep its cloak over its covert activities.

In a ruling made public yesterday, U.S. District Court Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr. held that the CIA had exceeded its classification authority in ordering 168 deletions in a forthcoming book, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence."

After having gone through the manuscript deletion-by-deletion, Judge Bryan reduced the number of national security excisions to 15. On originally reviewing the draft the CIA said 339 omissions would have to be made on national security grounds prior to publication.

In his ruling Friday, Judge Bryan said the CIA had "failed to meet the burden of proving classification."

The American Civil Liberties Union greeted Bryan's ruling as having a "profound impact on secrecy in government."

"It is the first time that any court has ever held that the government's asserting certain material is classified is not sufficient to prove it is classified," said ACLU attorney Mevin L. Wulf, who participated in the court arguments.

The book was written by two former government intelligence officers, Victor L. Marchetti of the CIA and John D. Marks of the State Department's Office of Intelligence and Research. Both men have been out of the government since 1969.

It was a case in which the government for the first time sought to exercise prior restraint on security grounds over a manuscript written by former government employees.

In 1972 Judge Bryan upheld the right of the CIA to prior review of the Marchetti manuscript, which at that time had not yet been written.

When the book was finished, with the assistance of Marks, it was submitted to the agency for clearance and came back in September, 1973, with the original 339 deletions.

Marchetti, Marks and the publisher, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., challenged the classification actions in a countersuit during which Judge Bryan heard testimony in a closed courtroom from CIA Director William E. Colby and his four top deputies.

The final result was the Fri-

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS
Washington, D. C., Thursday, March 28, 1974

CIA MALIGNING CHARGED

McCord Hits Baker Probe

Convicted Watergate conspirator James W. McCord Jr. has accused Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr., R-Tenn., of "seeking to create a diversion for the President" by "maligning" the Central Intelligence Agency.

In a letter yesterday to all seven members of the Senate Watergate Committee, McCord bitterly attacked a probe into the CIA role in the Watergate case which has been conducted by Baker, the committee's vice chairman.

In his three-paged, single-spaced letter, McCord blamed Baker for recent news accounts reporting that McCord's wife and a retired CIA friend of his had burned various papers and other materials at his house within days of the June 17, 1972, break-in.

THE FIRST news story, published by the Knight chain earlier this week, said a CIA agent had been "dispatched" to McCord's home to "burn anything linking him with the CIA."

McCord, who served 20 years with the CIA before retiring in 1971, said the "agent" was actually an 80-year-old personal friend who once had CIA ties. The man was "not sent" by anyone, McCord said, but merely happened to stop by at a time when McCord's wife was burning old newspapers and some other "fire hazards."

McCord said he had instructed his wife to burn the materials after the family

day ruling which held, in essence, that a fact could not be classified simply by a CIA official declaring it to be so.

Judge Bryan said that the decisions on what was classified in the manuscript by each CIA deputy director seem "to have been made on an ad hoc basis as he viewed the manuscript, founded on his belief, at that time, that a particular item contained classifiable information which ought to be classified."

The judge said that the government should have been able to produce documents or evidence of other affirmative actions to demonstrate that material in the CIA book was, in fact, classified.

Both the government and the authors have a basis for appeal. The CIA will presumably seek to again make the omissions it ordered in the manuscript. The authors may ask to reopen the question of whether their respective oaths

received a bomb threat two days following the Watergate break-in.

"We had had a near disastrous fire at night two years before while the family was asleep . . . When I heard of the June 19th, 1972, bomb call, I advised my wife to dispose of newspapers and other fire hazards in the house which a fire bomb could easily ignite," McCord said.

McCord said "no classified papers" nor other "sensitive documents" were destroyed. Nor did he ever attempt to conceal his CIA background, McCord said, noting he had told police about it the day he was arrested at the Watergate.

Rep. Lucien Nedzi, D-Mich., chairman of the House Intelligence subcommittee, said earlier this

week his own probe of the McCord papers-burning incident produced no evidence that the CIA was involved or that anything significant was destroyed.

McCord, who helped blow the lid off the Watergate cover-up a year ago with a letter to U.S. District Judge John J. Sirica, has repeatedly accused the White House and its supporters of trying to dump the blame for Watergate on the CIA.

In his letter yesterday, McCord called Baker "a Joe McCarthy of the 1970s," and said that "from the beginning of the (Watergate) hearings, Sen. Baker tried to drag the CIA in for the purpose of creating a diversion."

"CIA was the victim of the President's efforts to cover up, not the culprit," McCord said.

WASHINGTON POST
4 April 1974

Panel Votes To Release CIA Report

The Senate select Watergate committee voted yesterday to declassify and release a report prepared by its vice chairman, Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.), concerning the possible involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Watergate affair.

The committee, meeting in closed session, voted to

ask the CIA to declassify a number of documents and other materials that Baker has collected as part of his inquiry. Chief committee counsel Samuel Dash and minority counsel Fred Thompson were asked by the committee to work out details with the CIA.

In addition, the committee voted to invite former special presidential counsel Charles W. Colson to testify before it. Colson appeared before the committee Sept. 29 but invoked the Fifth Amendment when questioned under oath on the grounds that he was a target of a federal grand jury investigation.

of secrecy did not violate their First Amendment rights.

The CIA declined yesterday to comment on the decision. But the decision, if left standing, could strip away sanctions of secrecy covering many operations it is seeking to keep out of the public domain.

CIA Director Colby has indicated that he has drafted legislation which would provide, explicit congressional sanctions and stiffer penalties to buttress the agency's system of classification should the case be lost in court.

WASHINGTON POST
30 March 1974

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Sen. Baker and the CIA

Sen. Howard Baker's fruitless investigation of gossamer links between the Watergate scandal and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) seems unlikely to help President Nixon but threatens serious damage to the nation's beleaguered foreign intelligence operation.

Despite accumulating newspaper leaks and Baker's hints of knowing much more than he can tell, Watergate is not about to be blamed on the CIA, in part or in whole. Under close examination, the leaks turn out to be red herrings. Objective investigators are positive there was no CIA role in Watergate.

But conservative Republican Baker, ironically, sounds ever more like left-leaning critics of the CIA who complain that senators linked too closely to the agency never do adequately probe its inner recesses. What's more, the flood of innuendo seemingly originating from Baker's investigation further erodes the CIA's tattered morale and prestige.

Baker's motives are as shrouded as his overall Watergate performance. As senior Republican on the Senate Watergate Committee during last summer's televised hearings, he achieved instant fame. But the image of objectivity that made him a TV idol infuriated the White House and party regulars. Baker, a party man and a Nixon man, began hedging his bets in mid-summer.

That was apparent Aug. 2 when Richard Helms, former CIA director, returned from his post as ambassador to Iran to testify before the Watergate committee. Many senators believed the highly respected Helms had been bounced from the CIA for refusing to take the Watergate rap. But Baker was surprisingly hostile, his questions pre-empting his future investigation.

Baker has heatedly denied that this course was dictated by senior White House aides. Even so, his actions were obviously designed to help Mr. Nixon. In explaining his conduct immediately after the Watergate burglary, the Pres-

ident contended he feared investigation would uncover super-secret CIA operations. If Baker developed even tangential CIA connections with Watergate, Mr. Nixon would obviously look better.

Working toward that end, Baker late last October noted a Harper's magazine article by Andrew St. George claiming that Helms had advance knowledge of the Watergate burglary. Baker eagerly dispatched the article to

*"Under close examination
the leaks turn out to be
red herrings. Objective
investigators are positive
there was no CIA role
in Watergate."*

Sen. Stuart Symington of Missouri, acting chairman of the CIA oversight subcommittee. St. George, a journalistic swashbuckler, was summoned to Washington for a closed-door session. The verdict: he knew nothing.

But Baker relied on more than flamboyant journalism. The Watergate committee's minority staff, concentrating on the CIA, has produced a classified report. Insinuating more than accusing, it is the mother lode for published reports suggesting some ominous CIA role in Watergate (though, publicly, Baker, affirms Helms' innocence).

The Watergate committee majority staff regards the report as next to useless. Rep. Lucien Nedzi of Michigan, ranking CIA expert in Congress, believes there is no reason to change the Oct. 23 finding of his House subcommittee giving the CIA a clean bill of health. Federal prosecutors have found no CIA role in the conspiracy. Pub-

lished charges of such a role have all turned into red herrings.

Thus, recent newspaper accounts of internal tapes destroyed by Helms in his last CIA days become hollow when it is learned they were unrelated to Watergate. Nor is there factual grounding for insinuations, fostered by Baker, that prize-winning Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward was given Watergate information in return for steering clear of the CIA. The most recent red herring: a Chicago Tribune story, reflecting the Baker report, that a CIA agent was sent to Watergate burglar James McCord's house shortly after the burglary to destroy documents linking him with the CIA; in truth, a CIA informant joined McCord's wife in burning his papers.

Baker has been subjected to puzzled scrutiny by Senate colleagues, not only for his insinuations but for the way he conducts his investigation. When Helms was summoned from Teheran yet again last month, he faced intensely hostile closed-door questioning by Baker. The use of ex-White House aide Charles Colson, indicted in the Watergate conspiracy, as a major source of information in Baker's CIA investigation, is subject to criticism.

Moreover, the investigation is beginning to echo old complaints from Senate super-doves such as Sen. J. W. Fulbright of Arkansas: The CIA is permitted to run wild by Symington and other Senate protectors. Adding conservative Baker to the Fulbright camp further endangers the future of this vital agency.

When Baker on CBS's "Face the Nation" last Sunday declared "there's a great wealth of information" coming from his investigation (though he could not say what), his real message to the House could be: don't push too hard on impeachment because I am raising lethal new questions about the CIA. Actually, Mr. Nixon's problems seem too acute for Baker's warning to matter much. However he may hurt the CIA, Howard Baker can scarcely help the President.

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, April 2, 1974

Watergate Forces Retirement at CIA

Jack Anderson

The Watergate has claimed a major victim in the Central Intelligence Agency with the forced retirement of its dedicated director of security, Howard Osborn.

A veteran of 26 years at the cloak-and-dagger complex, the 56-year-old Osborn was caught up in the suppression of a mysterious CIA memo that described how documents were burned at the home of Waterbugger James McCord, an ex-CIA agent.

The secret memo was based on information supplied by a former FBI inspector, Lee Pennington, then with the CIA as a

paid "consultant." Pennington, an old family friend of the McCords', had visited Mrs. McCord after her husband was arrested inside Democratic National Committee headquarters in June, 1972. He found her burning papers and documents. Earlier, she had burned typewriter ribbons.

Pennington loyally reported the episode to his CIA bosses, and the CIA wrote it up in memo form. For more than a year and a half, it lay in the CIA files like a paper bomb.

Meanwhile, FBI sleuths were asking embarrassing questions about whether the CIA knew of destroyed documents from among McCord's papers, and

were getting persistent denials from the CIA.

Finally, Senate Watergate committee vice chairman Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.) began snooping into the CIA role in the cover-up, and a middle-level CIA employee who knew of the hidden memo threatened to blow the whistle.

After some debate, CIA Director William Colby was told of the suppressed memo and he quickly contacted Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.), chairman of a House intelligence subcommittee. They agreed that the best course was to let all congressional committees involved in the Watergate probe, as well as Leon Jaworski's special prose-

cutors, know about the memo.

Nedzi, after full hearings with Pennington, McCord and CIA officials including Osborn, concluded that the CIA had not dispatched Pennington to burn the papers, as the memo seemed to suggest. Osborn claimed that he had not even known of the memo. Nevertheless, Nedzi and Colby were both worried about the cover-up.

"It led to the early retirement of Osborn," Nedzi told us. When we reached the ex-CIA security boss at his home near the agency he had served so long, he clung to his oath of secrecy.

"I had planned for over a year to retire in June," Osborn insisted. "I realized there was no financial benefit to staying and decided to retire."

GENERALWASHINGTON POST *Sunday, March 31, 1974***Impeachment and Summitry**

DR. KISSINGER'S latest trip to Moscow established that Russians, scarcely less than Americans, are preoccupied by the ways in which President Nixon's domestic vulnerability may touch his foreign policy. Most directly, they wish to know if Mr. Nixon is politically competent to make and carry out agreements with them. Too, they no doubt wonder whether his weakness may soften him for agreements he otherwise might reject, or push him to drop detente for the sake of a ranks-closing appeal to anti-communism. In brief, the prospects of detente, already made uncertain enough by the course of "normal" events, have been rendered even more uncertain by the question mark hanging over the authority, mood and tenure of Richard Nixon.

This unhappy new fact in East-West affairs has implications for the conduct of policy. But before addressing these, we would draw an anticipatory bead on a troublesome contention that could well soon be raised in the President's impeachment defense. We mean the charge that the impeachment process is subverting the President's effort to build a "structure of peace." It would follow either that the impeachment drive should be set aside or that those who are pressing it, rather than Mr. Nixon, should be blamed for untoward consequences that might ensue. Presumably this contention would be made only if the President felt himself in special duress, for a crucial part of his diplomacy, as of his political defense, is to demonstrate that his capacity to govern has not been impaired. But the possibility is there, perhaps no further away than his next party rally. For a President long given to appeals for sacrifices and shortcuts in the name of "national security," it cannot be dismissed.

So it needs to be said categorically that nothing and no one is undermining Richard Nixon's foreign policy but Richard Nixon. It is not his policy critics or political rivals or "the media" but his own deeds, or lack of them—his omissions as well as his commissions—which have brought his presidency to such low estate. The first Watergate disclosures were made almost two years ago. Since then Mr. Nixon has employed virtually every political device, legal stratagem and delaying maneuver imaginable to keep the relevant information from flowing to the appropriate bodies established to review it, to investigate charges, and to prosecute possible wrongdoing. If his diplomacy is now laboring under heavy handicap, it is because Mr. Nixon himself made impossible the prompt resolution of issues which could only be resolved promptly by his cooperation. The single reason why an impeachment and a summit must now be mentioned in the same breath is that the President for his own reasons has refused to confront the challenge to his presidency decisively and forthrightly so that he could get on with the essential business of foreign affairs.

The Moscow summit, still scheduled for June, focuses the issue mercilessly. Impeachment proceedings may be well along by then, imposing upon Mr. Nixon harsh pressures either to play it too soft on the Russians, or too hard. We do not say Mr. Nixon will fall into one or another of these traps, but they are there. As long as his authority is uncertain, so will be public confidence in his performance in the summit crucible. For it is not only the substance of the negotiating position that must be well prepared before a summit. The integrity and solidity of the negotiator are equally vital pre-conditions to success. We understand why the President would not want to cancel out, if only because that would demon-

strate incapacity. But he—and we—cannot avoid paying a price in the pressure his predicament puts him under, if he goes through with it.

The more substantive problem is, of course, that detente is wobbling. Moscow's Mideast policy and its missile testing have led many Americans to question the depth of the Soviet commitment to better relations—or at least the commitment to appreciably better relations any time soon. The slim results and somber accounts of Dr. Kissinger's Moscow sojourn should probably be read in the context of the developing pre-summit bargaining positions of both sides, but they hardly make one sanguine. Moreover, the President's political condition puts before the Russians the temptation to try to squeeze out short-range advantage, though they must—or should—know that nothing could more quickly unite Americans around the President than the appearance of such a gambit by Moscow. It should be noted, however, that the congressional attitude on linking trade with emigration and Mr. Nixon's own defense programs may well have induced some Russians to question the American commitment to detente, as the Russians see it. Overall, this is not the time for large and final conclusions about detente. It is enough to say that the issues on the agenda for Mr. Nixon's third summit with the Soviets—control of offensive strategic arms, European security, and the Mideast, in particular—are excruciatingly difficult. They would tax the most conscientious and least distracted statesmen in the best of times.

In pondering these difficulties, one cannot blink the fact that this is the worst of times for the President to be heading to Moscow counting heavily on the nation's trust. That is part of the cost of Watergate. It forces upon Mr. Nixon, we believe, three special requirements, if he is to make of his diplomacy the effective instrument which all Americans would like it to be.

First, he must vigorously spread as much information as possible about the diplomatic steps he contemplates. Some things cannot be told—everyone understands that. But in his administration there has never been a time when a steady flow of information was more important: to offset the mistrust arising from Watergate; to give people some greater measure of assurance about a man in Mr. Nixon's adverse position being at the negotiating table with a hard and sharp adversary. It is not enough for the public to see Dr. Kissinger give another of his expert briefings. It is Mr. Nixon who inspires unease and it is he personally who must minister to it.

Then, the President would be well advised to stop playing politics with foreign policy. He must stop standing up before hand-picked audiences and giving self-serving plugs for his own statescraft. Such appearances only feed an already pervasive public tendency to question his motives—which is the last thing his diplomacy, or his politics, needs.

He does not encourage people to believe he is acting in the national interest by giving the impression that he is acting in his personal interest. The President may feel that foreign policy is his best defense against impeachment—and it well may be at this stage. But his diplomacy would be an even better defense if it were plainly being conducted in a disinterested way.

Finally, the President cannot lay off upon those trying to impeach him the blame for any disabilities which may weaken his effectiveness to conduct foreign policy. For those he has only himself to blame. And for their remedy he must look to means other than diplomacy.

NEW YORK TIMES
29 March 1974

Specter of Watergate at U.S.-Soviet Talks

By HEDRICK SMITH

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, March 28 — For the first time in two years, the Watergate affair has had some discernible impact on important Soviet-American negotiations.

During Secretary of State Kissinger's talks here with Leonid I. Brezhnev, each side went out of its way to assure the other that despite Mr. Nixon's Watergate troubles, it was still committed to improving relations, regardless of personalities.

The very need to make such commitments in public, through the ritualistic language of toasts and communiqués suggested how much Watergate and Mr. Nixon's personal future are now on Moscow's mind as well as Washington's.

Officially the final communiqué announced that both sides would push ahead with preparations for the visit of President Nixon to Moscow. But at a Soviet reception for American correspondents, one Soviet official kiddingly asked an American journalist, "Are you looking forward to the visit of President Ford? Such jocular irreverence would have been unthinkable for Moscow a few months ago."

Other Soviet officials were particularly keen to probe and question the Washington corre-

spondents traveling with Mr. Kissinger about the likelihood of impeachment proceedings against the President. In their private comments, they showed new respect for the power and autonomy of Congress.

The Watergate factor was undoubtedly one reason for the disappointing results of the Brezhnev-Kissinger talks. For Mr. Kissinger came here with a weak negotiating hand and the Soviet leadership obviously felt no compulsion to rush toward compromise with a weakened Administration.

The tables have turned dramatically since the spring of 1972 when Mr. Nixon's first Presidential visit was being prepared. Then, the Russians knew privately that they were headed for a disastrous harvest and that they needed both American wheat and an arms agreement to signal formally to the world that the United States accepted the Soviet Union as a nuclear equal.

This spring, Mr. Kissinger arrived not only with his President trying to hold Congress at bay but also with the Atlantic alliance rent with fundamental divisions. This situation undercut any chance for him to act as interlocutor with Moscow for the divided West on such major East-West issues as reductions of military forces in the center of Europe or terms for a European security conference.

On arms limitations, Moscow knows that the Nixon Administration is divided and may

well wonder whether Mr. Nixon would be able to persuade Congress to accept any deal to which Moscow might ultimately agree. Again, reason to pause to see how the power struggle over the Presidency is resolved.

With Marshal Andrei A. Grechko, the Soviet Defense Minister, now in the Politburo, Mr. Brezhnev must apparently move more carefully on the arms issue. Marshal Grechko's rapid return home from a visit to Iraq pointed up his importance in the exchanges with Mr. Kissinger.

Rather consistently in the last three months, the 70-year-old marshal has taken a more wary public stance on improving relations than other top leaders and has stressed the need to push ahead with "strengthening" of the Soviet arsenal. He was invited to Mr. Kissinger's luncheon yesterday but, along with a few other Soviet officials, did not attend. Tonight, however, American officials said they attached "no special significance" to his absence.

Despite the Kremlin's unwillingness to make concessions on the hard, practical issues, the Soviet leadership quite deliberately chose Mr. Kissinger's visit to take the recent chill off Soviet-American relations and to warm up the atmosphere.

Soviet officials from Mr. Brezhnev on down fairly exuded good fellowship and optimism during Mr. Kissinger's brief stay, though they let him go home without the crucial negotiating breakthrough on arms control or the other con-

crete results he had sought.

One implication is that the Kremlin hopes a more cordial mood with Washington, after obvious recent strains, may encourage Congress to liberalize the terms of trade with the Soviet Union.

As if recognizing Mr. Nixon's impotence to move Congress on the trade issue, the Soviet leadership reportedly offered some slight flexibility on the Jewish emigration question, presumably to see whether Congress could be swayed.

A Waiting Game

But the Kremlin seems inclined to wait to see what happens on the bread-and-butter issue of lower tariffs and bigger credits before striking any major new deals with President Nixon, perhaps with the thought that the pressures of the next weeks may make his own terms softer.

Once again, the Watergate affair and Mr. Nixon's low popularity ratings at home may have an impact on a kind of deadline diplomacy by Moscow. One theory here is that the Kremlin believes Mr. Nixon will be ready to pay a high price for a successful visit, indicate a willingness to compromise, and send Mr. Kissinger back to Moscow for more negotiating.

The deliberately downbeat assessment of the talks in Mr. Kissinger's party as he flew home could be intended to belie such a Soviet view, by signaling that the Administration was prepared to forgo success when Mr. Nixon came to Moscow rather than make unacceptable compromises.

WASHINGTON POST

2 April 1974

Victor Zorza

Grechko-Brezhnev Quarrel

A last-minute piece of evidence which became available in Washington after Dr. Henry Kissinger had left for Moscow might have stopped him from making a fool of himself—but it was not passed on to him in time.

The evidence, the most authoritative statement of the Kremlin hardliners' position to appear for some time, made it clear that little if any progress could be made during Kissinger's Moscow visit. But while some government analysts in Washington now claim to have recognized it as such, and to have urged that it be sent on to Kissinger, other officials thought the information was irrelevant.

Kissinger was thus allowed to go ahead to make a series of headbanging optimistic forecasts about his Moscow visit. It is in the light of these forecasts that the visit seems to be an even greater flop than it really was.

The clue to the situation in the Kremlin came in an article by Defense Minister Andrei Grechko in the leading Soviet party journal, *Kommunist*. In the Washington "intelligence community," there has always been disagreement about the relationship between Brezhnev and party secretary Brezhnev, and the effect of this relationship on Kremlin policy-making.

Intelligence analyses of the Soviet leaders' statements made in advance of Kissinger's trip noted a January speech in which Grechko seemed to take a somewhat harder line than Brezhnev, but no undue importance was attached to this at the time. The Washington "intelligence consensus" has been based for some years on the unshakable belief that Brezhnev and Grechko are as thick as thieves.

But the latest Grechko article, evidently keyed to Kissinger's visit, particularly to the SALT negotiations, began to raise doubts even among some of the most reliable sources in the Soviet Union. Grechko was

now insisting, in opposition to a line taken in the Soviet press by writers pushing Brezhnev's detente policy, that Lenin's formula that war was the continuation of politics was "to this very day" the key to strategic policy.

The pro-Brezhnev writers had argued, although circumspectly, that the formula had become obsolete. They maintained that military strength alone would not ensure peace, and that the Soviet Union should seek the best political—rather than purely military—means to restrain the U.S. arms buildup.

Grechko drew the opposite conclusion from Lenin's formula. The only reason the "imperialists" had not launched a war so far, he argued, was the Soviet Union's military power, and continued peace could therefore be assured only by an even greater "strengthening" of Soviet defense might. Coming on the eve of Kissinger's visit to negotiate an arms limitation agreement, this was a demand to the Politburo by the military to resist his blandishments.

While this assessment of the Grechko message could be made using the tools of Kremlinology, the reason why the significance of what he was saying did not get through to U.S. policymakers may be found only by using

the even more esoteric arts of Washingtonology. Hardliners in the Washington establishment have long been concerned to play down any impression that Brezhnev and Grechko might be at odds. They feared that any acknowledgement of the conflict between the two could be used to urge the White House to offer Brezhnev the concessions he might need to keep Grechko at bay.

The prime tool of Washington, fighting is the leak, and in the weeks preceding the Kissinger visit columnists were offered rare peeks into secret intelligence analyses which showed the supposed strength of Brezhnev's position. But the columns

in The Washington Post are read as assiduously by the Kremlin's Washingtonologists as Pravda is by Kremlinologists. A Washington column by a writer generally regarded as being on the extreme right dismissed talk of a Brezhnev-Grechko rift as "barrels of hogwash." A columnist of a more liberal persuasion maintained that the "overwhelming evidence" derived from a recent intelligence analysis—showing that all Soviet leaders line up behind Brezhnev—suggested that they were eager to cut a deal with Kissinger during his Moscow visit.

The conclusions drawn by columnists from these analyses suggested that Kissinger should press Brezhnev

as hard as possible for concessions on arms, emigration, and the like. This would have been read in Moscow as an intimation of what was in Kissinger's diplomatic baggage—and it would have strengthened the position of those Soviet leaders who were trying to force Brezhnev to take a harder line.

It was the evidence of this quarrel in Moscow which made it possible to say some time before Kissinger's trip that, in the light of these auguries, he ought perhaps to start preparing for his first failure in international diplomacy. But if the Washington intelligence community learns, if only by hindsight, the importance of this type of Kremlinological evidence, his present failure could be turned to future advantage.

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LONDON TIMES
30 March 1974

DISAPPOINTMENT IN MOSCOW

Dr Kissinger's failure to make substantial progress towards an agreement on strategic arms limitation or very much else during his Moscow visit has been greeted with surprise touching upon incredulity. But this reaction has much to do with the shattered optimism of a world which has recently been starved of good news, and with Dr Kissinger's personal image as Merlin at the court of President Nixon. To close observers the meagre results of the Moscow semi-summit should not have been entirely unexpected.

The Russians, irritated by President Sadat's anxiety to improve relations between Washington and Cairo, have been trying for some time to play down the importance of Dr Kissinger's one-man missions to the Middle East. It would be his reputation not theirs which would benefit from any bilateral advance at present and they have made clear their preference to work through revived peace talks at Geneva. Similarly they have been openly critical of Western attitudes at the Vienna talks on Mutual Balanced Force Reductions and there has been no reason to expect a sudden change.

As for the Salt negotiations, the advance towards a Stage-2 agreement has been minimal over the past eighteen months. Dr Kissinger himself made a gloomy prognosis in December and then, much more significantly, warned Americans earlier this month not to expect too much too soon. But his image had grown bigger than Dr Kissinger himself and until now, despite pessimistic strategic

assessments, there remained the hope that President Nixon might be able to endorse some positive progress during his visit to Moscow in June. An agreement which is more than a bland reaffirmation of principles, must now be considered doubtful to say the least.

The Pentagon has long been worried by the steadily growing missile-power of the Soviet Union. For instance the four new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) which have been tested by the Soviet Union, three of them with multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (Mirvs) would raise the throw-weight of Russia's ICBM fleet to between ten and twelve million pounds, between five and six times that of the United States equivalents. Until recently the American Salt team had been concentrating upon detailed proposals to deal with the growing quantity and quality of Soviet missiles—while the Soviet delegation had offered similarly detailed proposals to curb the progress of American technology and to remove the nuclear threat posed by American forward-based aircraft.

Hopes of a breakthrough being achieved during Dr Kissinger's visit were partly based upon a reported switch in the American approach. Instead of detailed proposals, which involve obvious difficulties, the United States would now try to establish two general principles. The first would aim at overall equality in weapon systems, while allowing each superpower to select whichever systems it preferred. The second would seek equality in the throw-weight of land-based

ICBMs. Together these two principles would establish nuclear "equivalence"—a characteristic Pentagon word—while still allowing considerable flexibility.

One must assume that this new American approach has so far failed to win friends and influence people in Moscow. Reports of Dr Kissinger's visit are short on detail but it is doubtless the second, directed at the Soviet emphasis on massive land-based missiles, which is particularly hard for the Russians to accept. The Soviet Union would surely prefer to see a form of quid pro quo involving the United States strategic bombers—each of which can after all fly a number of missions compared with the once-only flight of an ICBM. Each superpower's nuclear arsenal has about 80 per cent of its megatonnage concentrated in about 20 per cent of its weapons. And whereas the huge SS-9 land-based missiles figure prominently in the Soviet Union's 20 per cent of hyperpower, the United States bombers play an equally significant role in the American 20 per cent.

Dr Kissinger's negotiating position is not helped by domestic pressures in the United States. Too much compromise on Salt would quickly invoke the accusation that defence interests were being sacrificed on the altar of Watergate, and would erode remaining personal support for the President among Republican hawks. However much compromise and flexibility may be in the long-term interests of the United States it must now be that much more difficult to persuade the United States that it is so.

WASHINGTON POST
29 March 1974

Stephen S. Rosenfeld

Jackson: Advice And Dissent

As Henry Kissinger and then Richard Nixon head to the Kremlin, the "third man" with them at the table is Sen. Henry Jackson. By the power he wields on Soviet-related issues in the Congress and by the possibility that he may become President in 1976, the Washington State Democrat has a unique role in American national security policy.

Jackson, sensitive to the constitutional separation of powers and reluctant to crowd Nixon personally, insists that "I don't inject myself into policy." With the patient air of a schoolmaster who finds a student slow to learn, he says his role is "tell Henry... stiffen Henry"—by offering Kissinger his own, skeptical analyses of events and by providing the Secretary of State with the congressional stiffening which Jackson regards as essential to successful negotiation.

He finds James Schlesinger, whom he knew and admired before the Secretary of Defense came to town, not only "bright" but "tough." It's by coincidence not coordination that he and Schlesinger lean to the same strategic views, he says. Jackson sees Kissinger and Schlesinger as policy rivals. "But

who will prevail? The President hasn't decided. I don't know. The great mystery in this administration is who's making the decisions."

In the Senate debate on the 1972 strategic arms accords, Jackson recalls, he warned that Soviet missile throw-weight could be doubled—"and it's coming to pass." The administration justified the uneven terms of SALT I on the basis that Soviet momentum had to be stopped and that in SALT II the U.S. would press for equality, Jackson observes. But: "The administration is now hard pressed to fulfill its assurance of equality. The Soviets have other ideas."

Jackson believes Mr. Nixon was "mistaken" to set himself a 1974 target date for a SALT II agreement on offensive arms. The President is "beleaguered, weak." A SALT deal at the June summit would be "dangerous."

"Look at the impeachment schedule. How can Nixon focus? He prides himself on foreign policy but he's distracted. If someone were to write a scenario for disaster, it's all there."

In a basic difference, Jackson rejects the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of trying to build a web of interlocking interests between the two great powers in order to blunt their political and strategic rivalry. "I don't buy it," he says flatly.

Rather, he holds that the first task of detente is to loosen the Soviet government's grip on its own people, a result to be brought about by offering substantial credits ("economic assistance"), which, he is convinced, the Kremlin craves and can get nowhere else. Jackson acknowledges that no position can be pushed indefinitely with the Russians but he thinks the administration has seriously underestimated the political and human-rights price the Russians will pay for credits.

He thinks that a detente that does not produce results in terms of a loos-

ening of Soviet society and a more moderate foreign policy—look how Moscow acted in the Mideast last October, he says, how Gromyko recently "stirred up the Syrians," how Moscow now urges the Arabs to continue the oil embargo—is not a detente.

After the 1972 election, Jackson discussed the trade-emigration issue with a high Russian official, and he then set down his proposals for a smooth and regular emigration flow in a letter (copy to Kissinger), which went unanswered. Jackson and his staff receive lesser Soviet types, such as journalists, from time to time. He is not bothered by Soviet attacks on him ("polemics"), and he stays open to whatever Russian bids are made to keep in touch. An invitation to visit the Soviet Union was dangled indirectly before him earlier this year. Jackson did not respond and no direct invitation has been forthcoming.

Recently, the public Soviet line on Jackson took a certain new serious turn. From berating him as a tool of the "military-industrial complex" and "Zionism," the Russians began talking about "the overambitious and irresponsible Senator from Washington" as possibly the next President. ("A bit premature," Jackson responds, grinning.) "There is no greater threat to peace than such politicians pushing to power," Moscow Radio told its American audience.

Whether Jackson is telling the stern truth about the world or whether he is spoiling the possibility of better times, is, of course, a matter of some controversy in the United States. Personally, I'm unsure. What is much less in controversy, however, is that by each step of their own which arouses American anxieties and leads Americans to question the value of detente, the Russians are helping put Jackson in the White House.

NEW YORK TIMES
28 March 1974

U.S. URGED TO ACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS

House Unit Calls for Focus
on Violations Abroad

By DAVID BINDER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 27—A House subcommittee called on the Nixon Administration today to pay greater attention to the violation of human rights in foreign countries.

A report issued by 8 of the 11 members of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements asserted that "the prevailing attitude" of the Administration favored power politics at the expense of human rights. This, it said, "has led the United States to support

bracing governments which practice torture and unabashedly violate almost every human rights guarantee pronounced by the world community."

The 51-page report charged that the United States had "disregarded human rights for the sake of other assumed interests" in relations with South Vietnam, Spain, Portugal, the Soviet Union, Brazil, Indonesia, Greece, the Philippines and Chile.

The report, submitted under the name of the subcommittee chairman, Representative Donald M. Fraser, Democrat of Minnesota, makes 29 recommendations for improving United States policy on international human rights issues.

Dissents were made by Republican representatives, H. R. Gross of Iowa and Edward J. Derwinski of Illinois, and by L. H. Fountain, Democrat of North Carolina.

State Department Replies

recommended that the Administration "treat human rights factors as a regular part of United States foreign policy decision-making" by creating new institutional forms in the State Department, including an office for human rights.

In an initial response, the State Department spokesman, John F. King, said at a noon news session that the department had already responded to the subcommittee's attention to human rights questions by making several administrative changes.

He said that, being "carefully tuned" to the 15 hearings conducted by the subcommittee between August and December last year, the department had appointed a full-time human rights assistant, Charles Runyan 3d, in the Office of the Legal Adviser. In addition, it designated Warren E. Hewitt as officer in charge of legal and human rights in the Office of United Nations Political Affairs.

Mr. King said that the State

Department's response to the House report after studying its other recommendations and conclusions.

Status of Women Covered

At a news conference held in conjunction with issuance of the report, Representative Fraser said that he had decided to begin hearings on human rights last summer because he believed that in the period in which cold-war passions had receded "protection of human rights is often a better measure of the performance of government than is ideology."

The subcommittee's recommendations cover a wide range of human rights issues, urging that the United States act on its own or in United Nations forums to try to prevent other governments from practicing torture and massacre and to prohibit the use of fragmentation bombs, incendiary weapons and other arms that "cause unnecessary suffering" among civilians.

Recommendations also

deal with the status of women and with discrimination against blacks in South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories.

NEW YORK TIMES
4 April 1974

Détente: Some Qualms and Hard Questions

By Matthew B. Ridgway

PITTSBURGH—"Détente," I believe, poses the potentially gravest danger to our nation of all the problems we face. Whether it is to prove a siren's call to lure us to our destruction, or the first long step toward defusing the terrible threat of nuclear warfare and worldwide holocaust, no man can today predict with any assurance.

But what any reasoning person can clearly perceive is the distinct possibility that treaties can be abrogated or ignored, that solemn undertakings by the Soviet leadership can be deliberately flouted or repudiated and that an overnight reversion to the hard-line policies of a former Soviet Government can take place.

Against these possibilities this country must have ample safeguards, for we are dealing not with the fate of our own nation, though that may well be what we are doing, but with the fate of a civilization, the fate of the fundamentals on which our nation and the free world have built that civilization through two millennia.

What must be done is to critically and coldly examine and analyze every facet of this problem through the widest practicable public debate and then to make basic decisions and formulate policy guidelines.

Fortunately, it appears that an assessment of where we may be going, for what reasons, and for what guarantees of national benefits, is being made, constructively, by highly quali-

fied individuals, in and out of Government, whose intellectual honesty, integrity, competence and devotion to our country command respect.

There can be no real lessening of tensions, except in an atmosphere of mutual trust. Such trust does not exist. Positive action, not mere words, by the Soviet Government will be required over an extended period to create such trust. For America's part, I fail to see how it can exist in view of the unrelieved evidence of the actions taken and the courses pursued by the Soviet Government over the last fifty years, the frequently expressed fundamental objective of spreading its form and concept of government throughout the world—in short, of its aim of world domination.

Would it be in our national interest to extend long-term credits to the Soviet Union for the development and marketing of Siberian oil and gas reserves in exchange for Soviet promises to let us share them at fair prices years hence; to furnish technology that we have developed and that the Russians lack and eagerly seek; to continue to pare our military strength while the Soviet Union continues to augment its own in the nuclear and conventional fields, as it has been doing for the last five years; to consent to the present disparity in nuclear capabilities brought about by our 1972 agreement on limiting strategic weapons; to agree to a common percentage in the reduction of armed forces in Europe, leaving the Soviet Union in its present position of greater strength—another Soviet proposal?

These are hard questions of immense significance to us and to the free world. They demand hard thinking.

Under the vision of those who established our form of government, mankind's fires of imagination were kindled. They burned with an intense flame and spread over much of the world. They have yet to be extinguished. But now in the continuing erosion of morals and ethics, and in the apathy and muddled thinking of many of our own people today, they have been allowed to burn dangerously low.

We now have before us in our greatest hour for two centuries, an opportunity to show the world whether we are determined to keep those fires burning; whether we shall be found too lacking in integrity, too weak in moral courage, too timid in planning, too irresolute in execution to set before Almighty God and mankind an example of those principles, faithfully adhered to, on which our Founding Fathers staked "their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor"—whether we will show the world an example of what in our hearts we know is eternally right.

In this Bicentennial era, the choice is ours to make.

Matthew B. Ridgway, now a retired general, served as Supreme Commander of Allied Powers in both Europe and the Far East and was Army Chief of Staff from 1953 to 1955.

NEW YORK TIMES
25 March 1974

EXPERT OPPOSES NEW NERVE GASES

Briton Says Disadvantages
of Weapon Sought by U.S.
Outweigh the Advantages

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 23—A British expert on chemical warfare contends that the disadvantages of a new family of nerve gases that the United States Army wants to produce far outweigh any potential advantages.

In a scientific paper being circulated, Dr. Julian Perry Robinson, a research fellow at

the University of Sussex in England, says that these binary nerve gases are not needed as a deterrent to chemical warfare, would be substantially inferior militarily to the present nerve gases and would greatly complicate efforts for an international ban on the production of chemical weapons.

The objections by Dr. Robinson, who is regarded as an international authority on chemical warfare, are being raised at a time when the National Security Council is engaged in a broad review of the Nixon Administration's position on chemical warfare.

One objective of the review, according to officials, is to determine whether the Army should proceed with the production of the gases, and, if so, what effect this would have on international efforts to limit the production of chemical weapons.

The binary nerve gases con-

sist of two chemical agents, which, when kept separate, are relatively harmless but when combined, such as in an artillery shell after it has been fired, produce a lethal nerve gas. Largely because the binaries would be far safer to handle, transport and store than the present nerve gases, the Army contends that they would represent a "significant improvement in modernizing" its chemical warfare capability.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency believes that the binary gases, because of the ease of their production, would bring chemical warfare within the grasp of less developed nations and thus greatly complicate international efforts supported by the Administration, to stop the production of chemical weapons.

The same argument is raised by Dr. Robinson in his paper, which he will present at a symposium on chemical weapons

that the American Chemical Society will hold in Los Angeles on April 1.

"A significant diminution of the relative military strength in the world of the United States [and other nuclear powers] could result if nerve gas, which is a relatively cheap weapon of great potential, were to proliferate around the world," he concludes.

\$200-Million Cost

Furthermore, he says, a decision by the United States to proceed with the production of binary nerve gases "would almost certainly mean an end" to the negotiations in the Geneva Disarmament Conference on banning the production of chemical weapons, and with it "a prospect for improving United States security to a far greater extent than the binaries ever could."

The army has estimated that it would spend at least \$200-

million on binary munitions for its larger artillery shells. But Dr. Robinson found the artillery shell program to be but "the tip of a substantial iceberg" and estimated that the Army would ultimately spend upward of \$2-billion replacing the present stockpiles of nerve gases.

Dr. Robinson found that the Army was overstressing the environmental and safety advantages of the binary gases.

Noting that accidents with the present nerve - gas weapons have been "extremely rare in the past," he asked:

"Of all the environmental problems facing the United States today, does the nerve gas one really have sufficient priority to warrant the purchase of a \$2-billion solution?"

On strictly military grounds, Dr. Robinson questioned whether the binary gases would enhance the deterrent

posture of the United States against the use of nerve gases by another nation.

He acknowledged that the binary gases could be moved more easily into likely combat areas, but he suggested that the transportation of massive tonnages of nerve gas into Europe, for example, would "encourage the misperceptions of intent" on the part of the Soviet Union and "inflate the appearance of the threat" that

the nerve gases are supposed to be deterring.

Should deterrence fail, Dr. Robinson said, the binary gases could be used in "considerably smaller number of combat situations" than the present gases, would increase the effectiveness of enemy protective measures, and would be up to five times less efficient in their effect on targets.

NEW YORK TIMES
4 April 1974

U.S. Fertilizer Shortage Expected to Be Damaging to Many Poorer Nations

By ROY REED

Special to the New York Times

NEW ORLEANS, April 3 —

A shortage of chemical fertilizers for the next two to four years could diminish food production in some of the poorer nations and hold down rising crop yields in the United States and other developed nations.

Experts in the United States Government say the shortage could be especially painful in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh if those nations do not have good weather during the next several growing seasons.

The Economic Research Service of the United States Agriculture Department warned recently that rising prices and shortages of fertilizers could hurt all of the less developed nations of the world.

"Wheat and rice varieties that characterize the 'green revolution' produced no more than traditional varieties unless fertilized and irrigated, the research service said in a report. "High fertilizer prices and limited foreign exchange leave less developed countries vulnerable."

Problems at Factories

The research service said the less developed countries depended on imports for about one-third of their nitrogen and phosphate fertilizers. Their own fertilizer factories regularly operate at far less than capacity because of shortages of raw materials and electric power, labor problems and faulty equipment, the report said.

The fertilizer shortage should have far less impact in the United States, various experts say, because United States soil is not worn from centuries of intensive farming and it requires less fertilizer to produce bountiful crops.

Nevertheless, the fertilizer shortage is becoming a political problem in this country. Farmers in some areas, particularly in the Middle West, have not been able to buy all the fertilizers they wanted during the last several months.

They are bringing increasing pressure on their Congressmen and the Agriculture Department as they see their hopes for this year for record profits threatened. To take full advantage of rising farm prices,

they want to apply the extra fertilizer that pushes yields above normal.

No Proof of Collusion

Some farmers suspect the shortage has been contrived to drive fertilizer prices higher. Government officials suspect there may be some hoarding by speculators, but they say they have no evidence of collusion or manipulation by the large fertilizer producers.

The Agriculture Department predicts that phosphate fertilizers will run 12 per cent short of demand in the United States this year and that nitrogens will be 5 per cent short. The Fertilizer Institute, a private association of producer companies, predicts a 15 per cent shortage of nitrogen and a 10 per cent shortage of phosphate.

Edwin M. Wheeler, president of the institute, predicted that India, for one, would need one million more tons of fertilizer than it would get this year. He said fertilizer producers were "under tremendous pressures from every country in the world."

A strain on American fertilizer production facilities has led to pressure to cut exports and keep the fertilizers at home for American farmers. About 125 members of the House of Representatives have signed a bill that would embargo fertilizer shipments. The fertilizer industry has agreed voluntarily to limit exports until June 30.

Some Government experts now believe the anti-export policy may be shortsighted. If nations such as India are not able to buy American fertilizers now, they say, they may have to plead later for free food to prevent citizens from starving.

J. Dawson Ahalt, deputy to the Director of Agricultural Economics in the Agriculture Department, called the United States policy of limiting fertilizer exports "a two-edged sword."

"It's terribly serious and terribly alarming," he said in Washington last week.

The main chemical fertilizers are nitrogen, phosphates and potash. All three are plentiful in various parts of the world, but, for a number of reasons, nitrogen and phosphate are not being processed into usable forms of fertilizer in large

enough quantities to meet the growing demand.

The reasons for the shortages are complex, but the main ones seem to be continued increases in farming acreages and inadequate manufacturing and mining facilities.

Corn, Wheat and Cotton

In the United States alone, farmers this year are expected to harvest 339 million acres. That is 17 million acres, or 5 per cent, more than last year. It is 46 million acres more than in 1972. Most of the increased acreage this year will be planted in corn, wheat and cotton because of exceptional increases in their prices.

The situation elsewhere is similar. Many foreign farmers suffered from a widespread drought in 1972. Then farm prices went up in 1973. They want to plant more this year to capitalize in the rising prices.

Fertilizer companies overexpanded during the nineteen-sixties to take advantage of the worldwide "green revolution." Fertilizer prices dropped when manufacturing capacity outran demand. The companies stopped building new plants and cut back on maintenance of the old ones.

When demand began to catch up with supply two or three years ago, the leaders of the industry remembered the economic pinch of the nineteen-sixties and balked at spending more millions on expansion until they could be sure it would be profitable. They seem now to have overcome their fears. However, building a new fertilizer plant takes up to two to four years.

There are other problems, ranging from environmental disputes to shortages of raw materials and energy.

Most of the phosphate in this country is mined in central Florida. The material is in the fossilized bones of land and sea animals packed in thick layers under the soil of the orange groves and pastures east of Tampa. The material lies mostly in an area 40 miles wide and 50 miles long that the industry calls "bone valley."

Bone valley was in the news earlier this month when the leaders of the phosphate industry there complained that they were unable to get enough rail-

road cars to ship their product to American farmers for spring planting. Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz intervened and the Interstate Commerce Commission ordered 1,100 more cars to the area.

However, transportation is only the beginning of the industry's problems in Florida. After recovering from the economic slump of the nineteen-sixties, the state was hit by the electrical power shortage that plagues much of the Eastern Seaboard in the nineteen-seventies.

R. E. Schulz, manager of mining for the minerals division of the Mobil Chemical Company at Nichols, Fla., said Mobil's production had been interrupted by power shutdowns 11 times since Jan. 1. Other firms have similar complaints.

The industry has found no other way to retrieve phosphate from the earth except by strip mining. In spite of land reclamation projects in recent years, huge parts of central Florida are pockmarked from the gouging of draglines. The industry has become a target of environmental groups and ecology-minded political figures such as Gov. Reuben Askew and Senator Lawton Chiles.

A proposal is pending with the Interior Department for four large phosphate companies to strip mine in the Osceola National Forest in northern Florida. It is being opposed by most state government officials and every wildlife and environmental group in Florida.

The governing body of Hillsborough County (Tampa) gave permission last week for the Brewster Phosphates Company to mine 18,300 acres in the southeastern part of the county. But permission was granted only after the county commission enacted stringent controls including requiring "absolute liability" for any damage to surrounding property.

Several of the phosphate companies that are ready to expand their mining and manufacturing face an additional problem. Draglines are hard to get. It takes 36 to 40 months to have one built and delivered. The dragline is the huge, electrically operated machine that scoops away the earth and digs out the phosphate. One company lost considerable mining time recently when a drag-

line fell into a pit that had just been dug.

The companies that produce nitrogen fertilizer have different but equally severe problems. Most nitrogen in the United States is manufactured from natural gas, which is becoming scarce in this country. Natural gas curtailments last year reduced nitrogen production by about 350,000 tons, according to the Agriculture Department's Economic Research Service. That is not considered a substantial loss, but the experts fear that the problem will get worse.

"How are you going to expand when you can't buy gas at any price?" asked Mr. Wheeler, the president of the fertilizer institute.

The Senate last month passed a resolution urging the Federal Power Commission to make more gas available for fertilizer production to encourage producers to build more nitrogen manufacturing facilities. The commission is to hold hearings on that later this spring.

Potash is not in short supply yet but it could become a problem later this year, Mr. Wheeler said. Canada produces 65 per cent of the potash used in the United States. A reluctance by the Canadian Government to permit additional mining and a shortage of railroad cars there this year are threatening to slow the supply, he said.

Some farmers have expressed doubt that the fertilizer short-

age is genuine. Farmers interviewed by a New York Times reporter in the Middle West recently raised the possibility that the shortage was contrived by someone in the industry to raise fertilizer prices. Prices have skyrocketed during the last several months after sharp drops during the nineteen-sixties and early nineteen-seventies.

The price increases came after the Cost of Living Council decontrolled fertilizer Oct. 25 to try to balance domestic and export prices. Foreign prices were much higher, and were drawing off significant amounts of the United States' production.

'Last High Dollar'

After decontrol, domestic prices shot up. A government survey Jan. 5 found that producers of the three major fertilizers had increased their United States prices an average of 65 per cent since Oct. 25. The increases were passed on to farmers.

Although the production and other problems that have led to the current shortage appear to be genuine, there is suspicion at some levels in the Government that at least a few speculators may be holding back some amounts of fertilizer waiting for higher prices. Whether enough could be held back to seriously affect the nation's supply is not known. The government has not tried to monitor inventories.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

29 March 1974

Turkey plans to lift opium ban; U.S. relations strained

By Sam Cohen
Special to

The Christian Science Monitor

Istanbul, Turkey

The Turkish poppy, expected to reappear soon in the fields of western Anatolia, already has started to show its poisonous effects on the relations between the U.S. and Turkey.

The new government's intention to lift the opium ban, enforced in 1972 following American pressure, has become a heated political issue between the two allies. Tension is running high in Turkey and there are signs of a new wave of anti-Americanism.

Observers are concerned the clock could be turned back in U.S.-Turkish relations to attitudes of the late 1960's, when anti-American feelings soared over the Cyprus issue.

Plans under study

Premier Bulent Ecevit's coalition government is expected to announce soon a total end to the poppy-growing ban. Recently the administration has decided to allow the planting of poppies only in state-owned experimental farms in order to preserve the seeds, which are regarded as of the highest quality in the world. This is seen as the first significant step towards reintroduction of the poppy cultivation in private farms as well.

In fact the government is now discussing plans drawn up by the Ministry of Agriculture and already approved by the cabinet's economic agency for the lifting of the ban. Under the program, the cultivation of poppy will be allowed on fields limited to about 50,000 acres, under license. The controlled cultivation is expected to yield 200 tons of crude opium per year. A state agency will buy the poppy directly from the farmers for 15 lira (about \$1) a kilogram (2.2 pounds).

Government sources say the culti-

vation of poppy will be resumed next fall.

Meantime talks between Washington and Ankara on the question are continuing. Washington is pressing for continuation of the ban and seems prepared to help the 100,000 Turkish farmers who are said to have been suffering economically from the prohibition. The U.S. is paying Turkey a \$35 million grant for compensation to the farmers and for the introduction of substitute crops.

Determination seen

However, Ankara does not seem to want to use the issue for bargaining or pry more money from the U.S. Foreign Minister Turan Guner said recently "Money is not important. We cannot allow the farmers to depend on charity of a foreign country, no matter how friendly that country may be."

American diplomats here think that the Ecevit government is determined to go ahead with its plan to lift the ban. Their concern is that any harsh move to prevent it may cause more damage than good.

In fact, some unofficial angry reaction for the U.S. already has provoked resentment and tension here. Two U.S. congressmen, Reps. Lester Wolf and Charles B. Rangel, who came to Turkey on a fact-finding mission, were coolly received. When they were quoted as saying that Congress may revise the foreign aid program to Turkey if the ban is lifted, Turkish parliamentarians, politicians, and newspapers reacted strongly.

The congressmen and other American diplomats who visited the opium-growing areas were told by farmers that they wanted to go back to the cultivation of opium, more than anything else. One diplomat observed that poppy growing had been "a way of life" for these people for centuries. Indeed the Turkish farmer — who does not use the opium as a drug

himself — draws several benefits from the by-products as cooking oil, fuel and fodder.

Farmers long critical

The farmers have been most unhappy with the ban. Their main complaint was that nothing or very little was done in way of introducing substitute crops or new jobs.

The Americans blame previous Turkish governments and agencies for this, claiming that they were unable to produce or implement regional development projects, which Washington was prepared to finance. "The Turks are going the easy way, by lifting the ban and keeping the farmers poor, instead of trying to introduce new crops and improve their living conditions," a high-ranking U.S. diplomat said.

The government, and almost all the parties, argue that the ban was imposed by an Army-appointed government and therefore did not reflect the wishes of the people. With a democratic regime now, it appears inevitable that such an unpopular measure should be revoked. The Turks say that any attempt by the U.S. to influence Turkey to maintain the ban is an "interference in its internal affairs and sovereignty."

Competition cited

Another argument is that the Turkish farmers cannot be forced "to pay the bill for other people" who use drugs. Said a Turkish editor, "It's like asking the car factories in Detroit not to manufacture automobiles, because they cause accidents here."

The Turks also say, on the ground of recent international studies indicating that the world output of raw opium was inadequate for medicinal use, that Turkey should not be stopped from producing the world's best-quality poppy. Reports that the U.S. was ordering large quantities of opium from India for medicinal use provoked an angry reaction here. Foreign Minister Guner said, "This

means our legitimate income will flow from now on to other countries."

The American-trained Premier Ecevit seems to be aware of the "humanitarian problems," as he puts it, that opium causes, particularly in the U.S. He wants for this reason to keep the opium production in Turkey "limited and controlled." He is inter-

ested in a close cooperation with U.S. authorities on this to prevent illicit growing and smuggling.

In the light of the past experience American experts doubt that this would be possible. Before the ban, experts estimated that 80 percent of the heroin smuggled into the U.S. originated from Turkish poppies.

However the Americans' immediate and main concern now is the serious political implications which the issue is causing. Emotional reactions on both sides may lead to a deterioration of U.S.-Turkish relations, at a time when the Western alliance is already facing a crisis.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
28 March 1974

Marijuana smuggling gains hold in Ceylon

By Reginald A. Nicholas
Special to
The Christian Science Monitor

Colombo, Sri Lanka
Cannabis (marijuana) extract dressed in solidified cooking fat is one of the latest techniques adopted by big-time Ceylonese dope-peddlers — working in collusion with foreign operators who ostensibly visit the country as tourists.

Demand for this extract is very considerable in the United States, Europe, and Austria because smuggling from other traditional sources has been made more difficult due to heavy surveillance by extensive and well-trained government patrols.

Illicit drug syndicates in these countries are willing to pay high prices for cannabis extract from Sri Lanka (Ceylon) which, according to the Ceylon Police Narcotics Control Division, has an exceptionally high percentage of narcotic content.

A recent chance detection by the police in the heart of the back country gem district of Ratnapura of over 250 four-gallon tins of cannabis extract, dressed in solidified cooking fat, has now confirmed suspicion in police circles here that smuggling has been going on unnoticed for quite some time on an extensive scale.

Although the results of laboratory tests in the Government Analyst's Department have not been disclosed to the public, a policeman reportedly became unconscious within minutes of smelling the extract. Similar samples of cannabis mixed in oil detected in the Scandinavian countries are said to have been sufficiently concentrated to be lethal in very small doses.

Though police and excise officials are now combing several parts of the country to trace the secret laboratories where the processing is done, dope peddlers have been able to elude them through the apparatus of their own detective service.

Few difficulties

Foreign dope peddlers do not seem to encounter much difficulty in getting the contraband out of Sri Lanka. Tourists are not subjected to intensive searching, since, the authorities argue, this would tend to discourage tourism, which the government is trying to promote in a big way to earn foreign exchange.

In any case, excise, customs, and police officials are not necessarily knowledgeable about latest styles and techniques in drug smuggling and it is not, therefore, difficult to hoodwink them.

Though a penal offense, cannabis is extensively cultivated by Ceylonese peasant farmers in crown forest reserves and lands that have been cleared for the growing of food crops. They are finding cannabis growing a more profitable cash crop than food crops.

Money advanced

Peddlers, who operate mostly through agents, advance money to peasants and provide them with agricultural inputs to increase yields.

When plants are harvested, agents transport the leaves to secret laboratories for processing. The processed cannabis is then brought to Colombo and smuggled out.

It is estimated that, under ideal conditions, between 15,000 and 17,000 plants can be successfully grown on an acre.

Detection of the growing areas is difficult. Informants are not willing to come forward to help the police because of the fear that their identity may be revealed to interested parties. Dope peddlers are rich and are believed to wield immense power and influence that they can use to get rid of those who stand in their way.

Awards not big enough

At the same time, police awards to informants are not sufficiently attractive to offset the assumed risks. Foreign agencies connected with narcotics control work have urged the government to consider giving higher monetary awards to informants.

Yet another factor is that punishment is not adequate to act as a deterrent to growers. When they are caught and fined, they are promptly released by the peddlers' agents.

Western Europe

NEW YORK TIMES
23 March 1974

Fading Prospects Of the NATO Alliance

By C. L. Sulzberger

PARIS—The North Atlantic Alliance marks its 25th anniversary this spring in a far gloomier atmosphere than had been anticipated. Whatever efforts that were still in the air to produce a gala vanished amid the exchanges of verbal brickbats between the United States and France, which is still loyal to the treaty although it quit the NATO military organization more than seven years ago. Now President Nixon, who was supposed to come to Europe as a kind of master of ceremonies, may well cancel his trip.

The actual arguments taking place are really somewhat jaded because they are not based on new developments but rehash old differences. The basic problem is that when the appearance of Soviet menace fades, the cement holding together the Western coalition begins to flake away.

Neither in times of prosperity nor in times of inflation, as today, do the fat-dripping lands of Europe want to get together and protect themselves or pay the full price—above all in terms of trade and monetary arrangements—for the U.S. protection they need instead.

Moreover, Western Europe is more interested in developing a deterrent that would frighten off Russia than it is in developing a strategy to fight a war. Such a strategy existed during the nineteen-fifties, despite shortfalls in pledged contributions, but it has been languishing since.

Now the question of a deterrent is posed with less confidence as Soviet nuclear-missile power continues to gain both in actual and in relative strength vis-à-vis the United States.

Our North Atlantic allies have come increasingly to realize that they are too weak by themselves to create any serious deterrent of their own and that the likelihood of American action to save Europe in an emergency cannot help but diminish.

Now that both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. have second-strike nuclear forces capable of destroying each other totally, it is less and less easy to imagine them employing these forces for any issue other than their respective national survival.

For lesser issues—including military operations in Europe—they might prefer accommodation to mutual destruction. This has been increasingly plain since Gen. Maxwell Taylor was named chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff by President Kennedy—after he had published a book indicating Ameri-

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

can atomic arms should only be used if United States territory or forces were directly hit.

This line of thinking produced two European reactions. One reasoned that it was more necessary than ever to retain a considerable American military presence here—to insure the kind of U.S. troop pledge General Taylor wrote about. The second reasoned that without such a presence, all Europe might become a kind of Middle East where Washington and Moscow supported client states but avoided confrontation between themselves.

It is disquieting to the allies on their 25th birthday to feel themselves slipping into a choice between even greater dependence on the U.S.A.—and paying a stiff price for it—or becoming relatively so supine that they cannot insure their continued independence against all contingencies except the national survival of the United States.

The increasing reliance on a deterrent implies two things. The allies themselves must have total confidence that the single superpower among them will act decisively, if needed, for the common interest. And the single superpower among the alliance's adversaries—in this case Russia—must be, if not equally confident of a hostile U.S. reaction, at least extremely uncertain about if, how and when it would come.

But we know that the total confidence of our allies has been eroding more or less steadily since the Taylor book (and appointment); since the Cuban crisis and Vietnam posed the dangers of involvement outside the Atlantic treaty area, and above all since the impressive gains in Soviet power.

And with this erosion of confidence among our partners—which is the background to this month's nasty public debate—one may suspect there has also been erosion in at least the degree of military uncertainty concerning potential U.S. actions as analyzed by Soviet contingency planners.

Even Joseph Luns, the ebullient and normally optimistic Dutchman who is NATO's Secretary General, admits in the alliance's official publication: "There are serious doubts about the readiness of the electorates in the Western democracies to support their governments in essential defense spending. There are equally vocal doubts expressed about the cohesion of the alliance."

WALL STREET JOURNAL

22 MAR 1974

Encounter Magazine Of Britain to Be Sold To Illinois Publisher

Prestigious Literary Monthly,
Once Funded by the CIA,
Is Set to Go to Carus Corp.

A WALL STREET JOURNAL News Roundup

Encounter magazine, a highly prestigious British literary and intellectual monthly that once was surreptitiously funded by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, will be sold to an Illinois publisher.

Carus Corp., a closely held company in La Salle, Ill., said it has agreed to take over the magazine from its three trustees: Melvin Lasky, its editor; Maurice Cranston, a professor at the University of London, and Edward Shils, a professor at the University of Chicago.

Terms weren't disclosed, but Mr. Lasky said the publication has been losing about \$20,000 a year on its monthly circulation of about 26,000. About one-third of the circulation is in the U.S.

Encounter was founded in London in 1953 by Irving Kristol and Stephen Spender and, for its first 10 years, its deficits were underwritten by the Congress for Cultural Freedom, which Mr. Lasky described as a CIA front.

In 1964, Cecil Kling, a British newspaper owner, took over a sponsorship that lasted until 1971. "The past three years we've been raising money from various private donors," Mr. Lasky said.

Throughout its history, however, none of its backers has ever tried to influence the magazine's editorial comment, Mr. Lasky insisted.

The monthly runs about 100 pages with "half a dozen new poems by new and established poets, a long short story and political, cultural and critical articles," the editor said.

Carus, the new owner, currently publishes a wide range of editorial products, ranging from Cricket magazine for children to the Monist, a scholarly quarterly of philosophy.

NEW YORK TIMES
24 March 1974

BALL CRITICIZES NIXON ON EUROPE

Ex-Official Calls President
and Kissinger 'Gaullists'

BRUSSELS, March 23 (UPI)
Former Under Secretary of
State George W. Ball says that
Secretary of State Kissinger is

cred and shows it, that President Nixon is using Europe to distract attention from Watergate, and that neither really wants a united Europe.

Mr. Ball, now a 64-year-old investment banker, was a "devils advocate" in the administration of President Johnson and is one of the most respected of the "Atlanticists," who are specialists in United States-European relations.

He said in a recent interview that both Mr. Kissinger and President Nixon are "Gaullists" who are not sympathetic to the idea of European unity.

Mr. Ball said that the current problems between the United States and Europe began when Washington, taking over leadership in the Middle East from the Europeans, failed to compel an Israeli troop withdrawal from occupied Arab territory after the six-day war in 1967. This made last October's Middle East war "inevitable," he

said.

Cites Arm Airlift

During the October war, Mr. Ball said, the United States began an arms airlift to Israel without consulting the Europeans and then complained when the Europeans, "scared to death" about their oil supply, refused to help.

"So the Europeans watched its pre-empt their leadership, then watched this leadership misused by their standards, saw the American policies cause an oil embargo," he continued.

"So there's a natural tendency for the Europeans to get back in the political act," as they did by announcing plans for a meeting with the Arab nation.

Recent verbal attacks on Europe by President Nixon and Mr. Kissinger brought the dispute to a head, he said, adding that he felt the attacks were "excessive."

Charges 'Manipulation'

"Neither Nixon nor Kissinger

has been fundamentally sympathetic to the idea of a united Europe," Mr. Ball said. "Both are Gaullists. The thrust of Kissinger's foreign policy has been away from alliances toward maneuver, toward manipulation."

Mr. Ball was under secretary of state from 1961 to 1966, under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. He had served earlier as under secretary for economic affairs.

In the closing years of the Johnson administration, Mr. Ball occupied an uncomfortable position as an official dissenter on Vietnam policy. He is out of government now, but he remains one of the influential men in government, business and academic life.

He was interviewed at the airport here while stranded by fog on his way to Geneva and London.

The former Under Secretary said that American foreign policy methods had changed. Instead of working quietly through

existing diplomatic channels, the United States carries out policy through surprise.

'Borrowed From de Gaulle'

"This system of surprise announcements was borrowed from de Gaulle," Mr. Ball said. "It made sense for the general, as the leader of a small power, to keep the world off balance. But it is inappropriate for a great power."

Mr. Ball said that he thought that Mr. Kissinger "is very tired."

"One gets past the threshold of physical and mental exhaustion," he said. "A good deal has to do with jet lag. I really don't think it [Mr. Kissinger's criticism of Europe] was calculated."

He also said that he thought some of Mr. Nixon's motivation in his critical remarks about Europe this month resulted from the "domestic stress" of Watergate.

"This criticism gratifies the blue-collar element which is xenophobic," he said.

COURANT, Hartford, Conn.

26 February 1974

Probe Asked of Ties With Sweden

By JOEL LANG

A journalist from Sweden has asked 32 congressmen, including Connecticut's two senators, to investigate U.S. diplomatic relations with Sweden.

The journalist, Sherman Adams, charged the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is trying to get American blacks in Sweden to condemn their new home as a racist country.

Adams claimed that such accusations will embarrass Sweden and divide it from the black freedom movements it supports and which the U.S. government opposes.

He made his claims two weeks ago in Washington, D.C. He also was interviewed by reporters from the Washington Post and the New York Times.

Born In Atlanta

Adams is not a native Swede. He was born in Atlanta, Ga., 36 years ago, and moved soon after with his family to Hartford. As a young child, he played baseball in Bushnell Park. He played football for Hartford Public High School as a teenager.

After high school, he turned to boxing. He fought professional matches in many arenas, including the old State Theater and Foot Guard Hall in Hartford.

Then in 1962, he was arrested in Texas for refusing to sit in the back of a railroad car. He served 43 days in jail. He came out, he says, "disgusted with the whole American system of racism."

He flew to Sweden in hopes of getting work with the country's heavyweight boxing champion, Ingemar Johansson. Once there, Adams was exposed to socialist politics and began writing.

He became deeply involved with blacks who deserted the military as sentiment grew against the Vietnam war.

Writing mostly about matters related to blacks in Sweden, Adams now has won acceptance in major Swedish newspapers.

He lives with a native Swede and has a daughter.

Still a U.S. citizen, Adams has returned to this country rarely since 1962. He returned several weeks ago for his father's funeral.

In an interview last week at The Courant, Adams said CIA involvement in Sweden grew as more and more deserters sought asylum there. Sweden led Europe in condemning the U.S. role in Vietnam.

He claimed the CIA bribed and coerced blacks to condemn Sweden as a racist country. Oc-

asionally, he said, CIA machinations were exposed.

"If you want to know why the United States has such a bad image abroad, just dig what they do," Adams said. "Even the Russians aren't so stupid."

Sweden, Adams says, "is a good country."

In Washington, Adams asked that full diplomatic relations be restored with Sweden. During the height of Swedish protest against the Vietnam War, the government let the Swedish ambassador post lapse.

As for Hartford, Adams says he barely recognizes it. Once familiar neighborhoods, such as South Arsenal and Windsor Street, have been leveled for urban renewal. He remarked on the loss of stores such as Kresge's from the downtown area.

He wondered aloud why people here seem to get so little in return for their taxes.

Some people apparently wonder about Adams. When he arrived at Kennedy International Airport in New York, he was taken aside at customs for special questioning.

His name, he said, was listed in a big black book "third line from the top on the second page."

NEW YORK TIMES

4 April 1974

Human Rights Group Sees NATO Violation of Treaty

LONDON, April 3 (Reuters)

—Amnesty International, a human rights organization, charged today that members of the North Atlantic Treaty Association violated basic principles in the treaty about safeguarding people's freedom, common heritage and civilization.

Specifically, it said that NATO was training its military personnel in torture techniques, and appealed to it to stop. Amnesty's secretariat issued the statement on the eve of NATO's 25th anniversary.

BRUSSELS, April 3 (Reuters)

—A North Atlantic Treaty Organization spokesman said today that Amnesty International was wrong when it accused alliance countries of training military personnel in torture methods.

"There have been one or two cases of torture during military schemes but these have been excesses and were followed by legal prosecutions," he said.

Near East

THE ECONOMIST MARCH 30, 1974

Indian Ocean

How to make your life harder

If the Russian navy could have planned the last two weeks, it would probably not have done anything differently. On one side the British and the Americans were jointly mounting a major assault on the explosives in the Suez canal, hurrying along the day that Soviet ships can use it to get to the Indian Ocean; on the other hand politics in both Britain and the United States threatened to undo the agreement that would give the American navy a chance to use the island of Diego Garcia, also in the Indian Ocean, to balance Soviet power in the area.

In the Suez canal a variety of explosives, including some shallow-water mines, have been piling up since the 1967 war. The Egyptians had originally wanted to do the clearance themselves, but preliminary surveys showed the job was beyond them, so they asked Britain and the United States to help. On March 22nd the American navy's senior mine-sweeping officer arrived in Cairo to discuss arrangements for deployment of his helicopter minesweepers; the previous day three Royal Navy anti-mine ships and a command ship had sailed for Suez. Since most of the sunken explosives are in the form of unexploded bombs, shells and rockets, rather than automatic sea mines, the British ships which have specialised detection equipment will probably prove more useful, if not as spectacular, as the American helicopters. The helicopters can explode the mines pretty efficiently but are not

much good at detecting things. The whole job could cost Britain and America several million pounds.

All the sea-using nations will get some benefit from having the canal opened; the Mediterranean countries in particular will find it cheaper to bring oil from the Middle East. Egypt will get the canal revenues. But in the military sense no one will benefit more than Russia. Its considerable Indian Ocean fleet now operates from Vladivostok in the Pacific; it is some 6,000 miles shorter to come from the Black Sea.

The Americans have also had a task force in the Indian Ocean since the Arab-Israeli October war. Although not as large in numbers as the Russian fleet, it has an aircraft-carrier and the support of the British and French forces in the region. What the Americans need is a base where they can do minor maintenance work, fly in supplies and spare parts, and above all operate their shore-based patrol aircraft that keep watch over the Russians' activities. Diego Garcia, a British territory, was ideal for all this; it had already had an American communications station and an airstrip. Britain and the United States agreed in principle in February to enlarge the facilities there, including the runway.

But it was not to be as easy as all that. The Nixon Administration's request for money has run into serious trouble in Congress. Not that so much money is involved—the £12m is relatively little as defence expenditure goes—but the idea of even a limited naval base in the Indian Ocean repels some senators. There are also a number who oppose the practice of making executive agreements for such purposes, and believe that a treaty—which would have to be ratified by two-thirds of the Senate—is the right document for such a commitment.

Although President Nixon could probably find the money somewhere and proceed without the consent of Congress, he is in no condition to get many more Senators angry with him.

On top of that, Britain has changed governments since the preliminary agreement was made. The Labour government has every right—and has expressed the intention—to give this particular agreement a careful look over.

States around the Indian Ocean have complained about the plans for Diego Garcia. Most of these have not only ignored the increasing Russian naval presence in the Indian Ocean (and its facilities such as those recently established at Chittagong in Bangladesh) but also attribute to the Americans intentions they do not have, including the basing of nuclear submarines and B-52s at Diego Garcia. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Moorer, and the Deputy Secretary of Defence, Mr Clements, did seem to suggest in their recent testimony to Congress that B-52s might be based there. In fact they cannot: the runway at present planned will be neither strong enough nor wide enough for these huge aircraft. Their retracting statement the next day was not as widely quoted as their original mistake.

The Americans can do without Diego Garcia. But it costs a lot of money to supply their Indian Ocean task force from the Pacific fleet, and there is a cost in lost efficiency if they cannot operate patrol aircraft routinely over the central Indian Ocean. When the Suez canal is reopened, life for the Russians will be simpler. It will be curious if America and Britain open the way for them at Suez and tie their own hands at Diego Garcia.

WASHINGTON POST
22 March 1974

The Plight of the Kurds

A TENSE AND TRAGIC showdown is being played out between the Kurds, a proud non-Arab Moslem people who want a state of their own in northern Iraq, and the government in Baghdad, which wishes to settle its centuries-old Kurdish problem and to consolidate control over oil lands coveted by Kurds. Baghdad, having strengthened its hand by arming itself heavily (with Soviet aid) and by moving in Arab colonists, offered the Kurds a formal but limited autonomy earlier this month. The Kurds, under the venerable Gen. Mulla Mustafa Barzani, rejected the offer; among other things, it deprived them of Kirkuk, Iraq's major oil center, as their capital. Iraq now threatens a military crackdown. The Kurds, with arms from Iraq's rival Iran and apparently with some help from Israel too, say they're ready to fight. Past Iraqi-Kurdish struggles have been long, brutal and inconclusive.

Through newspaper interviews, Gen. Barzani, who has no diplomatic service, has solicited American military support or "political understanding." By helping, he says, Washington could reduce Soviet influence in Iraq and, thereby, Soviet pressure on Iran and Turkey. Favored access to "Kurdistan's" oil and uranium is also

being dangled. The U.S. government, taking the position that it has received no formal request, says it has no comment. Gen. Barzani's open and growing anxiety is perhaps the best evidence of the American response.

It would be folly, of course, to encourage a Kurdish rebellion. Such a gesture would anger Iraq and its allies and worry other nations with Kurdish minorities (Turkey, Iran, Russia). The Kurds would pay.

The ironies are, however, pervasive. Iraq's two million Kurds surely have a strong claim to be regarded as a legitimate "national liberation movement." But the politics are stacked against them. Arabs who support Palestinian nationalism at the expense of Israel will not support Kurdish nationalism at the expense of one of their own. The Russians tried and failed to set up the same Gen. Barzani in a Kurdish republic in Iran in 1946. Now they back Baghdad against Barzani. The United States could well use, in the region, political leverage and oil. Barzani offers both but we are turning him down, without so much as one public word of thanks or sympathy, because the benefits come tied to unacceptable risks. It is all very unfair, to the Kurds.

NEW YORK TIMES
26 March 1974

AUSTRALIA IN PLEA TO U.S. AND SOVIET

Messages by Whitlam Urge
Restraint by Both Powers
in the Indian Ocean

Special to The New York Times

SYDNEY, Australia, March 25—Australia has called on the United States and the Soviet Union to "exercise mutual restraint" in the Indian Ocean.

The appeal, in messages from Prime Minister Gough Whitlam delivered through the Australian Embassies in Washington and Moscow, reflects concern that rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union could lead to a large-scale increase in their forces in the Indian Ocean.

The messages coincide with Secretary of State Kissinger's visit to the Soviet Union, and its is believed the aim was to have the matter placed on the agenda of Mr. Kissinger's talks with Soviet leaders.

The appeal follows expressions of disapproval within the Australian Government of United States plans to expand the American naval facility at Diego Garcia, a British-ruled island in the Indian Ocean. It is feared that the build-up at Diego Garcia may influence the Soviet Union to increase its forces in the area.

British Gave Approval

The United States reached agreement with Britain's Conservative party Government, before the British election, Feb. 28 for a \$30-million expansion of the Diego Garcia facility. The agreement is now under review by Prime Minister Wilson's new Labor party and at a news conference in Canberra last week, Prime Minister Whitlam said he would support any British diplomatic moves that might be opposed to an



The New York Times/March 26, 1974

U.S. plans to expand its base on Diego Garcia are deplored by Australians.

American build-up on Diego Garcia.

Mr. Whitlam is understood to have decided last Friday that Australia should make an approach to the United States and the Soviet Union. His deci-

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, MARCH 21, 1974

Zumwalt Backs U.S. Plan for Indian Ocean Base

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 20—Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., the Chief of Naval Operations, said today that the United States must have a naval support base in the Indian Ocean on the British-held island of Diego Garcia so as to be able to project military power into the region.


The admiral spoke at a House hearing on behalf of an Administration request for \$29-million to expand an existing naval communications station on the island so the equatorial atoll could provide refueling and maintenance for Navy forces in the Indian Ocean as well as make possible aerial reconnaissance of the area. The funds would be used to extend a runway to 12,000 feet and dredge a harbor large enough to handle a carrier task force.

Testifying before a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee, Admiral Zumwalt pictured the Indian Ocean as the area with the potential to produce major shifts in the global power balance over the next decade.

"It follows," he said "that we must have the ability to influence events in that area, and the capability to deploy our military power in the region is an essential element of such influence."

Without a naval support base on Diego Garcia, he said, the Navy would be taxed "to the absolute limit" in supporting naval operations in the Indian Ocean. He said it would be taxed to the point of reducing its abilities in other key areas, such as the Western Pacific.

While the Administration's proposal to expand United States military facilities on the island has stirred up unexpected debate on Capitol Hill and encountered public opposition



The New York Times/March 21, 1974

from most of the nations in the Indian Ocean region, the prevailing opinion here was that Congress would grant the funds for the project—although formal approval might be put

off until the regular defense appropriations bill passed later this year.

The Administration has asked for the funds as part of an emergency supplemental appropriations bill to be considered by Congress the next few weeks.

Responding to one of the main objections raised on Capitol Hill, Admiral Zumwalt argued that expansion of the Diego Garcia facility would not set off a naval race in the Indian Ocean since the Soviet Union was already "on the move" in the region and expanding its naval presence.

The Soviet Union, he said, already possesses a support system in the region "substantially more extensive than that of the United States," with access to harbors or airstrips in Somalia, Iraq and southern Yemen.

sion followed a meeting between Australian and Indian officials at which a joint approach of the two powers was recommended.

According to a Foreign Ministry source, the Australian messages noted that the states bordering on the Indian Ocean had a long-term objective of making it a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. They suggested that the most effective way to realize this goal was for both great nations to exercise restraint there, the source said.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union are said to have responded promptly to the Australian messages. The Foreign Ministry source described the United States reply as "encouraging." He said the Russians had also taken note of the Australians' concern.

At his news conference, Mr. Whitlam said Australia hoped there would be an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union "to restrict their build-up."

Australian defense and foreign

privately that Australia understands the military considerations behind the American expansion of the Diego Garcia base and express sympathy with the American position.

But Mr. Whitlam is understood to feel Australia should identify herself more closely with the aspirations of Asia and to consider it necessary for his Government to make a gesture of support for the Indian Ocean peace zone proposal.

At the same time he is under pressure from the left-wing of his Labor party to oppose any American military presence in the region.

While Australia has stopped short of demanding that the United States halt its expansion program for Diego Garcia, there is some concern in official American circles that the growing feeling against the Indian Ocean base could lead to new agitation against American bases in Australia.

Two bases—one at Pine Gap,

near Alice Springs, in the geographic center of Australia, and the other at Woomera, in the Burning Plains of South Australia—are a considerable distance from the Indian Ocean. However, a third, at Northwest Cape, in Western Australia, where the United States has a station, could be a target of anti-American feeling.

U.S. Explains Position

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 25—United States officials said today that in addition to Australia, the Governments of New Zealand and Indonesia had recently raised questions about the Navy's plans to enlarge its base on Diego Garcia.

The officials said that explanations of American defense policy had been given by Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush on his tour of the region earlier this month in response to proposals that the South Pacific and Indian Ocean be declared nuclear-free zones.

Africa

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
2 April 1974

Africa's simmering youth

Among last week's headlines were "5 Westerners Seeking Oil Are Captured (by Eritrean Liberation Front) in Ethiopia" and "Sweden triples its aid to Frelimo guerrillas (fighting Portuguese rule in Mozambique)." Virtually unnoticed by the Western press was the same week's conference of the Pan-African Youth Movement (PYM). Yet attention must be paid if the headlines of tomorrow are not to be grimmer than those of today.

For the estimated 350 delegates and observers at this fourth conference — in Benghazi, Libya — represented many more groups from all over Africa and abroad than the number at the third conference in Dakar three years ago. If this emerging activist generation meets no positive response to its demands for freedom and progress, its simmering discontent is likely to escalate in the violence to which many young Africans have already turned as "the only alternative" to vain attempts at peaceful change.

Two thrusts were emphasized in open meetings and small conversations during the conference. First, the cry for liberation from the continent's last vestiges of colonialism—whether European, as in the Portuguese lands, or African, as seen by those Eritreans fighting Ethiopian domination. Second, there is the need, represented by governmental organizations at the conference, to care for the education, growth, and livelihood of youth in lands already independent. Linking the two is an effort to foster the feeling that the youth in the latter lands cannot really consider themselves free until their brothers and sisters in all of Africa are free.

Why, they ask, does the United States, with its own history of revolutionary struggle for independence, seem to ally itself with Africa's oppressor governments rather than with the people struggling to be free? Even one of

the few evident critics of the Soviet Union at the conference winds up calling the U.S. "the greatest imperialist force of modern times." The American people know that this is not true; they can help to convey a truer image by supporting such measures as the legislative efforts to bring their country back into line with its United Nations obligation to join in economic sanctions against the racially repressive regime in Rhodesia.

The anomaly is that the Soviet Union, so nakedly imperialistic in Eastern Europe, is greeted warmly at the conference. Its representative promises solidarity with the aspirations of African youth. Representatives from its European satellites are equally fervent in support. American voices are conspicuous by their absence. When that lonely critic of the Soviet Union ventures to circulate a pamphlet stating that the PYM discriminates against liberation movements not recognized by the Soviets — and thus excludes a number that are recognized by the Organization of African Unity — he is asked to leave the meeting.

The young liberationists insist they will take aid from East or West, wherever they can get it — but only without strings. This brings a cynical smile from those who predict a lapse into subservience to Chinese or European Communist aid-givers in the absence of support from the free world.

Here is where ideals as well as material influence come into play. The young Africans seem to be clearer about what their revolution is against than what it is for. The U.S., for example, despite its acknowledged deficiencies, exemplifies at this most troubled moment the kind of fiercely cherished freedom of expression that is worth fighting for — and which the PYM, alas, does not yet seem to value sufficiently highly to welcome at its own conference.

NEW YORK TIMES
30 March 1974

CAETANO IS ADAMANT ON AFRICAN LANDS

LISBON, March 29 (UPI) — Premier Marcello Caetano has declared that Portugal has no intention of giving up her three African territories, where she has been fighting guerrillas for 13 years.

In one of his periodic "family chats" on television, Mr. Caetano said: "As long as I occupy this palace, the Portuguese overseas shall not be abandoned, in thought or heart."

The Premier made his first public allusion to a recent book by General António de Spínola, the ousted deputy chief of staff, criticizing Portugal's African policies.

Mr. Caetano dismissed General Spínola for saying in the book, "Portugal and the Future," that no military solution of the war was possible and for advocating a loose federation of Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea with Portugal.

Without mentioning the book by name, Mr. Caetano said: "the international press and our customary enemies quickly picked up and proclaimed all of that analysis that supported their aims. But they dismissed at the same time any solution that does not mean immediate surrender to the so-called liberation movements."

Far East

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
28 March 1974

Vietnam in 1974

By Charles W. Yost

New York
It seems as though it is impossible for the United States to unburden itself of Vietnam.

The administration has recently asked Congress for authority to increase military aid to South Vietnam during the current fiscal year from \$1.128 billion to \$1.6 billion, that is, for authority to spend an additional \$474 million for this purpose during the next three months. The New York Times points out that, during the first year after "peace with honor" was concluded in Paris, U.S. expenditures for weapons and ammunition in Vietnam were only 25 percent less than those of the war year 1972.

The fact is that the elaborate charade conducted at Paris was designed to bring about, not peace in Vietnam, but disengagement of U.S. forces and return of American POWs. Neither Vietnamese party was then prepared, or seems now prepared, for any political settlement which would not lead to the total elimination of the other from the South. The war, therefore, continues.

There are still in Vietnam about 4,000 American civilians in military-related jobs in support of the Saigon government. The U.S. continues to supply that government with large quantities of arms, ammunition, and highly sophisticated military aircraft. This may not be a formal violation of the Paris accord, but it is certainly a violation of its spirit.

It is argued that the North Vietnamese and their allies are also violating the accord, which they no doubt are, and that the U.S. is therefore justified in doing so. This was the argument used in the '50's and early '60's to justify America's increasing intervention.

The fundamental question is of course the old one: What is America's

national interest in Vietnam and the other Indo-China states?

In the mid '60's the administration decided its interest was so great as to justify sending there 500,000 American troops and, before it was over, sacrificing 50,000 American lives. In the early '70's the U.S. decided that was unnecessary and intolerable. Whatever happened to Vietnam was not worth such sacrifice.

But the U.S. has still not made up its mind what is the extent of its residual national interest. What is the U.S. still prepared to expend and to risk to maintain the status quo in Vietnam and Cambodia?

The administration obviously still has a profound emotional commitment, and a publicly stated military commitment, to both. In his last foreign policy report to Congress President Nixon said in this connection: "We expect our friends to observe the agreement just as we will not tolerate violations by the North Vietnamese or its allies."

This formulation has been at the root of American difficulties in Indo-China for many years. The U.S. would have been and would still be more likely to keep the peace if it reversed it, if it said "America will not tolerate violations" by its friends, and it expects the other side to observe the agreement to the same extent its friends do. Such a formula would be both more principled and, one would have thought, easier to enforce.

That, however, is not the administration's policy. In a news conference last August Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger said the U.S. would support South Vietnamese forces from the air "in the event of overt North Vietnamese aggression." It is primarily for that purpose that the U.S. maintains large air forces (nearly 40,000 men) at bases in Thai-

land.

Since Mr. Schlesinger spoke the Congress has adopted a joint resolution on war powers which provides, inter alia, that the President "shall consult with Congress before introducing U.S. armed forces into hostilities." One wonders whether the administration would undertake such consultation before commencing aerial bombing "in the event of overt North Vietnamese aggression."

The present ambiguous situation in Indo-China, in which the U.S. is three-quarters out and one-quarter in, has two grave disadvantages. First, it risks leaving to Hanoi the decision whether, by escalating the fighting, to drag the U.S. back into combat, and incidentally by so doing gravely to damage its detente with China. Second, even if hostilities are not escalated beyond the present level, U.S. involvement relieves Presidents Thieu and Lon Nol from the need to seek political settlements.

It would seem that the clear implication of America's decisions to withdraw its forces from Vietnam and to stop bombing in Cambodia is that maintenance of the status quo is not vital to the national interest of the U.S. If the status quo is not vital to the U.S., it is high time it removed its thumb from the balance and let it assume whatever its natural equilibrium may prove to be.

The latest Viet Cong proposal for a political settlement may or may not be serious, but the only way to find out is to negotiate. Any further U.S. aid to President Thieu, other than purely economic, should be withheld until he negotiates seriously, honestly and to some conclusive end.

The author of this article writes from a background of 40 years as a United States diplomat.

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WASHINGTON POST

3 April 1974

Kennedy Bares Envoy's Message

Viet Cable Stirs Controversy

By Dan Morgan

Washington Post Staff Writer

U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Graham A. Martin advised the State Department last month to deny Congress an "honest and detailed" answer to inquiries about American policy in Indochina, according to a confidential cable made public yesterday.

In releasing the March 21

cable on the floor of the Senate yesterday, Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D. Mass.) described it as an "outrage" to every member of Congress.

At the same time, Kennedy accused Martin of "unwarranted interference" in the work of General Accounting Office investigators looking into foreign aid expenditures in South Vietnam on be-

The release of the Martin

cable came in the midst of a growing controversy between the State Department and Congress over the extent and purpose of continued American aid to Indochina.

On March 13 Kennedy asked Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger for "comprehensive comment" on nine questions relating to U.S. objectives and spending programs in Southeast Asia.

On March 25 Kissinger re-

sponded. His letter said Ambassador Martin believed that the government "must continue to provide the best answers to the concerned questions many Americans have about our Indochina policy."

The Kissinger response was at odds with Martin's March 21 cable, which said:

"I think it would be the height of folly to permit Kennedy, whose staff will spearhead the effort (to reduce economic and military aid), the tactical advantage of an hon-

est and detailed answer to the questions of substance raised in his letter."

He added that the questions were "cleverly drawn to thoroughly mix up apples and oranges. Any substantive answer would permit another calculated campaign of distortion that would preempt the attention the presentation of the administration's case should receive."

He urged that the Kennedy requests be brushed aside with a "short, routine reply from the assistant secretary of state for congressional affairs."

Martin's message also disputed the authority of Kennedy's Senate Refugees Subcommittee to conduct such an investigation.

Martin, 61, who took up his post last summer, has a reputation as a tough career diplomat. In Saigon, he has strongly supported the government of President Nguyen Van Thieu while running the American embassy with a tight hand. He also has imposed a curtain of secrecy around the work of the American mission.

A State Department spokesman, in confirming the authenticity of the cable, said the department "deplored" the unauthorized leak. He said it was the prerogative of Ambassador Martin to make "any internal recommendations he sees fit," adding, "As you

know, the secretary decided otherwise."

Last month he fired off an 18-page cable to the department (which he asked to have made public) attacking a long New York Times article on the American aid program. He said the article contained "slanted" reporting.

In the cable released by Kennedy yesterday, Martin renewed an earlier charge that some were trying to aid Hanoi by drastically reducing military and economic aid to South Vietnam.

At the heart of Senate inquiries into the aid program has been concern that administration commitments in Indochina are in conflict with Congress' intention to limit U.S. involvement.

Kennedy has said the administration's commitments are costing \$3 billion this year. Kennedy said yesterday that Kissinger's response showed "honesty and willingness to clarify U.S. policy." He said he regretted that this attitude apparently was not shared by Martin.

"The cable raises the most profound questions about which country and whose interests Ambassador Martin is truly representing," Kennedy said.

Kennedy also charged that Martin repeatedly tried to restrict investigators' access to embassy files and "even attempted to censor the transfer of General Accounting Office information from Saigon to Washington."

NEW YORK TIMES
2 April 1974

NEW U.S. PLEDGES TO SAIGON DENIED

Administration Contradicts
Charge by Kennedy Based
on a Kissinger-Letter

By DAVID BINDER

Special to the New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 1—An allegation by Senator Edward M. Kennedy that the Nixon Administration had made "new commitments" of support to South Vietnam was denied today by the State Department.

Referring to a letter to Senator Kennedy from Secretary of State Kissinger, the department spokesman, John F. King, said: "It did not state any new commitment. It simply reaffirmed commitments we already have."

Senator Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, had written

Mr. Kissinger March 13 in his capacity as chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Refugees. His letter asked about "existing obligations and commitments" by the United States to the governments in Indochina, including Saigon.

In his reply, dated March 25, Mr. Kissinger said that while "the U. S. has no bilateral written commitment to the Government of the Republic of Vietnam," the objective of American policy "continues to be to help strengthen the conditions which made possible the Paris agreement" on a ceasefire and withdrawal of United States forces.

Mr. Kissinger went on to say that as a signatory of the Paris agreement, the United States committed itself to supporting self-determination for the South Vietnamese people.

"With these commitments in mind," he added, "we provide to the Republic of Vietnam the means necessary for its self-defense and for its economic viability."

Mr. Kissinger said that the United States "derived a certain obligation from our long

and deep involvement in Vietnam." Having invested so heavily in human and material resources, he said, "we have thus committed ourselves very substantially, both politically and morally."

'Disturbing Clarification'

In releasing the correspondence, Senator Kennedy called Mr. Kissinger's response "a welcome but disturbing clarification."

"I am distressed that the Secretary's statement seems to propound a new rationalization for our continued heavy involvement in Indochina," he added.

Senator Kennedy said that it was now apparent the Administration viewed the year-old Paris agreement "as creating new American commitments to South Vietnam."

The agreement, issued in Paris on Jan. 27, 1973, says that a commitment was made by all the signatories to "the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination and to contributing to the consolidation of peace in Asia and the World."

In response to questions at

a press briefing today about how this should be interpreted, Mr. King said, "A legal commitment, no — a moral-political commitment, yes."

Senator Kennedy observed in a statement that "rather than chart a new beginning, the Administration's interpretation of the Paris agreement is perpetuating old relationships and continuing old policies — as if nothing had changed."

In the light of current United States commitments in Indochina, officially estimated at \$3-billion this year, Mr. Kennedy said that this policy was "contrary to the new directions set by Congress last year."

A Kennedy aide estimated total United States spending in Indochina would be closer to \$4-billion in 1974, with nearly \$3-billion going to South Vietnam. He added that Mr. Kissinger's letter represented "a totally new justification" for the involvement that had never been broached before by Mr. Kissinger or other Administration officials.

The aide said that the Senate would probably hold hearings on the American involvement in Vietnam this spring.

NEW YORK TIMES
28 March 1974

NIXON IS ASSAILED ON GROUND RAIDS

Hughes Says Indochina Data
May Show Law Violation

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to the New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 27—Senator Harold E. Hughes declared today that the Senate Armed Services Committee had developed evidence strongly suggesting that President Nixon violated the law by permitting secret ground operations inside Laos and Cambodia.

The Iowa Democrat said the committee, which held public

hearings last summer on the secret B-52 bombing of Cambodia and other activities, had determined that 60 ground operations inside Laos and Cambodia were authorized from early 1970 to the end of the American ground involvement in the Indochina war, in early 1973.

The White House had no immediate comment on Mr. Hughes' remarks.

"What is most disturbing here," Mr. Hughes said in a Senate speech, "is that the Congress had acted, by law, to forbid the introduction of ground combat troops in Laos and Cambodia." He cited the Cooper-Church amendments of 1969 and 1970, which barred the use of United States funds to finance "the introduction of American ground combat troops" into Laos and Cam-

bodia.

Not all the ground operations were solely for intelligence gathering, Senator Hughes said, citing one witness who testified that many of them designated "slam" for "search, locate and annihilate missions."

Investigation Urged

Mr. Hughes said the Pentagon acknowledged that it had authorized 32 ground operations involving a platoon of combat troops or more inside Laos in 1970 and 1971 after Congress banned such activity in December, 1969. The Pentagon also reported the authorization of 31 missions of similar size—some involving 50 to 100 men—inside Cambodia after Congress forbade those operations a year later, the Senator said.

In a subsequent telephone

interview, Mr. Hughes urged that the secret ground operations be investigated as potential Presidential impeachment offenses. "I think this should be pursued by the House Judiciary Committee," the Senator said.

He declared that "there is no doubt of obvious violations of the law" and of the "miscadging" of the American people.

Mr. Hughes noted that the investigation conducted thus far by the Armed Services Committee had failed to develop any specific evidence linking Mr. Nixon personally to the orders for secret ground operations or to the Administration's decision to falsify classified records in 1969 and 1970 to conceal the secret B-52 bombing of Cambodia from the American public.

But in his speech, I Sena-

tor said that "no commander, including the Commander in Chief, should feel free to act beyond the limits of the Constitution or in violation of the law, even if his actions may successfully be concealed for

months or years."

For four months last year the Armed Services Committee investigated the secret B-52 bombing of Cambodia without determining who had authorized the military to keep a

double bookkeeping system for the bombing raids, which were reported inside the military's own communications system as having taken place in South Vietnam.

MAINICHI, Tokyo
21 March 1974

China Turning Again To The Third World?

By S. M. ALI

HONG KONG (Gemini) — While a major shift in Peking's foreign relations as part of the current ideological struggle is generally ruled out, experts here see a few signs of a change of priorities in China's ties with the outside world.

One possibility now visible on the horizon is a switch in Peking's external ties in favor of increased involvement in the Third World. In essence, it is more a matter of emphasis than a question of any fundamental change.

Over the past two decades, China has always acted as an ardent advocate of the Third World, identifying herself with developing nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America. She has backed the concept of national revolution for countries as far apart as South Vietnam and Angola, provided aid to several developing nations and supported a variety of causes associated with the Third World.

During the last two years, however, Peking's main diplomatic preoccupation centered on its détente with the U.S. and Japan and, to a lesser degree, on its efforts to improve economic and political ties with industrialized nations in the West. There were no major developments in China's relations with the Third World nations as such.

Among others, noted Egyptian journalist Hassanin Heikal, who visited Peking for talks with Premier Chou En-lai in mid-1973, noted China's hesitation to make any direct move in the politics of the Third World, especially in the Middle East.

New Priorities

On his return from China, he told me that he felt Peking was too preoccupied with its new priorities — the détente with its one-time enemies like the U.S. and Japan — to pay any direct attention to other areas of world politics.

During the same period, Peking's policy statements on problems in Asia, Africa and Latin America were few and far between. Cautiously worded and moderate in tone, they tended to give the impression that China was too busy with

jecting its image as a responsible world power to get directly involved in the violence-ridden politics of other developing nations.

China watchers here now see signs of a change in Peking's foreign relations, a change that puts increased emphasis on its ties with the Third World. Certain recent developments in Peking's foreign relations seem to support this view.

Two important visitors to China recently were President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and President Houari Boumedienne of Algeria, leading figures of the nonaligned camp. Both were accorded red carpet treatment by the Chinese leadership. Both had fairly long discussions with Chairman Mao.

Revolution

Significantly enough, it was at the banquet given in honor of Dr. Kaunda that Premier Chou made his most significant statement to date on China's new revolutionary objectives and on the present anti-Confucius and anti-Lin Piao ideological battle now going on within the country.

If the Chinese Premier used the occasion to tell the outside world that he was very much with — and not against — the new tide, he also found a good opportunity to assure a black African leader that, notwithstanding the talks of a détente, Peking's differences with the U.S. were fundamental.

Premier Chou's attack on the two superpowers was more direct in his speech at the second banquet during the week, hosted in honor of President Boumedienne. Here, the Chinese leader found the right audience for a major policy statement on the Middle East, the first to come from Peking since Egypt and Israel reached accord over disengagement of their troops.

During the same week, China took a somewhat unusual step of sending a message of goodwill to the Islamic Summit in Lahore, probably in recognition of the fact that, despite its semi-religious character, it was a gathering of 37 Third World nations. According to press re-

ports, the Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan held detailed talks with Premier Bhutto in Lahore before the opening of the summit.

The Chinese envoy's talk with the Pakistani leader probably covered prospects of Pakistan's imminent recognition of Bangladesh which, when announced, was promptly welcomed by Peking. Judging by press reports, both Washington and Moscow remained silent.

Varied Views

China watchers are divided in their interpretation of these events. Some believe that Peking is merely mending its fences with the Third World nations, reiterating its basic sense of solidarity with the resurgent Arab bloc. Others are speculating about the possibility of a major diplomatic offensive to be launched by Peking to regain its once powerful position in the developing world.

Whatever it is, the timing is significant. The Middle East scene is changing fast, with the U.S. and Russia moving ahead to adjust their positions to the newly-emerging power equation in the area. Above all, if all goes according to schedule, the Suez Canal may start operating again within less than a year, offering a new outlet to the Soviet Navy to move into the Indian Ocean.

Instead of putting too much faith into its détente with the U.S. which, as some say, is running out of steam anyway, China might find it more to its advantage to operate through the Third World nations against the so-called hegemony of the superpowers in the Middle East as well as in the Indian Ocean.

At this stage it is difficult to see the relationship between the new ideological struggle inside China and a change of emphasis of Peking's external ties.

At the moment, only one theory — and it is no more than a theory — makes sense. If the anti-Lin Piao struggle develops its hitherto dormant anti-Western bias, especially in ideological and cultural fields, the internal pressures in favor of increased Chinese involvement in the Third World may gain momentum.

WASHINGTON POST
29 March 1974

Eight Koreans Sentenced for Opposing Park

Washington Post Foreign Service

SEOUL, March 28—Eight more Christians were sentenced to prison terms of 3 to 15 years by closed military court-martial today for defying the presidential ban on criticism of the constitution.

In a related development, six students at an American-sponsored Jesuit college here were arrested after demonstrating for freedom of speech and peaceful revision of the constitution.

The students gave themselves up willingly despite the lengthy imprisonment likely to be imposed. "They seemed to be wanting to make a symbol of this," said the college president, the Rev. John Daly.

In a crackdown on growing dissent, President Park Chung Hee issued a decree Jan. 8 banning all opposition to the 1972 martial law constitution which extended his rule indefinitely and vastly increased his power. The decree also banned any proposal or petition for constitutional revision or repeal.

With today's convictions, 34 persons including political and civic leaders, clergymen and university students have now been sentenced to prison terms for defying the Jan. 8 order.

NEW YORK TIMES
24 MAR 1974
20 Years in China

John T. Downey was shot down over China while on a mission for the Central Intelligence Agency in November, 1952, and was kept prisoner there for more than 20 years, until his release a year ago this month.

Mr. Downey, who is 43 years old, is now a first-year student at the Harvard Law School, to which he applied shortly after his return. He said last week of his 20-year ordeal: "I certainly bear no hard feelings."

LEE DEMBART

WASHINGTON POST
2 April 1974

Haydens in Hanoi

Agence France-Presse

HANOI, April 1—American actress Jane Fonda and her husband, pacifist Tom Hayden, arrived here today. It was believed that Miss Fonda was making a film in North Vietnam.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
3 April 1974

China cools on Nixon detente

Premier Chou
mocks 'generation
of peace' thesis,
but doesn't
mention Nixon
by name; says
'revolution and
war are inevitable'

By John Burns

Special to

The Christian Science Monitor
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Peking

Premier Chou En-lai on Monday publicly mocked President Nixon's claim to be laying the foundation for a "generation of peace" — a claim based in part on the efforts Mr. Nixon has made to improve U.S. relations with China.

"The revolutionary people do not at all believe in so-called lasting peace or a generation of peace," Mr. Chou declared. "So long as imperialism exists, revolution and war are inevitable."

The Chinese Premier, speaking at a state banquet for visiting Cambodian Communist leader Khieu Samphan, did not mention Mr. Nixon by name. But the allusion was clear and is bound to be taken as an indication of a new reserve in Peking's attitude toward Washington.

Evidence of cooling
BALTIMORE SUN
22 March 1974

China-watch flourishes at Hong Kong mission

By EDWARD K. WU

Hong Kong Bureau of The Sun

Hong Kong—The American mission of "watching China" from Hong Kong has remained as vital as ever despite the establishment of the United

States Liaison Office in Peking nearly a year ago.

Charles T. Cross, China-born Sinologist and formerly ambassador to Singapore, arrived

In recent months there have been a number of signs that have been interpreted as evidence of a cooling in the amiable relationship that developed after Mr. Nixon's visit here in February, 1972.

U.S. officials claim to have sensed no change, but their position may become more difficult to maintain with Mr. Chou making remarks that are so clearly directed at the White House.

The Premier has up to now generally limited his public references to the U.S. to routine denunciations of its role as a superpower and allusions to unspecified "troubles" on the domestic scene — kid-glove treatment, considering the issues that continue to divide the two governments.

A matter of expedience

In their domestic propaganda, however, the Chinese have always presented the approach to the U.S. as a matter of expedience which does not at all detract from the ultimate inevitability of a clash between the forces of reaction (capitalism) and revolution (communism).

The difference Monday night was that the Premier was saying it publicly, for an international audience.

The easy conclusion would be that this was a response to current internal political pressures in China. But there was no sign in Mr. Chou's demeanor — relaxed, outgoing, and good-humored — that there have been any extraordinary pressures for a change in foreign policy.

Another indication of a shift in attitude was in Mr. Chou's accusation that the South Vietnamese Government has incessantly breached the Paris cease-fire agreement "with the support and instigation," of the U.S. Previously, he had avoided blaming Washington directly for breakdowns in the cease-fire.

References to the U.S. role in Cambodia have never been that guarded, however, and Monday night was no exception. The Premier said that the U.S. has attempted to save the "tottering puppet regime" of Lon Nol with massive economic and military assistance, but asserted that nothing Washington could do would prevent an eventual victory by the

Khmer Rouge insurgent forces.

Mr. Chou also spoke of Peking's determination to continue giving "all-out support and assistance" to the rebels; and Mr. Samphan declared that his forces have "all along received unqualified and sincere support and multiform assistance" from the Chinese.

These latter declarations seemed to contradict Prince Norodom Sihanouk's earlier claims that Chinese and North Vietnamese scruples about the Paris agreement have prevented supplies getting through to the insurgent forces — although there is still no indication whether the Chinese supplies now going to Cambodia include weapons.

Prince Sihanouk, who is based in China, was present at last night's banquet but did not speak.

Ironies appear

The occasion was heavy with irony, for Mr. Samphan was once finance minister in Prince Sihanouk's Phnom Penh government but was condemned to death by the Prince in absentia when he went underground and founded the Khmers Rouges.

When Prince Sihanouk was ousted in the Lon Nol coup of March, 1970, the Chinese were instrumental in forging the coalition between him and the Communists — the so-called Royal Government of National Union — that now claims to control more than 90 percent of Cambodia.

The Prince's role in the government has been largely confined to rounding up diplomatic support while Khieu Samphan wields the real political and military power.

Mr. Samphan's visit to Peking is his first and offers the Chinese leaders an opportunity to size up the man who could one day be the strong man of a Communist Cambodia.

A handsome man in his mid-40's, he made his mark Monday night with a speech in which he stressed the insurgents' determination to fight on until the U.S. ends all forms of assistance to the Phnom Penh government and leaves the Cambodian question for the Cambodians themselves to settle — a formula that does not absolutely rule out a compromise with Lon Nol.

her Wednesday to be the new head of the oversized U.S. Consulate General, which has been the official China-watcher in the last 25 years.

Although many of the U.S. consuls general have moved from here to other countries as ambassadors, this is the first time the reverse has happened.

It is not an unprecedented practice in the Foreign Service. None the less, it did much

to underscore the importance of the consulate here, especially at this time.

When the U.S. Liaison Office was opened in Peking last spring, it was generally thought that it would gradually take over most of the China-watching functions from the consulate. This has not taken place. Though the liaison office does its share within its limited scope, the bulk of China-watching is still done in Hong

Kong, with no sign of appreciable reductions in the consulate staff.

This has become all the more important in view of the present political upheavals in China, known as "The Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius."

China experts here and in Peking are dedicated specialists of the highest caliber, and many of those now assigned to Peking had worked in the consulate here previously.

But each locale has different circumstances under which to work. The liaison office, for

example, has the definite advantage of being there to see and feel things firsthand in its reporting work. But the consulate has at its disposal, to give one example, the vast volumes of Chinese provincial press and radio material for analysis, which are not available to the liaison office.

According to knowledgeable sources, it would be senseless for the liaison office to set up an elaborate machinery to monitor and translate this material when it can be easily done here. What it should do, they said, is what Hong Kong

cannot do.

Apart from Hong Kong, the U.S. missions, in other points of the rim of China are also China-watching, though perhaps in a less concentrated way. A glance at the background of U.S. ambassadors in the region confirms this.

David L. Osborn, who just moved from the consul general's post here to become ambassador to Burma, is a recognized China expert as well as an Asia expert. His three predecessors in Rangoon fall into the same category.

Burma, with a sizable Chi-

nese population and a common border with China, is a good spot for quiet China-watching without the glare of publicity.

Henry A. Byroade, who moved from Manila to Islamabad in Pakistan as ambassador not long ago, was in China and served in Gen. George C. Marshall's mission to mediate in the nationalist-Communist civil war after World War II.

Pakistan, also bordering on China and with good relations with Peking, is another ideal spot from which to watch China.

NATIONAL GUARDIAN 3 April 1974 *U.S. steps up aid to Philippines*

Manila, another Saigon?

By FELIX RAZON

As the people drift back to the charred remains of Jolo city in the southern Philippines, scores of U.S. military and civilian "advisers" are descending on the area.

The town, inhabited by more than 40,000 people at the beginning of this year, is the historic center of Muslim civilization in this part of the Philippines and the commercial center of the Jolo island chain. In February, nearly all of it was burned to the ground. Eyewitnesses say that troops sent by Ferdinand Marcos, the Philippine dictator, set the fires deliberately and kept them going with artillery barrages, in an effort to deprive the Muslim insurgent forces in the town of the friendly cover and support provided by the population.

New York Times reporter Sidney Schanberg, visiting the ruined site a month after the battle, talked to the people who were trying to build up their lives again. He found that "most are, if not active supporters of the rebel cause, at least a silent rebel majority."

Despite the widespread unpopularity and insecurity of the martial law regime imposed by Marcos, the U.S. government has committed its resources to propping up this dictatorship. The appearance of U.S. "Civic Action" teams, police "advisers," members of "research" groups and other U.S. government personnel in Jolo and in nearby Mindanao, reported in the Philippines underground press, has increased the government's growing involvement. It is a

pattern that was molded not far from the Philippines, in Vietnam.

There are 40-man teams of Special Forces personnel scattered throughout the Philippines at spots where the liberation forces are making new inroads. Other U.S. operatives are training Filipino counterinsurgency commandos, remodeling the police forces or gathering intelligence. Five major U.S. military bases back up the operation, which is fueled by outpourings of U.S. dollars and military supplies.

At stake is the survival of the Philippine dictatorship of President Ferdinand Marcos, together with the Philippine properties of about 800 U.S. corporations. The Philippines are key to the general U.S. strategy for the Pacific Rim area.

FIRST U.S. CASUALTIES?

Already by March of last year, 25 U.S. Army personnel had been killed in combat by the New People's Army, the military arm of the Communist party, which is leading the insurrection in most areas and has close fraternal ties with the Muslim rebellion in Jolo and Mindanao. Will these 25 be the first entries in another roll of U.S. troops killed in another land war in Asia?

U.S. involvement in attempting to suppress insurgency in the Philippines goes back, of course, before the turn of the century. The modern phase of that involvement, however, began in the late 1940s and early 1950s when Col. Edward Lansdale, the CIA "brain" behind the Special Forces program, supervised the permanent installation of a team of about 65 officers called the Joint U.S.-Philippine Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG), which commanded the Philippine armed forces in fighting the Huk rebellion.

One of JUSMAG's tasks today is to direct the so-called Civic Action teams. A force of 182 Filipino and U.S. soldiers, under the "Civic Action" banner, helicoptered in mid-February to nine villages in the rebellious areas of Bataan and Zambales, scenes of fierce fighting between the Philippine government and the New Peoples Army. The force, commanded by Maj. Ralph Brunner, attempted to zone off the barrioes of Zambales and is using psychological warfare, terrorism and bribery against the cultural minorities, the jungle tribes of the area, who have long cooperated with the guerrillas.

from Okinawa last April to conduct

operations in areas of Luzon where the NPA has liberated villages and towns. Zamboanga, the city to which many of the 30,000 residents of Jolo City were evacuated after government shelling and arson destroyed nine-tenths of their homes, is another area where a "Civic Action" team has been operating for about a year. Insurgent Muslim forces there have occupied rubber plantations owned by B.F. Goodrich and Goodyear.

Advertised as engaging in development services in the area of health and sanitation, the "Civic Action" groups are in reality little else than the old Green Beret units of Vietnam in a new disguise. They are tools of government propaganda, repression and "pacification."

"Those guys are volatile," said one U.S. officer last September about the CA teams. "Most of them have been in Vietnam. Now that the fun there is over, they have to be unleashed once in a while."

At first, the U.S. fielded relatively small 40-man CA teams in island provinces like Palawan and Bohol, with the idea of maintaining a low profile. By last spring, however, larger forces were required. U.S. Special Forces last April landed 600 troops in Panay and 150 in Capiz province, where the NPA has wiped out repeated government campaigns. On April 6, according to the Philippine underground newspaper, *Liberation*, three U.S. Hercules transport planes landed in Roxas city and disgorged U.S. soldiers, arms, ammunition, jeeps, trucks, weapons carriers and assorted equipment. This intervention of U.S. forces is a sign that the Philippine government's own forces have been unable to contain the liberation struggle in Panay, where the NPA has found roots among the sugar-cane cutters, landless peasants and laborers in the sugar and coconut plantations with their oppressive, feudal-like conditions.

The amounts of money spent by the U.S. to maintain such operations are not trivial. From 1950 to 1969, the Philippines received a total of \$527 million in military aid, far more than all the countries of Africa received during the same period. The Philippines have received more military dollars than any country of Latin America, including Brazil.

An important U.S. activity in the Philippines is the training of Filipino army personnel. Here too the numbers reveal an important involvement: 12,961 Filipino army personnel trained by JF'SMAG between 1950 and 1969, more than twice as many as in all Africa, and twice as many as in Brazil. The number of Filipino trainees also exceeded those in Thailand, Iran, Indonesia, Jordan and other Asian and Middle Eastern "trouble spots."

"PACIFIC RIM" STRATEGY

Five major military bases make the Philippines a vital position in U.S. imperialism's "Pacific Rim strategy," the plan for the economic and military domination of Southeast Asia and the whole Pacific. Clark Air Force base, headquarters of the 11th Air Force, occupying 131,000 acres in four Philippine provinces, is the biggest U.S. military base on foreign soil. It

was a key staging area for the air war in Indochina, a base for refueling B-52s and for jungle warfare training camps, a major maintenance depot and a base hospital. The Subic Bay Naval base is headquarters for the entire U.S. 7th Fleet in the Pacific and for a nuclear submarine base with the biggest naval ordnance depot in Asia.

These major bases contain about 22,000 U.S. military personnel, plus 1400 civilian U.S. employees. Nearly 50,000 Filipinos are hired by the bases. The payroll for the Filipino base workers alone amounts to \$150 million annually, more than the total Philippine defense budget.

Although the number of U.S. troops now stationed in the Philippines is smaller than during the Vietnam war, it is increasing daily as the U.S. contingent from Okinawa is being transferred to the Philippines. The 20,000 U.S. troops now in the country greatly outnumber the forces stationed in Taiwan at the height of U.S.-Chiang Kai-shek relations and is several times larger than the forces stationed last year in Greece and Turkey, both forward posts of NATO.

ADVISERS AND MERCENARIES

Shortly after becoming President in 1966, Marcos arranged with the U.S. embassy a program of police training completely controlled by the Office of Public Safety of the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID). It was supervised by a U.S. official, Frank Walton, who had earlier set up and expanded the police forces of South Vietnam and mobilized them for their counterinsurgency and paramilitary role. Since its start, AID has equipped nine regional police training academies and set up 30 police communications networks. Some 17,500 police officers, according to an AID staff report, have gone through special training courses and 255 of them were sent to the International Police Academy in Washington, where Thieu's police officials in Saigon also received their credentials.

An extension of the police training program in the cities—\$530,000 was spent on the Manila police alone in 1973 by AID—is AID's new Provincial Development Assistance Project. This operation, which cost \$4 million last year, sets up a network of U.S. civilian advisers, generally thought to be supplied by the CIA, who are attached to Filipino provincial administrative officers in areas where the insurgencies led by the NPA and the Muslim revolutionary forces are the most advanced.

According to the journalist Tad Szulc writing in the *New Republic* last year, this project is staffed by former officials of the notorious Vietnamese Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program (CORDS), which was jointly run by the CIA, AID and the Pentagon and was considered the main "pacification" tool in Vietnam. The project is headed by Thomas Rose, who served as AID's public administration chief in Saigon, and by Richard Kriegel, the former CORDS provincial adviser in Vietnam's Binh Dinh province. Eight former CORDS specialists have already been given posts as advisers in such areas as Central Luzon, Cotabato, Zamboanga and the Sulu Islands where most of the recent fighting has taken place.

Western Hemisphere

THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
20 March 1974

US policy making is subordinated to the interests of the largest corporations, many of which have invested heavily in South America, reports CHRISTOPHER ROPER

Latin lesson misconstrued?

AT A congressional conference on the implications of Chile for United States foreign policy late last month, Senator Edward Kennedy appealed almost desperately to the assembled academics and former diplomats for suggestions how a more constructive policy might be formulated.

Most of those present were critical of US policies, and the Chilean military junta had few defenders: the best anyone could say was that the rôle of the United States had been exaggerated. But no one put forward any credible alternatives.

Senator Kennedy, from the safety of opposition, is better advised on Latin American affairs than any other member of either chamber of congress, but he gets little political mileage from his campaign for the recognition of Cuba, or his attacks on the bloody repression in Chile.

This is because the Right dislikes his interventions, and the Left suspects that they cannot be translated into action — even should the senator from Massachusetts one day be President of the United States.

In his most recent statement on the need for normal relations with Cuba, made to the Senate on February 9, Senator Kennedy did not mention the question of the Guantanamo naval base, which the US still maintains as an enclave on Cuban soil.

The Cubans have always made its evacuation a precondition of any negotiations with the US. Guantanamo, like the military bases in Panama, is probably outside the effective jurisdiction of either the President or the US Congress.

Quite apart from the limits set by the Pentagon on changing the basis of inter-American relationships, no one has any useful suggestions how policy making might escape from its present subordination to the commercial interests of the largest US corporations, many of which have invested heavily in Latin America.

Professor Richard Fagen, of Stanford Fagen, of Stanford University, president of the Latin American Studies Association, and one of the most articulate liberal critics of US policies, has made some concrete suggestions, but admits the improbability of their implementation.

High on his list came a recommendation that investors' claims for compensation be dissociated from all official US actions overseas. National

corporations must seek resolution of differences through direct negotiation with the Governments concerned.

The suggestion has been criticised on two grounds. In the first place, it is not just the conduct of foreign policy, but almost every aspect of the US Government, which is deeply penetrated by corporate interests.

During senate hearings last year into the activities of the International Telephone and Telegraph Company in Chile, William Merriam — an ITT executive — was questioned about a meeting between executives of Anaconda, Kennecott, Grace, Pfizer, Ralston Purina and ITT, to discuss the Chilean question.

He dismissed the suggestion that there was anything abnormal about the meeting, which had discussed liaison with the CIA and Henry Kissinger — then with the National Security Council — with a quip to the effect that such meetings of corporate ad hoc committees were a way of life in Washington.

And secondly, there is no country in the world which divorces foreign policy from commercial considerations — certainly not the Chinese or the Russians. There is no reason to suppose the United States will ever be an exception to this rule. The lamentable fact is the US commerce as a private sector affair and so US foreign policy is necessarily entwined with corporate interests.

In fact, real misunderstandings may have arisen in the public mind as a result of ITT's well-publicised rôle in attempting to encompass the downfall of President Allende in Chile.

The episode is today presented — or rather dismissed — by State Department spokesmen as one or two unfruitful meetings between ITT lobbyists and the CIA during the autumn of 1970. Some even go so far as to deplore ITT's initiatives, which they imply were far from the norm of corporate behaviour.

But the hearings almost a year ago before the Senate subcommittee on multinational corporations suggest that many corporations were involved and all shared ITT's determination to bring Allende down.

Furthermore, Henry Kissinger was involved at a very early stage. An Argentine banker of Cuban origins, now working in London for a multinational banking group, has told acquaintances how he met Augustin Edwards — the unchallenged leader of the Chilean

Buenos Aires a month before the elections in 1970, from which Allende emerged victorious.

He warned Edwards that precautions against an Allende victory could be taken. He suggested "the Brazilians are the people who know how to handle this kind of thing."

After the elections on September 4, the banker flew to Santiago to see Edwards and then to Washington to discuss the matter with Kissinger. On September 16 Dr Kissinger gave a now famous "off-the-record" press briefing, in which he described Allende's success in the elections as a severe setback for the US in Latin America, and almost openly invited the Chilean armed forces to prevent his accession.

Dr Kissinger took the line that the accession of a Socialist President in Chile could have had a domino effect on Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru.

From these early beginnings, two lines may be usefully followed. The first is the now admitted fact that Brazilian interests gave substantial assistance to the engineering of last September's military coup. This was documented in great detail in a report which appeared in the Washington Post in January of this year.

And secondly, it was notable that Dr Kissinger did not feel ready to take new initiatives in Latin America until after the Allende Government had been overthrown.

The main outlines of this new policy were given by President Nixon as long ago as October 31, 1969, when he told the Inter American Press Association of his plans for "reshaping and reinvigorating" the inter-American alliance.

The reshaped alliance was to give greater weight to the wishes of the Latin Americans, would depend on trade rather than aid, and would be characterised by a lower profile on the part of the US.

Dr Kissinger has long been anxious to establish a new consensus in Latin America, removing wherever possible old bones of contention. It is probably positive, in this regard, that real efforts have been made to improve relations with Panama and Peru. But it would be an exaggeration to say that the US relations with these countries had undergone a fundamental change.

Both Governments were shaken by the coup in Chile, and both are under pressure from Argentinian forces which

have the backing of both private interests in the US, and probably of covert agencies.

No attempt has been made to tackle the Cuban question. Dr Kissinger has been at pains to play it down, and to bypass it. There has been a shift in Washington to the extent that fewer efforts are being made to prevent trade with Cuba, but the question is far less urgent with Chile out of the way.

Chile was virtually the only country, apart from Cuba, which proclaimed a model of development running sharply counter to that approved in Washington. There was no question of being able to exclude Chile, as Cuba had been excluded almost 10 years before, from the inter-American system.

So long as the Unidad Popular Government was present in the various forums and agencies, in which hemispheric policies were discussed, other countries were liable to follow Chile's lead into areas in which they would not themselves have led. This is why, today, so much of the propaganda is aimed not at proving Allende to have been a "Communist" as to proving that his policies had been a disastrous failure.

This in itself is a measure of how things have changed since the Cuban revolution, when thousands of words were expended on the debate as to whether Castro was, or was not, a Marxist.

NEW YORK TIMES
28 March 1974

BRITISH END ARMS AND AID TO CHILE

London Says It Wants to
See Restoration of Rights

Special to The New York Times

LONDON, March 27—Britain announced today that she would sell no more arms to Chile and would suspend economic aid.

Foreign Secretary James Callaghan told the House of Commons that his policy toward the military junta would be governed "by a desire to see democracy restored and human rights fully respected in Chile."

The Labor party cabinet also underscored its disapproval of the Greek military Government.

Mr. Callaghan, Minister of

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
4 April 1974

Chilean junta censors traditional free press

Foreign reporters detained, denied entry

By the Latin American correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Santiago, Chile

Marcel Niedergang, the Latin America specialist of the Paris newspaper *Le Monde*, was recently denied entry here at Pudahuel International Airport.

The incident, coming on the heels of a several day detention of a British newsman, George Roth, correspondent for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, is fresh evidence, say observers here, that Chile's new military government is smarting from overseas criticism and has become suspicious of foreign newsmen.

For *Le Monde*, however, the Niedergang incident suggested that Chile's military were trying to hide something. "When a government refuses entry to a journalist," the paper asked, "how can one not conclude that it has something — perhaps many things — to hide?"

Whatever the reason, the denial of entry to Mr. Niedergang is another example of the Chilean military junta's attitude toward the press and toward newsmen. At home, the junta has muzzled the few remaining newspapers, radio stations, and television channels — putting them all under stiff censorship.

There was a time when Santiago's newspapers were the most freewheeling, controversial, and entertaining papers in all of Latin America. But that was before the military came to power last September, overthrowing the Marxist government of Salvador Allende Gossens.

The military immediately closed five newspapers that had supported Dr. Allende, including the Communist Party's *El Siglo* and the highly politicized *Puro Chile*, which represented an extremely leftist point of view.

Two other papers have folded since then — the rightist *La Tribuna*, which the military closed for publishing a story that later proved false, and *La Prensa*, official organ of the centrist Christian Democratic Party, Chile's largest. *La Prensa* was closed down by its publishers since it was under heavy censorship, and "there seems no point in putting out a political newspaper when politics are banned," as a spokesman said.

Only five still publish

That leaves only five papers now publishing — three put out by the

conservative *El Mercurio* organization, *La Patria* (which uses the presses of the onetime *La Nacion*, the government paper), and *La Tercera de la Hora*, a tabloid with the largest circulation in Chile, about 400,000 copies daily.

Instead of the lively, controversial press of earlier days, these five papers are "in some ways very little more than house organs for the military," as a local newspaper here put it. "They certainly are not newspapers doing the job that newspapers ought to do — searching for the truth. They merely print whatever the government permits them to print."

The same is true for the radio and television stations and for magazines. *Ercilla*, a weekly newsmagazine long considered one of Latin America's best, is read by censors before it goes on the newsstands.

Page torn out

Another magazine here appeared recently with a page torn out — pulled out by the military censors.

The military-imposed censorship prohibits stories critical of the military, those that mention price increases not announced by the government, and those about members of the Allende government unless the information has been officially released. All mention of politics is taboo.

Military officials here are reluctant to give reasons for the censorship. But one officer said some days ago that "we are going to restructure the country, and we can't have criticism."

Chileans, long accustomed to freedom of expression, are beginning to resent such attitudes, and some observers here think the resentment will grow with time.

Luggage searched

Back in September, soon after the military took over, newsmen entering Chile had their luggage searched for any material — clippings, notes, etc. — dealing with Chile. It was removed and customs personnel refused to give receipts for it, and the material was never returned. That does not happen now, but customs personnel say the mechanism for reinstating the practice exists.

In Mr. Niedergang's case, he never got as far as customs. He was told at immigration that he could not enter the country, even though he had been told by the Chilean Embassy in Paris that he was welcome. Mr. Niedergang subsequently caught the next plane for Buenos Aires.

State in the Foreign Office, told the Commons that restoration of democracy in Greece would advance the long-stalled negotiations on Britain's adherence to the Treaty of Association between Greece and the European Economic Community.

Within a few days of taking office, the Government canceled a visit to Greece of a British naval squadron.

The action against Chile involves one frigate and two submarines, ordered in 1969. Economic aid and technical assistance to Chile in the last six months amounts to about \$2-million.

Political Impact Seen

Special to The New York Times

SANTIAGO, Chile March 27

The end of British aid to Chile will have little economic impact since it involves only about \$9-million annually in technical assistance — mostly technical and professional training programs.

But politically, it will add to the sense of international disapproval and isolation that the junta has felt here in the aftermath of the coup and the frequent charges of violations of human rights.

The refusal of the new British Government to permit further arms sales may halt the delivery of two destroyers and two submarines to the Chilean Navy. The Chilean Air Force has also depended heavily on British jet fighter-bombers. Six of those planes were recently delivered to the junta to complete an order of 39 Hawker-Hunter planes contracted in the nineteen sixties by the government of Eduardo Frei Montalva.

The only official response to the British announcement was a statement earlier today by Federico Willoughby, the press secretary for the junta, who said: "No official statement has been received from the British Government that would alter in any form the traditional bonds of friendship between our people and their government."

BALTIMORE SUN
31 March 1974

Brazil: Time to cut the cake?

By RICHARD P. O'MARA

Rio de Janeiro.

Gen. Ernesto Geisel, an inscrutable, 65-year-old soldier, was inaugurated president of Brazil two weeks ago in a ceremony characterized chiefly by its efficiency. Pomp there was, but the human ostentation and magnificence strived for was diminished by the sterile atmosphere and emptiness of modern Brasilia. This country's hinterland capital. Asked for a single word to describe the inauguration, a foreigner would do well to choose "controlled."

Exactly 10 years ago today the Brazilian military took complete charge of their country's destiny after a bloodless coup d'etat against the civilian government of President Joao Goulart. They have been in control ever since, firm control.

Much has happened during those 10 years. Though the government remains rigidly praetorian, a system has developed for transferring presidential power peacefully, no small achievement in

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Latin America. The country is also inclined toward leaders of quiet competence, rather than flamboyant caudillos. This is another anomaly within the context of Latin America. General Geisel, though a different man from the three military presidents who preceded him since 1964, shares their distaste for personal display and demagoguery.

The rulers of Brazil these past 10 years have projected a double image of their country upon the world: one is positive, healthy; the other negative, degenerate.

Thousands of Americans, Europeans and Latin Americans see Brazil as the land of torturers. Much has occurred to give substance to this image: corroborated testimony from victims of the torturers, refugees from the "parrot's perch," the electric shock implements. There have been many witnesses to, and victims of, degrading violence in dark police dungeons.

Today Brazilians have few rights. They enjoy no institutional protections from arbitrary abuse by the authorities. They cannot select their leaders. Workers dare not strike. Journalists criticize only indirectly, then timorously, for they have reason to fear. The press, radio and television, is censored. For that reason, Brazilians live in a bubble, hearing little bad about their country. They are told only of its successes, which are, in truth, many. Through a pervasive propaganda campaign, they are persuaded that Brazil is not only changing into a modern nation, but into a world power.

Whatever the reason: the nationalistic propaganda, the lack of alternatives, the economic success, or because they are basically patriots, Brazilians generally support their government.

To give the revolutionaries of 1964 the benefit of the doubt, probably they did not intend to implant such a totalitarian system. And the question has never really been answered whether it was necessary. Could they have achieved what they wanted without the torture, the institutional terror, the general disregard of inherent human rights? The question now may be moot, but certainly it is clear they did achieve, or are in the process of achieving, what they intended.

Brazil was in such chaos in 1964 that many Brazilians welcomed the military intervention. President Goulart was thoroughly irresponsible. He virtually destroyed the economy, allowed inflation to approach 100 per cent. He perversely sought to exacerbate social tensions, and even tried to sow discord within the army. The latter, according to Alfred Stephan, one of the foremost American experts on the Brazilian military, was his undoing.

The coup of 1964, the deposition of "Jango" Goulart, was not to be a corrective intervention, as so many of its original supporters had expected. Marshall Humberto Castelo Branco and his colleagues had long-range plans for Brazil.

At the outset, President Castelo Branco imposed harsh austerity. Wages were frozen. Debts (which were enormous) were renegotiated or paid. Inflation was dampened. This period endured until 1967. Of it, Mario Henrique Simonsen, President Geisel's new finance minister and the brightest among Brazil's new crop of technocrats, wrote:

"Without doubt, the first cause of the so-called [Brazilian] miracle lay in the efforts at restoration implemented between 1964 and 1967. . . . The explosive growth that we have seen since 1968 is, in good part, the fruits of the sacrifices made during the government of Castelo Branco."

The economic story of Brazil from 1968 through 1973 is well known. Annual growth rates have run over 10 per cent, the highest of any major country in the world. Capital from the United States, Europe and Japan has poured into Brazil. Profits are up. Jobs are plentiful. And Brazil's growth has been broad-based, with significant investment in roads and heavy industry.

In the decade 1963-1972, for instance, the number of miles of paved highways increased by 153 per cent. Steel production grew by 132 per cent, cement output by 161 per cent. The automobile industry expanded by 248 per cent, while the country's electric energy capacity more than doubled. More important, perhaps, Brazil's exports grew by 183 per cent during 1963-1972. Last year was

the biggest ever, with earnings of \$6.2 billion, about a third of which was from manufactured goods.

But not everyone has shared in the prosperity, and this, along with the ongoing political repression, is the other persistent criticism of the men who run Brazil today.

According to an economist attached to the influential Getulio Vargas Foundation here (and who for obvious reasons preferred to remain anonymous), "wages are kept low for both economic and political reasons." In the first place, he explained, low wages mean big profits, and big profits encourage further capital investment. In the second place, he said, low wages mean depressed aspirations. The idea seems to be that rising wages whet appetites for more. The minimum wage, that earned by around 50 per cent of the population, averages under \$60 a month. Brazil is one of the most expensive countries in Latin America. Life in Rio or Sao Paulo, for instance, is much more costly than, say, in Baltimore.

The image, at first glance, looks harsh. There is something ostensibly inhumane about a government that practices intense political repression, and at the same time encourages the sort of primitive capitalism that makes the rich richer and the poor poorer. Statistics found in Mr. Simonsen's book, "Brasil, 2002," show that the rich of Brazil are getting richer a lot faster and the poor are improving their lot. In fact, there is some argument over whether they are improving at all, since the buying power of workers salaries has been deteriorating in recent years.

It should be said in the government's favor, that the percentage of investment in education increased dramatically in the 1963-1972 decade. And the numbers of students at primary, secondary and university levels are up by 56 per cent, 208 per cent and 460 per cent, respectively. Expenditures in real terms are not high, however. Also, investment in most other social areas such as housing and public health is not impressive.

The philosophy that guides the men who have run Brazil these past 10 years tells them that the only way a country can work its way from the Third World into the developed world is to allow the wealth to concentrate in the hands of the few. Only then will it be used to further the country's economic development.

"Distributivism," the economy minister, Mr. Simonsen, believes, was the undoing of the Socialist government in Chile. Policies that tend to distribute or spread the country's earnings out among a greater number of people, he concedes, stimulate development. It is both complicated and simple, and Brazilians have a metaphor they like to use to explain their approach. It has to do with an imaginary cake.

According to the metaphor, the Brazilian government is in the process of taking a cake and cutting a modern econ-

amy). Before the cake can be cut and divided among the hungry onlookers, it must be permitted to swell to a certain size. To distribute it prematurely would satisfy no one. Brazilians, then, are encouraged to endure their hunger until their cake is big enough, and they find a way to distribute it. Some believe the government has no intention of ever initiating a distribution of wealth, for that would slow growth and restrain Brazil's surge toward great-power status.

The desire to cast a long shadow across the world is very strong among Brazil's leaders. One observer here described it as "the mystique of greatness." Those entranced by it do not see Brazil's future as one of a medium power, such as England and France. They hope to fly with the superpowers.

Whether those who entertain these grandiose ambitions are in the majority among Brazil's ruling elite is hard to say. Whatever, the ambition is probably illusory. Brazil, impressive though its potential and growth, is not in complete control of its own destiny.

"For years we have been favored by the international situation," said one former government minister, and new member of the Foreign Office. "Economically, Chile, Argentina, most of Latin America, was a mess, with high inflation and economic disorder. Here there was economic stability.

"Politically, things abroad were worse. There were student and racial riots in the United States. Assassinations. Last year Watergate began. Argentina? Chile? Chaos. Here there was stability."

Now the world's troubles are starting to impinge. The high costs of petroleum and other raw materials are straining Brazil's exchange reserves, and could throttle development. Internal inflation is high. Brazilians are finding it harder

to make ends meet.

There is still stability, but there is also a perceptible undercurrent of discontent and uneasiness. These apprehensions grow out of the fear that the economic situation might worsen, that the masterful technocrats could lose control. Brazil has a history of inflation. It is a recurring disease, and the fear of it and the insecurity it always provokes is never far from the surface.

Also, the political aspirations of the Brazilians, though suppressed these past 10 years, have been reviving in recent months. Expectations for a political liberalization were at their highest in Brasilia on March 15. Brazilians have invested General Geisel with a thousand hopes—hopes that he will end the torture, modify the censorship, return a modicum of power to the people through legitimate representatives, and attend to some of the needs of the country in health, housing, education.

The political and economic dimensions of the situations in modern Brazil are inseparable. The stability of one was necessary to the other. Big-time American and European capitalists have always said that the imposed political stability made the economic prosperity possible. Now a peculiar reversal has occurred: more and more people are coming to the conviction that political stability can only endure here as long as the prosperity lasts. In other words, inflation emerges as a potential political problem as well as an economic one. Last year inflation nearly reached 20 per cent. In 1974, it is expected to climb higher.

Brazil's immediate future, then, depends on President Geisel's willingness to accept this proposition. As the economic pressure on the people intensifies, relief must be allowed in other areas. Once the technocrats are revealed as fallible, as an economic downturn would

indicate, demands will grow among those now outside the decision-making circle, for entry.

Since becoming president, General Geisel has stimulated the hopes that a political liberalization is in the offing, in his first speech after getting down to the work of governing, he promised "sincere efforts for the gradual, but secure, perfecting of democracy..." It offered much to hang hope on.

But even before the speech, President Geisel took an action which hinted at least that attention would be paid to the social aspects of development. He elevated the social security administration, INPS, to a full-scale ministry. Virtually all Brazil's medical and welfare programs are in this ministry and now it will have more clout.

In the same speech, President Geisel said that the government would continue to wield its "special instruments" to "maintain an atmosphere of security and order." "Special instruments" is the euphemism for the repressive laws—particularly Institutional Act Number 5—which permit the government to do anything it wants to do.

Still, two weeks after the inauguration, precisely on the tenth anniversary of the revolution, the outlook remains optimistic. There is more commentary in the press. The new war minister has promised an army "with a firmer democratic vocation." Everywhere people see, and continue to search for, good signs.

The Brazilian people want economic development, but they also want social and political development. Over the past 10 years, they have had much of the former and little of the latter. Many of them are coming to the conclusion that Brazil's future will be brighter, more secure even, if this order of priorities is tilted a little in the other direction.

NEW YORK TIMES
3 April 1974

Latins Accuse U. S. Of Hinderin Loans By Regional Bank

By JONATHAN KANDELL
Special to the New York Times

SANTIAGO, Chile, April 2—Peru and Venezuela today criticized the continued power of the United States to veto loans granted by the Inter-American Development Bank and complained that the American Congress had failed to approve further funds for that institution.

The comments by the Peruvian and Venezuelan Finance Ministers were made here at the annual meeting of the Inter-American Development Bank, which includes 24 nations in the hemisphere and has become the prime source of public development funds.

At issue is what a number of nations allege to be the continuing dominance of the United States in the disbursement of so-called soft loans—money lent at 2 or 3 per cent interest.

Such loans can be granted only with a two-thirds vote in the Inter-American Bank, with voting based on shares of its capital. The United States, which holds about 39 per cent, enjoys veto power.

Guillermo Marco del Pont, the Peruvian Finance Minister, asserted that "powerful lobbies" representing multinational corporations had tried to "restrict and condition the free use of the bank's resources" when disagreements arose between the United States and Latin-American countries over expropriations.

Responding for the United States, the Secretary of the Treasury, George Shultz, noted that "if we cannot feel secure from expropriation, and certainly from expropriation without just compensation, you will not have a flow of capital—private or public." He said he was hopeful that Congress would yet approve more funds for the bank.

Hector Hurtado, the Venezuelan Finance Minister, said the delay in Congressional approval "has placed the bank in a situation of uncertainty with respect to the availability of its resources."